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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
Professor O'Flaherty, descended, as his name attests, from a 
loyal Irish race, became by a trick of fortune a Protestant, where-
as I, descended from Scottish Covenanters, have become a Catholic 
of sorts. In spite of our excentric trajectories, we were brought 
into conjunction by our interest in Hamann, and are united all 
the more closely because, so far as we can tell, few other Ameri-
cans have shown an interest in this great man. But we have 
reason to hope that such celebrity as accrues to us by reason of our 
singular interest will not be lasting, for Hamann will not always 
be forgotten. Now, a century and a half after his death, Profes-
sor Nadler of the University of Vienna has just published :i 
new biography which interprets Hamann as "The Witness of 
the Corpus Mysticum," and has commenced to publish in five 
volumes the most complete edition of his works and letters. It is 
vain to contend, like Michael and the devil, about the body of 
Hamann; for this good Protestant was buried as a good Catholic 
in the garden of Princess Gallitzin, where in the company of her 
pious court he had enjoyed "a foretaste of heaven", and upon 
his tomb was appropriately written simply "A Christian man." 
Professor O'Flaherty insists that my ,Pamphlet, "Johann 
Georg Hamann," published in 1950 by the Princeton Theological 
Seminary, is worth more than his Dissertation; but with the 
perfervidum ingenium Scottorum (to use Tacitus' characteri-
zation of my race which is easily roused to anger) I protest that 
it is far easier to write, as I have done, a sketch of this strange 
man's life than to illuminate, as he has done, the thought of 
the most enigmatic writer since Lao-tze and Herakleitos. 
I was attracted to Hamann by Kierkegaard's admiration for 
him, which was expressed in the Journal by the exclamation, 
"Emperor!" on the occasion of his first encounter with this great 
man-as Napoleon had instructed his lackies to shout when 
they threw open before him the double doors, de par in par, 
as the Spanish say. Later I was struck by the admiration Goethe 
expressed for the Magus of the North, his polar opposite in mat-
ters of faith. And because of the candor and generosity he showed 
in this instance I form a loftier estimate of Goethe than ever 
before. "Deep calleth unto deep"-Sag' welch ist tiefer! ex-
claimed RUckert. 
Walter Lowrie 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
September 12, 1951. 
INTRODUCTION 
When the intellectual history of the first half of the twentieth 
century is written, scholars will most certainly call attention to 
the extraordinary attempt in this period- and that in the most 
diverse quarters-to understand the peculiar role which language 
plays in the cognitive process. In order to note this emphasis one 
need but call to mind developments in several areas, e.g., the 
contemporary concern of the physicist with the validity of his 
mathematico-physical symbolism for the interpretation of real-
ity; the flourishing growth of positivistic semantics; the current 
Soviet linguistic controversy (in which even Joseph Stalin appears 
in the guise of linguistic philosopher ! ) ; and finally the focussing 
of theological attention upon the word apparent on the one hand 
in the development of form-criticism and on the other hand in 
the emergence of the dialectical theology. Whether this general 
concern with various types of linguistic symbolism bespeaks 
an intellectual climate more fruitful than that which produced 
the medieval schoolman's debates about universals and particulars 
remains to be seen. But the emergence of this phenomenon in the 
first half of the twentieth century is a fact beyond dispute. 
In such a period as this it is not at all strange that interest 
in Johann Georg Hamann should revive. For Hamann is pre-
eminently the philosopher of language. Whatever divergent rami-
fications his thought may have-and they are many-the source 
of all that is most positive in his thinking is to be found in his 
philosophy of language. Hamann is not easy to interpret. Indeed, 
those who are even slightly familiar with his writings may feel 
that to put it this way is to make a classic understatement. But 
much that Hamann has to say can be understood, and this is suf-
ficiently important to warrant attention. For better or worse, 
the day when Hamann, the so-called "Magus of the North," could 
be contemptuously dismissed as an obscurantist has passed. For a 
thinker who defied the philosophic conventions of his time, and 
faced squarely the problem of the relation of thought and language 
speaks in a more contemporary idiom than those of his compeers 
who ignored the problem or gave it but insignificant attention. 
In this study no attempt has been made to establish Hamann 
as a present-day oracle. I have rather undertaken to discover the 
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major outlines of his thought and to determine the extent to 
which it yields permanently valid insights. It will be seen that 
Hamann was in many ways a child of the eighteenth century. 
But it will also be seen, I believe, that what he has to say is of 
more abiding value than many critics have supposed. 
The basal importance of Hamann's concept of unity for an 
understanding of his thought has long been recognized. Thus 
Goethe wrote nearly a century and a half ago in the twelfth 
book of his autobiography: "The main principle to which all 
Hamann's statements may be referred is the following: 'All 
that a man undertakes to perform, whether by deed or word 
or otherwise, must proceed from all his powers united; everything 
isolated is worthless' ."1 From one point of view this dictum may 
be accepted as an adequate statement of Hamann's main prin-
ciple. Not only does he frequently state that he is interested in 
"nothing but the whole,"2 but he repeatedly protests against the 
tendency of the rationalistic philosophers to destroy what he 
conceived to be the essential unity of existence. "The philosophers 
have always given truth a bill of divorcement," he wrote, "in 
that they have put asunder that which nature has joined together, 
and vice versa."3 The complaint against the divisive tendency 
of reason is one of the most frequent refrains of the Hamannian 
writings, and indeed it underscores his demand for unity more 
tffectively than his positive statements concerning the impor-
tance of the whole. 
That the disagreement as to how Hamann's concept of unity 
should be understood is still very great, however, is attested 
by the fact that in recent years it has been interpreted on the 
one hand in terms of axiological theory4 and on the other hand 
in terms of existential philosophy.5 In spite of the acknowledged 
centrality of this concept in Hamann's philosophy, no systematic 
treatment of it has appeared up to the present time. This is par-
ticularly unfortunate, since a relegation of it to the background 
has the invariable result that, in one way or another, it obtrudes 
itself upon the discussion. Thus nothing is gained by the refusal 
to come to terms directly with this central idea. 
The emphasis upon the importance of the concept of unity 
should not, however, be construed to mean that there is one prin-
ciple which illuminates all areas of Hamann's thought. Such a 
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claim would do violence to both the letter and spirit of his philo-
sophy. Yet it may be asserted with confidence that, if one prin-
ciple were to be singled out as most nearly definitive for his 
thought, it should have to be the principle of unity. Therefore, one 
cannot in the last resort quarrel with Goethe's formulation, 
though it may very well be doubted that he understood its full im-
plication for Hamann. 
It is, however, not my aim to treat Hamann's concept of unity 
from the psychological, metaphysical or purely theological stand-
points. Indeed, this study is not so much concerned with a sys-
tematic treatment of the concept itself as with its foundations 
in Hamann's linguistic philosophy. To be sure, statements such 
as "my mind seems to comprehend nothing so well as the whole" 
(V,87) and "rather nothing than half" (G,V,405), suggest that 
the psychological factors in his demand for unity are very im-
portant, and Rudolf Unger finds them decisive.6 On the other 
hand, such statements as "after all, the excision of each part de-
pends upon the whole" (G,V,137) and "when a single truth reigns 
like the sun, that is day" (H.' italics. Il,281), are invitations to a 
primarily metaphysical treatment of the unity-concept. For even 
though Hamann vigorously rejects the possibility of an "intuition 
of the one in the many" (VI,5), his philosophy of unity does have 
metaphysical implications, and Metzke has treated these implica-
tions as pointing to a new interpretation of reality.7 Finally state-
ments like "the unity of the Creator is reflected in the dialect of his 
works" (H.'s italics. II,276) and "to dissect a body and an event in-
to its first elements means to desire to detect God's invisible being, 
his eternal power and Godhead" (II,17), are an invitation to a 
purely theological treatment of his idea of unity. Despite the 
potential fruitfulness of each of these approaches, I have adopted 
none of them, but have considered it far more imperative for an 
understanding of Hamann's philosophy to keep to the foundations 
of the unity-concept. 
The frequency with which Hamann appeals to the unity of 
language as a basic principle strikes even his casual reader. This 
would suggest that the clearest possible understanding of his 
idea of linguistic unity is the indispensable propaedeutic to an 
interpretation of his total philosophy. Unger has dealt exten-
sively with Hamann's language theory,8 but, as we shall see in the 
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sequel, his interpretation, despite its many merits, must finally 
be rejected. It shall be my concern to emphasize precisely those 
aspects of Hamann's linguistic philosophy which have either been 
ignored or misunderstood by Unger. This study, then, is chiefly 
concerned with language as the prismatic medium through which 
Hamann saw experience or reality. In order to accomplish my 
purpose, it will be necessary to appeal to his epistemological and 
theological principles, but these are subsidiary to the primary 
task of showing in what way Hamann conceived language to be 
a faithful surrogate for reality. Once his theory of language is 
grasped, an understanding of the rest of his thought inevitably 
follows. "With me," he wrote to Jacobi, in 1785, "it is neither 
a question of physics nor of theology, but of language, the mother 
of reason and revelation, their alpha and omega." (H.'s italics. 
G,V,122). Hamann once said of his philosophy, "It stands and 
walks with its feet on the ground, and can only reach heaven with 
its eyes, from a distance, from afar." (VII,400). In the follow-
ing pages I shall undertake to show just how language con-
stitutes this "ground" of his total philosophy. This does not mean 
that his thought may be reduced to a system, but it does mean 
that the consistency of large outline is recognized. 
At this point a word should be said about Hamann's well-
known aversion to system, for any coherent discussion of his 
thought presupposes some degree of consistency inhering in it, 
and therefore appears to be in opposition to his clearly announced 
principles. On numerous occasions he disclaims a desire for sys-
tem on the ground that it is a hindrance to truth. "I am not equal 
to truths, principles, and systems" (I,497), he wrote to J. G. 
Lindner in 1759 in defense of his first important attack on the 
Enlightenment, the Socratic Memoirs. Some twenty-seven years 
later, he wrote to Jacobi, "System is in itself a hindrance to 
truth." (G,V,228). These and other utterances9 similar in import 
simply constitute Hamann's own admission of a fact which is 
everywhere apparent to his readers. On the other hand, he does 
not completely abjure system, for in speaking of his writings, 
he says : "In all that chaos is a thread which the adept can 
find."10 A clue to the manner in which he conceived it possible 
for system and chaos, order and disorder to exist side by side 
may be found in his characterization of the Bible: "In the Bible 
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we find precisely the regular disorder which we discover in na-
ture. All methods are to be regarded as go-carts of reason and 
as crutches of the same." (1,118). The student of Hamann must 
agree with Cassirer who maintains that Hamann's thought re-
volves about language, and that the degree of coherence residing 
in his thought is the result of its centripetal orientation to lan-
guage.11 The manner in which this occurs will become plain in 
the subsequent chapters of this study. The disorderly nature of 
Hamann's writings and his own disclaimer of system should 
not deter the commentator from the attempt to determine the 
degree of coherence which is actually present in his thought. 
The difficulty presented by the form of the Hamannian writings 
should serve, however, as a fair warning that concern with his 
ideas involves a very severe discipline. For Hamann both con-
sciously and unconsciously puts his reader at grave disadvantage 
on almost every page of his writings. It is not without good rea-
son that Unger describes Hamann as "the most obscure author of 
our modern literature."12 
Since Hamann does not propound a basic idea as explanatory 
of the manifold of human existence, he cannot be called a monist 
in the sense in which this term may be predicated of Parmenides, 
Spinoza, Hegel or Bradley. His monism, if we are justified in 
applying that term to him at all, is a religious monism which 
finds in the "unity of the Creator" the ground and source of 
whatever unity may subsist in reality. We shall find that, accord-
ing to Hamann, there is a unity given in human experience 
which is of basal importance for cognition ; but since this unity 
is within experience it is simply a "parable" of the unity of 
ultimate reality, and a monistic system may not be predicated 
on the basis of it. Thus the only rationally demonstrable unity of 
prime importance for cognition is not the unity of the Creator 
but the unity of the created. Hegel's dictum that the "true is 
the whole" Hamann would doubtless accept, but not in the 
Hegelian sense. Hamann is no metaphysical monist. On his view, 
unaided reason cannot arrive at an adequate conception of the 
whole, for reason is essentially analytic and divisive in nature. 
Appealing to Paul's word concerning the atomistic nature of 
reason (I Corinthians, 13 :12), Hamann says, "Our thoughts are 
nothing but fragments. Indeed, we know in part." (I,129). 
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Emphasizing as he did the unity of human existence, it is 
small wonder that Hamann set himself in array against what 
he conceived to be the divisive and fractional techniques of eigh-
teenth-century rationalism both before and after the critical work 
of Kant. It was against the rationalist's sundering of the in-
timately interwoven and delicate fabric of human existence that 
Hamann strove. This accounts for his polemic and in many 
ways negative orientation to the chief intellectual currents of his 
time. Many critics have seen only the negative side of Hamann; 
for them he was simply a bizarre and splenetic Don Quixote, 
tilting against the windmills of the Enlightenment. For example, 
Hettner, who is one of the truly great historians of German lit-
erature, was misled into the following characterization of 
Hamann: 
Hamann's thought and feeling is almost exclusively nega-
tive. It is the Pietistic blustering against the freedom and in-
dependence of science, which has emerged from the authority 
of the Bible, and against its alleged presumption.1a 
There can be no doubt that the mature Hamann hated the ra-
tionalism of the Enlightenment with all the intensity of his deeply 
emotional nature. But in the last resort he, too, was the child 
of the Enlightenment in an important sense, and shared with 
its other adherents at least an endlessly questing spirit and an 
attitude of relentless criticism of authoritarian pretensions. If 
he saw in the rationalistic proponents of the Enlightenment the 
most dangerous pretenders to authority, he may be considered 
as the Enlightenment turning upon itself. Indeed, he aptly 
described his own work as a "metacriticism" (VII,1-16), i.e., a 
criticism of the contemporary critical philosophy. 
Hamann's most effective blow against the Enlightenment, 
however, was something apart from the mighty flood of indict-
ments and vituperative jeremiads which issued from his pen. 
It is to be found in his linguistically-grounded idea of unity, for 
it was that idea, clothed in its peculiar but powerful form, which 
made him as Jakob Minor says, "the father of the Storm and 
Stress Period"14 of German literature. When the young Goethe 
listened to Herder in Strasbourg, and was converted from the 
rococo-versification of his Leipzig days, he was really hearing the 
voice of Herder's master, Hamann. Though Goethe never en-
countered Hamann personally, but only indirectly through 
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Herder's doctrines and through Hamann's writings, it was never-
theless the remote influence of the Magus which freed the young 
Goethe from slavish obedience to the prevailing literary ration-
alism, and enabled him to find in the unity of his own experience, 
in the natural togetherness of feeling and thought, the true 
sources of his own creativity.15 If Hettner's judgment upon 
Hamann were correct, there would be no way of explaining the 
liberating, positive influence of Hamann upon Goethe and other 
adherents of the Storm and Stress in Germany.16 Of particular 
interest today is Hamann's influence on Kierkegaard,17 and here 
again we come upon another positive aspect of his work. Even 
a brief list of the greatest thinkers and writers who have found 
Hamann a primarily constructive influence is imposing: Herder, 
Goethe, Jean Paul, Kierkegaard, and, in our own day, Brunner. 
Despite the controversy which the name of Hamann has always 
evoked in Germany, there can· be no doubt that he is one of the 
genuine immortals of German history. It is interesting to note that 
a sketch of Hamann's life is included in a modern dictionary of 
biography which is limited to accounts of the lives of German not-
ables from Arminius to Erich Ludendorff.18 
One of the most interesting and important developments in 
the history of Hamannian research is taking place at the present 
time. In fact, it must be said that this development is the most 
important from the standpoint of pure research. At this writing, 
the first two volumes of Hamann's complete works have just 
appeared in Vienna under the able editorship of Josef Nadler.19 
The remaining volumes of this work are scheduled to appear at 
intervals during 1952. For the first time in history, all of the 
Hamannian writings will be available in print.20 This will be 
the consummation of the wish not only of Hamann himself, but 
also of Goethe.21 What results this will have for scholarship in 
this area remains to be seen.22 Moreover, Nadler has written a 
well documented and thoroughly readable biography of Hamann 
based on his long acquaintance with the unpublished manu-
scripts.23 In recent days these volumes have come into my hands, 
but unfortunately they arrived too late to serve as source ma-
terial. An examination of them, however, reveals that they offer 
no material which would substantially alter the argument of this 
study. In this latest development in our field, we find Hettner's 
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opinion of Hamann again implicitly called in question, for we 
have before us at the present time the edifying spectacle of the 
turning of a leading German scholar to the Hamann-problem. 
This, in conjunction with the prospect of the appearance of 
Hamann's collected works in the near future, is sufficient cause 
for rejoicing on the part of those who have labored in this field. 
Although I believe that the present investigation of Ha-
mann' s linguistic philosophy discloses some grounds for optimism 
with reference to its ultimate significance, any feeling of this kind 
must be tempered by a sober awareness of the severe limitations 
of the Hamannian thought and literary style.24 For, as Hegel 
aptly remarks, Hamann is characterized by a "perfectly con-
centrated intensity," and attains to "no kind of expansion, 
whether of imagination or of thought."25 Or, as Kierkegaard more 
vividly expresses it in his CQncluding Unscientific Postscript: 
"With all his life and soul, to the last drop of blood, he is concen-
trated in a single word ..... "26 Hamann's procedure required 
the compression of his thought into the brief est possible space 
and the search for more and more compl'ehensive symbols in the 
attempt to say everything at once. This is a source of both 
strength and weakness. At its best, it enables him to epitomize in 
remarkable language his greatest insights. At its worst, it is 
productive of hard kernels of hopelessly obscure allusions. There 
is, nevertheless, much in Hamann's writings which is quite lucid, 
and his frequent obscurity should simply be accepted as one of 
the permanent conditions of research in this area. Because of de-
velopments within the field of linguistic philosophy in the last 
half century,27 modern scholarship should be in a better position 
than that of an earlier day to do justice to his more luminous in-
sights into the nature of language. If this is true, Hamann's fore-
taste of the "abilities of a better posterity" (11,114) may not in 
the last resort prove to have been illusory. 
A final introductory word should be said about my procedure 
in translating passages from Hamann. As may be readily sur-
mised, Hamann is a very difficult writer to translate. For, in 
his conception, style is an individual and private matter. "Our 
individuality," he wrote in this connection, "must become effec-
tive in every phrase and in every period."28 To this principle he 
adhered as faithfully as the nature of language permits. With 
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reference to this subject, Hegel wrote, "Hamann's writings do 
not so much have style as that they are style through and 
through."29 By this he apparently meant that Hamann did not 
superficially adopt the conventionalities of language, but strug-
gled to inform his expressions with the spirit peculiar to him. 
It is certainly true that one must read his own words to sense the 
full power of his mastery of language. In this study, in which 
we are chiefly concerned with his ideas and not with his literary 
creativity, the ineluctable loss of aesthetic power in translation 
will not be felt too much. Inasmuch as translations are one means 
whereby the considerable barrier which separates Hamann from 
the English-speaking public may be partially overcome, I have 
translated all citations occuring in the text, but not those oc-
curing in the notes.30 
CHAPTER I 
THE PRIMACY OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
Hamann's language theory has always been a source of great 
attraction and disappointment at the same time. For his insights 
which seem momentarily to throw a flash of light upon the resi-
dual problems of language and knowledge appear quite inconsis-
tent and exasperatingly obscurantist, when they are gathered to-
gether and considered in relation to one another. Rudolf Unger, 
beyond all doubt the most energetic and thorough Hamannian 
scholar before Nadler, attempts in Hamann's Language Theory in 
Relation to His Philosophy to explicate the theory in a coherent if 
not systematic fashion. Fascinated as he obviously is with the chal-
lenge of his subject, he makes it quite clear that he expects nothing 
from it as a theory of language capable of standing on its own 
feet.1 The language theory is the one positive side of Hamann's 
work which has had no historically visible effect in the sense in 
which the language theories of Herder and Humboldt have. Its 
only value, he further contends, lies in the fact that it serves 
to illuminate the historical personality and achievement of its 
author.2 These conclusions, stemming as they do from one whose 
concern with Hamann has been long and intelligent, are indeed 
depressing to those who should expect more of Hamann. They 
are even more so, when one realizes that both Hamann and his 
commentators are in substantial agreement as to the centrality 
of the language theory in all the manifold facets of his thought.3 
Because of the great influence which Unger has exerted, 
and continues to exert, upon the interpretation of Hamann, and 
because of my own deviation from his version of the language 
theory-a disagreement which will become plain in a subsequent 
chapter-it will be well to turn aside momentarily from the pri-
mary task in order to examine Unger's assumptions. There can 
be no question that Unger accepts the viewpoint of Hegel with 
regard to Hamann. That viewpoint is as follows: Hamann's writ-
ings are noteworthy as a reflection of the "inconceivable singu.., 
larity of their author." They constitute, however, "an exhausting 
riddle," and in order to understand them, one must look beyond 
them, presumably to the sources of his thought.4 It is clear from 
Unger's method, which involves an amazingly thorough research 
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into Hamann's intellectual environment (but unfortunately not 
so thorough with regard to the political, economic, and social en-
vironment) , from his conclusions, and from specific remarks con-
cerning Hegel's interpretation5 that he has on the whole adopted 
the Hegelian view of Hamann. 
One can understand the willingness to acquiesce in the judg-
ment of so great a thinker as Hegel ; yet such a view virtually 
denies to Hamann's ideas any validity in themselves. Unger's only 
explanation of Hamann's continued influence is to point to the 
singular personality of the Magus as expressed in his writings. 
It is indeed difficult to see how it could be Hamann's personality 
or individuality alone which makes his reckoning with the great 
minds of his own day a matter of interest to contemporary philos-
ophers. For example, Metzke, who disagrees with Unger's'basic 
orientation to Hamann, strives for a deeper understanding of the 
latter precisely as a philosopher, holding that the man who gave 
Herder's philosophy the decisive impulse, who carried on pro-
longed philosophical discussions with Jacobi, and who took up 
the battle over central philosophical issues with Hume, Men-
delssohn, and Kant should greatly concern the historian of phi-
losophy. 6 It is further difficult to see how Hamann's influence 
could be widely felt in succeeding generations in the areas of 
belles lettres, philosophy, and religion (during World War II let-
ters dealing with Hamann's theology were sent regularly to 
theologically inclined German prisoners of war7), if we have here 
to do exclusively with a remarkable individual. Certainly Goethe's 
prophecy that Hamann would someday become for the German 
people a "codex" similar to Vico for the Italian people8 is mean-
ingless, if one sees his ideas as of secondary importance only. 
At any rate, I am committed to the view that, while it must be 
conceded that Hamann was no systematic thinker and that his 
personality was truly remarkable, the attempt to do justice to 
his ideas should, nevertheless, be seriously undertaken. 
Having seen that there is reason to question Unger's inter-
pretation of Hamann's significance in general, we may now turn 
to a study of the language theory without the prepossession that 
might otherwise unduly influence our conclusions. 
It is a fundamental doctrine of Hamann's linguistic phi-
losophy that ordinary human language is, to use Bergson's phrase, 
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"molded on reality." This conviction was largely a by-product of 
his conversion experience in London in 1758. For it was through 
the. instrumentality of the Bible, the written word, which he ex-
perienced as at once divine and human, that he was converted. 
But this written word necessitated the condescension of God to 
speak in the natural idiom of the people concerning what ap-
pears to human reason as "little contemptible events" (1,219) 
and "humanly foolish, indeed sinful actions." (I,87). The divine 
revelation was not tailored to fit the requirements of the ration-
alistic philosophers, who would have demanded a more intellec-
tual formulation. (I,57-58 ;cf .61,223). That God had chosen 
to speak the ordinary language of the people concerning humble 
events rather than the technical language of the philosophers 
concerning abstruse matters never ceased to impress Hamann. 
Here we find the root of that abiding interest and confidence in 
natural language which is so characteristic of his thought until 
the end. Here, too, we find the root of his abiding suspicion of ab-
stract language. 
In choosing to speak the language of the people in poetic 
fashion,9 God had ennobled that language, and had made it once 
and for all clear that knowledge about the meaning of life as a 
whole must always be cast in this form. It was not simply a 
form adopted for the masses who do not understand the language 
of the philosophers ;10 it is the only language in which God can 
speak even to the philosophers. For philosophers are also men 
with sensory natures, which they may despise but cannot circum-
vent. 
The Scriptures cannot speak with us as human beings other-
wise than in parables, because all our knowledge is sensory, 
figurative, and because reason makes the images of external 
things everywhere into signs of more abstract, more intellectual 
concepts. (I, 99). 
That is to say, the tendency of reason is always to reinterpret the 
"images of external things" or objects of everyday experience 
by means of the abstraction of certain characteristic features 
from them, and by the substitution of the abstract signs for the 
familiar signs of the vernacular. In this process two things hap-
pen: first, a part is substituted for the whole; secondly, the 
emotional associations or connotations are sloughed off. For 
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Hamann this process means not only a mutilation of language, 
but also a concomitant restriction of meaning to ultimately in-
significant fragments of reality. "All mortal creatures," he says 
elsewhere, "are only able to see the truth and the essence of things 
in parables." (I,88). 
In reply to Michaelis' strictures concerning the pictorial, fig-
urative language of the Old Testament as unworthy of deity, 
Hamann wrote: "Senses and emotions speak and understand 
nothing but images. The entire treasury of human knowledge and 
felicity consists in images." (H.'s italics. II,259). The idea that all 
knowledge is "sensory, figurative" Hamann always espoused sub-
sequent to his conversion. Here we are at the bed-rock of his lin-
guistic philosophy, for apart from this idea one cannot begin to 
understand his thought. In the Aesthetics in a Nutshell (1762) he 
sums up his attitude toward the importance of the Scripture 
in understanding the primacy of natural language. The "extinct 
language of nature," which belonged to man in the childhood of 
the race, must now be consciously and deliberately regained by 
"crusades" and even by "old wives' cunning." (II,293). 
It is evident from what has been said that Hamann's point of 
departure for an understanding of reality was his own existence 
and not the observable properties of objects scientifically con-
ceived. "Homo sum," he wrote, "the basis of all other relations" 
(VII,145), and "in the word homo sum" is "a world of ergo's 
according to my taste." (VI,286). Adopting for the moment the 
generally alien Leibnizian terminology, he stated, "The monad 
of my house is for me a mirror of the universe.'' (V,188). In the 
letter of July 27, 1759 to Kant he declined unequivocally the 
point of view of the physical sciences in the interpretation of 
reality: "Just how far man can work in the order of the world 
is a task for you to determine, which one should not venture to ap-
proach, however, until one understands how our soul works in 
the system of the little world." (I,437). Self-knowledge, then, is 
the one thing needful, and upon it depends everything else. "Our 
life is the first of all goods and the source of happiness." (1,132). 
Self-knowledge, which is not in our power apart from knowl-
edge of God (I,133), issues, among other things, in recognition of 
the basic emotionality of man. "Optimus Maximus,'' we read in a 
letter to Jacobi, "demands no headaches (i.e., ratiocination) but 
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pulse-beats." (G,V,197). Shortly after his conversion the em-
phasis upon the emotionality of man appears. "If the natural 
man has five senses, then the Christian is an instrument of ten 
strings, and without passions more like sounding brass than a 
new man.'' (I,393). To his brother he wrote in 1759: "Use your 
emotions as you use your limbs.'' (I,515). Again, over against 
the objurgations of the rationalistic Biblical exegetes with ref-
erence to the affective language of the Bible, he posed the ques-
tion: "If the emotions are members df dishonor, do they there-
fore cease to be weapons of manhood.'' (H.'s italics. II,286). 
These and many passages like them testify to Hamann' s urgent 
proclamation of the right of the emotions to be recognized for 
what they are-the gateway to the soul of man. This emphasis up-
on the affective elements of man's nature springs directly from 
Hamann's perception of the witness of Scripture to their impor-
tance. Thus it is the divine word which furnishes man with true 
insight into the height and depth of the emotions, their good and 
their evil. When Hamann sought a 'fitting symbol for self-
knowledge with its concomitant recognition of man's emot-
ionality, he turned to orthodox Christian theology and found 
it in the doctrine of Christ's descent into hell, and spoke of the 
"descent into the hell of self-knowledge." (Il,198). 
But the emotional nature of man is not the only truth which 
the divine word reveals about the life of feeling. Nature seen ab-
stractly, i.e., apart from the emotions, is not really seen. "More 
is :necessary than physics in order to interpret nature" (1,509), 
was the admonition to the young university teacher Kant, and 
with this admonition Hamann reveals his attitude toward that 
Newtonian physics which was for Kant so definitive. In the 
Flying Letter to Nobody the Notorious (1786), he speaks of a 
"violent divestiture of real objects into naked concepts and 
merely conceivable signs ( bloss denkbaren M erkmalen) , into pure 
appearances and phenomena." (VII,107). The abstracting process 
involves a reconceiving of natural objects which omits the emo-
tional connotations associated with the immediate, uncritically 
received impression. Hence there is no real understanding of 
nature. For "nature is an equation of an unknown magnitude; 
a Hebrew word which is written merely with consonants and to 
which the understanding must supply the points." (I,509). 
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His charge against the philosophers who adopt the point of 
view of Newtonian physics is that "your lying philosophy has 
pushed nature aside" (Il,281), and "the great and small Masorah 
has flooded the text of nature like a deluge. Was it not inevitable 
that all its beauties and riches become as water?" (H.'s italics. II, 
285 ;cf.440). It is significant that these last quotations are from the 
Aesthetics in a Nutshell, in which Hamann comes to terms with 
the rationalistic Biblical interpretation of J. D. Michaelis11 and 
his colleagues. Part of the explanation of the impassioned and elo-
quent nature of this work is certainly to be found in the fact that 
Michaelis sought to minimize the figurative and familiar lan-
guage of the Scripture. Thus he minimized precisely what Ha-
mann magnified; in so doing, Michaelis was striking at the heart 
of Hamann's religious philosophy. 
Hamann, drawing strength from his deeply religious and at 
the same time aesthetic experience of Scripture, def ends the 
parabolic form of revelation with all his considerable powers. 
Not a lyre!-nor painter's brush!-a winnowing shovel for my 
muse to sweep the threshing-floor of sacred literature ..... Poetry 
is the mother-tongue of the human race; as gardening is older 
than agriculture; painting, than writing; song,-than declama-
tion; parables,-than deductions; barter,-than trade. (H.'s 
italics. II,257-258). 
This subject so inspired Hamann that he rose to heights of ex-
pression unequalled almost anywhere else in his writings: 
Emotion alone gives to abstractions and hypotheses hands, 
feet, wings;-to images and signs, spirit life and tongue--Where 
are swifter deductions? Where is the pealing thunder of eloquence 
produced and its companion, monosyllabic lightning? (H.'s italics. 
Il,287). 
Cassirer has said of Goethe, in contrasting that poet with the 
mathematical physicists, that "mathematics endeavors to make 
all phenomena measurable, while Goethe's method wants to make 
them completely visible."12 Precisely the same thing can be said 
of Hamann, perhaps with greater emphasis. 
The restriction of the expression of truth about existence as 
a whole to the parabolic form implies that Hamann desired to 
preserve relational simplicity. Only the simplest, elemental rela-
tions may be expressed in :figurative form. For greater com-
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plexity, resource must be had to analysis, and analysis always 
involves abstraction. It is apparent that Hamann considered the 
relations involved in religious and aesthetic truth to be essen-
tially simple, no matter how grandiose the scale on which they 
may be drawn. "We make deductions," he wrote, "as poets, as 
orators and as philosophers. The former are more often closer 
to reason than those in the logical form. When the heart speaks, 
our understanding is nothing but quibbling .... " (I,281). In 
the sequel we shall examine Hamann's doctrine of relational sim-
plicity more thoroughly. Here we may simply remark that it is 
a characteristic of the parabolic expression of truth. 
The essential simplicity of religious and philosophic truth 
must, according to Hamann, be matched with simplicity of heart. 
In the period immediately after his conversion he prays for the 
"reverent simplicity of a Christian heart" (I,53), and twenty-
seven years later, in the evening of his life, he still writes, "We 
should become children in order to enter the Kingdom of 
Heaven."13 He contrasts the simplicity of the believer with the 
sophistication of the Enlightener. Comparing the injunction of 
Matthew 18 :3 with the slogan of the rationalists, he says: " 'Be-
come as children' in order to be happy-can scarcely mean: 'Have 
reason, clear ideas.' " (G,V,7). 
Since the terms "natural language" and "abstract language" 
are used as key terms throughout this study, it will be well to 
indicate at this point what is meant by them. The term "natural 
language'14 designates the historically developed vernacular of 
any people and likewise all poetic treatments of such a vernacular. 
Hamann held all language to be, in so far as it preserves its 
pristine nature, poetic language. By the term "poetry" Hamann 
meant any imaginative and affective use of a historical verna-
cular. As we have seen, poetry is for him the mother-tongue of 
the human race, and it has been hallowed as an instrument 
of the divine revelation. The transformation of language into a 
precision instrument, whether on the refined level of science or 
on the cruder level of professional and trade jargon, is contrasted 
with natural language throughout Hamann's writings. The 
meaning of "abstract language" for Hamann will become 
clearer in the subsequent pages. At present it suffices to say that 
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it is the non-imaginative and non-affective terminology produced 
by the ratiocinative process. 
Natural language or abstract language, poetry or mathe-
matics-these are in Hamann's scheme the two great choices 
which confront the philosopher, and between which he must in-
variably decide. In practice, neither the ideal of pure poetry nor 
the ideal of pure mathematics is attainable for the philosopher, 
but the ideal for which he decides as his lodestar invariably 
guides all his thinking about the ultimate issues of life. It is 
the fundamental error of the abstract thinker that he holds 
mathematics to be the ultimate ideal of knowledge. "It seems 
to me," he wrote to Herder, "that the mathematicians [i.e., 
philosophers imbued with the mathematical spirit] are like the 
Samaritans: ye do not know what ye worship." (H.'s italics. VI, 
366). It is the spirit of "mathematical observation" which leads 
the philosophers astray. (IV,25). This must inevitably be so, 
since the great "book of nature"15 is not written in the lan-
guage of mathematics, as the pnysicists and their followers 
imagine. Mathematics cannot express the meaning of nature nor 
can it speak to the human heart. Goethe's dictum on this subject 
expresses the Hamannian thought: "Mathematics is able to 
eliminate no prejudice; it cannot mitigate wilfulness or allay 
partisan spirit; of all that is moral it can accomplish nothing."16 
Hence, it makes a very great difference whether the primordial 
language of nature, the language of the "firm prophetic word 
in the oldest documents of the human race and in the Holy 
Scriptures of genuine Judaism" (VII,47), or the transformed, 
"mutilated" language of mathematics is the medium chosen for 
the expression of religious and philosophic truth. Thus, form 
cannot be divorced from content, and, indeed, form is to a very 
great extent determinative of content. Only on the basis of this 
high estimate of form does Hamann's life-long wrestling with 
the problem become meaningful. For him the tyranny of words 
was a matter of constant concern, and he revealed his feeling 
about it in his phrase "the serpent's deception of language.'' 
(V,29). 
The Magus' emphasis upon the language of nature as the 
form in which statements about the ultimate meaning of life 
must be cast is unusual in the history of philosophy and theology, 
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and doubtless this emphasis accounts for his strange isolation 
or for what Windelband has called his "quaint singularity"17 
in the history of thought. If the emphasis upon external form 
would seem to prejudice his case in advance-particularly in 
so far as his religious philosophy is concerned-it may be profit-
ably noted that the considerable differences between Lutheran 
and Calvinistic Protestantism have been ascribed precisely to 
the differences in the respective forms in which these two ver-
sions of essentially the same faith were originally cast. This 
thesis is ably expounded by Hermann Bauke in his study of 
Calvin's theology.18 The material assumptions of Lutheranism 
and Calvinism were originally approximately the same. In this 
respect Calvin was the disciple of Luther. But the formal struc-
tures of the two apologetic theologies have so affected their tone 
that the result is two clearly distinguishable types of Christiani-
ty. Calvin was temperamentally as much of a rationalist as 
the high scholastics, and explicated his faith with logical rigor, 
whereas Luther repudiated the scholastic method as inadequate 
for the expression of his faith. The scholasticism of Melanchthon 
and his followers did not become definitive for Lutheranism 
simply because Luther himself, rather than his disciples, was 
the authoritative bearer of the Protestant spirit for the Lutheran 
religious community. His religion, according to Bauke, was a 
religion more of the heart than of the head, and it is his religion 
rather than that of his scholastic disciples which mediates New 
Testament Christianity to the majority of his followers. What-
ever one's judgment upon Bauke's theory may be, it cannot be 
denied that he is here dealing with fundamental issues, and that 
in so far as this is true, we have here a corroboration of Hamann's 
insight that the formal expression of faith is a decisive matter. 
We might note parenthetically that Hamann, whose intention 
to adhere to traditional Lutheranism is beyond doubt and whose 
striving with religious problems prompted one writer to describe 
him as "probably the most profound Christian thinker of the 
eighteenth century,"19 would correct Bauke at this point by re-
placing his duality of religion of the head and religion of the 
heart with the duality of the language of logic and the language 
of nature. For, in Hamann's eyes, the religion of the heart is 
not at all a pauper with no definite external means, i.e., with 
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no objective form of expression which it can call its own. Nat-
ural language is the objectively given instrument of true religion 
and of true philosophy. It is the "womb" (Cf.VI,39) of reason 
and reason's progeny, and therefore no mere rationalisms can 
compete with it. All rationalisms arise out of natural language 
and are finally accountable to it, for they must somehow be ex-
plicable in terms of it. In Hamann's words, natural language is 
the "mother of reason and revelation, their alpha and omega." 
(G,V,122). This is the point at which, we believe, Hamann still 
has something to say concerning the philosophy of religion. 
Blanke stated some years ago that the influence of evangelical 
Christianity upon Hamann's language philosophy needed greater 
appreciation than it had found up to that time.20 This was true, 
and still is to some extent, but the full influence of that language 
philosophy on evangelical Christianity still awaits an intellectual 
climate suitable for its appropriation. The full scope of Hamann's 
idea that language is the "mother of revelation" as well as of 
reason needs to be understood. 
"It is my same old tune," Hamann wrote, "but through lan-
guage are all things made." (G,V,122). This, as we have seen, 
was an insight which he gained principally through his conver-
sion by the Biblical word. Just as the world and living organisms 
were called into being in the beginning by the word of God, so 
man's spiritual life is re-created by that same word as it is 
spoken through the Gospel. But the power of the word to create 
is a characteristic not only of the divine word; it is also a 
characteristic of the human word, in so far as it partakes of the 
nature of the divine word. For Hamann, it is therefore permis-
sible to speak of human speech as "creative energy,21 if one re-
members that the transcendent God of the Biblical revelation is 
the constant source of that energy for him. Hamann's concern 
with natural language was never a matter of purely aesthetic 
or belletristic interests, but a profound concern with the medium 
in which God had chosen to reveal himself. Prior to his conver-
sion Hamann had subscribed to the basic tenet of the Enlighten-
ment that reason is able to devise abstract formulas which can be 
utilized as norms for the regulation of life in its larger aspects.22 
With his conversion, this faith in formulas vanished forever. 
Language was for him not the pliable material with which ab-
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stract norms may be molded, but was a reality to be appropriated 
and understood, 23 as far as one may speak of understanding a 
living organism which one may observe, but not mutilate or de-
stroy. 
It is instructive to consider Hamann's attitude toward at-
tempts at language reform, especially the attempt of the French 
Academy to keep the French language standardized and pure. 
Hamann had a particularly keen scent in such matters, detecting 
the proneness of reason to refashion language where others failed 
to do so. In this connection he wrote in Miscellaneous Remarks 
concerning Word Order in the French Language ( 1760) : 
The purity of a language diminishes its riches; a too strict 
correctness diminishes its strength and manhood. In as large a 
city as Paris are foregathered annually, without expense, forty 
learned men who know infallibly what is pure and decent in their 
mother-tongue and what is necessary for the monopoly of this sec-
ond-hand trade. Once, ·however, in centuries it happens that a gift of 
Pallas-a human image-/ alls from heaven, empowered to rule 
the public treasury of a language with wisdom-like a Sully, or to 
increase it-like a Colbert. (H.'s italics. II,151-152). 
Bound up with this assertion are many ideas which we shall 
encounter in other contexts. At this juncture, however, we may 
note how effectively the cited passage stresses the natural process 
of language development, an objective process which takes place 
apart from the self-conscious intervention of reason. The asse-
veration that "the purity of a language diminishes its riches" 
thrusts us into the very heart of the Hamannian language phi-
losophy. It means that a language which is deprived of its ima-
ginative and affective force, "its strength and manhood," is im-
poverished. For, as he wrote in Aesthetics in a Nutshell: "Nature 
works through the senses and emotions. He who mutilates 
their instruments-how may such a one perceive?"24 In Hamann's 
judgment, the French Academy's efforts were directed toward 
the mutilation of the language of nature, for it was the task 
of that body to preserve the stylistic forms acceptable to good 
taste. Thus were ruled out unusual idioms, images, tropes, and 
the vivid, imaginative language which Hamann himself loved 
so excessively.25 The language stereotypes which good taste26 
might approve may once have been charged with imaginative 
and affective power, but in the course of time such power has 
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been lost. To assert and preserve their authority in the realm of 
letters is to vitiate natural language, to excise its power at the 
root. 
Hamann rejected, as we see from the cited statements, also 
the idea that learned men can be the arbiters of language. The 
reason for this is given in the statement that at intervals in 
history there arises a genius, "a gift of Pallas," who is able to 
accomplish what cannot be accomplished by the joint efforts of 
scholars in council, namely, to explore the unusual and unused, 
perhaps half-forgotten or unknown areas of natural language, 
i.e., "to rule the public treasury of a language with wisdom 
like a Sully," or to create new and effective syntheses out of the 
old elements, i.e., "to increase it like a Colbert." True creative-
ness does not issue in the creation of new words, as in the case of 
the philosopher with his abstractions, but in the creation of new 
sense-units of language, new phrases. In this way the old be-
comes the new; the familiar is seen in a new light. Genuine novel-
ty and tradition combine in a most fruitful way. It is plain that 
he held natural language to find its greatest expression through 
great individuals, and that time is necessary for this development, 
for it occurs only "once in centuries." As there will be occasion to 
notice subsequently, the time process in history is a matter of 
great importance for Hamann, and the efforts of the rationalists 
to escape the necessity of a serious reckoning with it lead them 
into error in all areas. 
Although the French Academy's undertaking involves only a 
modest control of language, and that in a philosophically indif-
ferent area, nevertheless Hamann's critique of its efforts clearly 
reveals his attitude toward over-arching reason in its efforts to 
control language. In so far as the Academy's efforts to separate 
man from the "riches" of language and from the time-process 
with regard to the appearance of geniuses are concerned, the dic-
tum which Hamann liked to apply, in one version or another, to 
the rationalistic philosophers applies here also: "The philo-
sophers have always given truth a bill of divorcement in that they 
have separated what nature has joined together, and vice versa." 
(IV,45). 
The attitude of the Magus toward attempts of reason to reg-
ulate language may be further inferred from his opinion of spell-
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ing-reform. In an ironical essay entitled New Apology for the 
Letter "h" (1773), Hamann took to task in most humorous 
fashion a minor Berlin rationalist who had objected to the re-
tention of the silent letter "h" in certain German words. (IV, 
115-147). Although his lampooning of this effort was actually a 
veiled attack on natural religion, it discloses his feeling toward 
rational intervention in language. Seven years later his objur-
gatory essay on Klopstock's proposed spelling-reform was in 
the same vein. (Vl,23-44). That he was willing to take up the 
cudgel even against the author of the M essias can only be ex-
plained by reference to his feeling that something quite important 
was involved here. That something was not the question of 
proper spelling, but the assumptions which underlay such re-
formatory ideas. Hamann's strength as a critic did not reside in 
his ability to judge the details of a system, but, to use Kanrs 
phrase concerning him, in the ability "to think things in the 
large."27 Hamann saw that the question here was not one of 
quibbling about the minutiae of language, but of its higher pur-
pose, which involves its meaningful use. Therefore he wrote: 
For as little as the purpose of speech consists in mere articula-
tions and modifications of blind tones, far less still does the purpose 
of writing consist in an enumeration, weighing, and punctuation 
of their mute substitutes, which all amounts to a Pharisaic tithing 
of mint, anise, and cummin in relation to the true, natural, and 
higher purpose which unites speech as well as writing-to a 
shekinah, tabernacle, and chariot-throne of our thoughts, con-
cepts, and sensations through audible and visible signs of language. 
To transform these material aids of our intellectual need and 
caprice into the final and only purpose would be the crudest abuse 
of poetic license and sensuality.2s 
This passage is highly characteristic of Hamann, for here we 
find the most prosaic of matters connected with ultimate mys-
teries of the religious life. Spelling-reform as "the Pharisaic 
tithing of mint, anise, and cummin" is .contrasted with the mani-
festation of the divine presence in the "shekinah, tabernacle, and 
chariot-throne." These latter Biblical symbols are used to rep-
resent the union of word and concept or of thought and language 
in the process of meaning. The very fact, however, that he had 
recourse to the symbols of the divine-human togetherness in order 
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to express the concept-word togetherness indicates a great deal 
about his feeling with regard to the process of speech. The 
meaning of the passage is simple. Language was created for the 
high purpose of conveying meaning, and that purpose should con-
cern us more than the mechanical details of its physical actuali-
ty. Reason can tamper with the "aids" of meaning, but in so doing 
it does not alter the great fact of natural language and its func-
tion. But to translate Hamann's minimal meaning into more 
prosaic terminology is to lose not only the affective tone of his 
utterances, but also the important metaphysical and religious 
implications. 
The belief that language is originally molded on reality served 
to encourage his innate love of linguistics, for it provided a 
reason for believing that the study of historical vernaculars could 
yield important insights into the structure of reality.29 Actually 
he was an assiduous and successful student of a number of for-
eign tongues and a tutor of young men in two-French and Eng-
lish-besides instructing his son in several. Herder was his pupil 
in English, the study of which was begun with Shakespeare's 
Hamlet. The far-reaching implications of the :first encounter of 
the younger Herder with this drama in the original language 
under the tutelage of one of the epoch-making Shakespeare-en-
thusiasts of the Continent is at once obvious. It was characteristic 
of Hamann that language instruction was the occasion for im-
mediate encounter with the best a language has to offer; hence, it 
was but natural that Shakespeare was regarded as the gateway 
to English. In addition to the language mentioned, Hamann 
pursued studies in Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, Lettish, and Portu-
guese.30 To be sure, his mastery of these tongues varied from 
thoroughness at one extreme to a merely superficial and fleeting 
acquaintance at the other. But with the exception of Portuguese, 
all of his language studies were reflections of deep cultural in-
terests.31 Thus it is not surprising to find him especially diligent 
in French studies during what one might call his Enlightenment-
phase, i.e., just prior to his conversion in 1758. In addition to his 
intellectual concern with French, his occupation as tutor and 
later as translator for customs officials in Konigsberg caused 
him to become exceedingly proficient in that language. In the 
period of concern with the genius-concept it is not surprising to 
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find him interested in the mother tongue of Shakespeare, for 
along with Homer, Shakespeare provided the example of genius 
par excellence. Greek was, however, as Nadler remarks, "the 
language of his mature years and of his great thoughts."32 This 
mastery of languages was not, however, without its unfortunate 
consequences, for, coupled with his extraordinarily wide reading, 
it led to all too frequent citations from foreign languages, many 
of which in no way serve to illuminate his thought. 
Hamann translated four longer works and numerous short 
articles into German. Of the four longer treatises, one was trans-
lated from French and three from English. The translations 
are: Des H errn von Dangeuil Anmerkungen ( 1756), done at the 
request of his Riga merchant-friend, J. C. Berens; Ferdinando 
Warners vollstiindige und deutliche Beschreibung der Gicht 
(1770), done for Kant and his friend, Green; Heinrich St. Johann 
Vitzgraf Bolingbroke und Jakob Hervey (1774); Humes Ges-
priiche uber die natilrliche Religion (1780). The first three trans-
lations were done at the instigation of friends; only the last was 
done as a result of compelling spiritual and intellectual need; 
Hamann engaged Hume as an ally in his battle against the pro-
tagonists of natural religion, and this translation has to be seen 
as one of his tactics in that struggle. It was never published, 
inasmuch as another translation appeared before Hamann's was 
ready for press ; therefore, it is of interest only to the student of 
Hamann. It is noteworthy that none of Hamann's translations 
were done for monetary gain-except the routine translations 
required in his job with the tax officials of Konigsberg. They 
were done either on behalf of friends or as the result of an 
inner compulsion, and they bespeak not only his interest and 
ability in languages, but also his pure motives. 
Since it was Hamann's conviction that we find the history 
of a people in its language (I,449), he turned to naturally de-
veloped languages for insight into the peculiarites of those who 
spoke them. But "no language can be understood from books 
alone," and "the language of writers is a dead language in rela-
tion to the language of conversation." (H's. italics. II,205). Hence, 
one must turn to the living spoken language as a guide to true 
comprehension of its nature. One then finds that the spoken lan-
guage is characterized by richness · of idiom, and it is from the 
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peculiarity of the idiom that we gain some idea of the individual 
and folk mind.33 Though interested in the mechanics of language 
to the extent of having started a grammar of the French language 
in his youth (1,345), and having written somewhat on compara-
tive grammar (1,345), he was :finally interested in language as a 
means of gaining access to the spirit of a people. So intimately is 
language bound up with life, and so faithfully does it reflect the 
peculiarities of the multifarious activities of man that "court, 
school, trade and traffic, exclusive guilds, cliques, and sects have 
their own dictionaries." (Il,210). As a people and their activities, 
so are their languages and their specialized jargons. 
Although great literature is the language of writers, it reflects 
to a considerable extent the idiom of the spoken language. Thus, 
in so far as it remains unmutilated by attempts at rational regula-
tion, it provides an almost inexhaustible thesaurus, which is the 
rightful legacy of a people; it constitutes an important part of the 
"public treasury of a language." Hamann's own example proves 
to what extent he took this idea seriously. He drew many of his 
expressions from the German of Luther, particularly from his 
translation of the Bible, and wove them into the fabric of his 
thought and expression. "What Homer was to the ancient 
Sophists," he confessed, "the Holy Books have been to me ..... " 
(H.'s italics. G,V,38). 
Hamann's own experience with Scripture as the revelation 
of God through the medium of natural human speech combined 
with Luther's principle that theology is a grammatica in, spiritus 
sancti verbis occupata34 to impress him indelibly with natural lan-
guage as the gateway to true philosophy. Thus he wrote to Jacobi 
in 1787: 
Do you understand now . . . my language-principle of reason, 
and that with Luther I make all philosophy a grammar, a primer 
of our knowledge, an algebra and construction according to equa-
tions and abstract signs, which signify nothing per se and every-
thing possible and real per analogiatn.35 
Going straight to the heart of the matter, he explained the dif-
ferences between Jacobi-the more traditional thinker-and 
himself thus: "What in your language is 'being' I should prefer 
to call the 'word'." (G,V,516). Linguistics, then, is the basic 
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philosophic discipline. What geometry was to the Platonic Aca-
demy, language was to Hamann. 
Language evoked religious feelings in Hamann, but at the 
same time it stimulated his scientific curiosity. For he felt that 
language offered an opportunity close at hand to achieve real 
knowledge about human existence, an opportunity which the 
scientists and philosophers missed because of their concern with 
"celestial discoveries," and he spoke sardonically of the "spirit 
of mathematical observation" confined exclusively to "ethereal 
spheres." (IV,25). Religious motivation was always far stronger 
with Hamann than scientific motivation, but as even Hettner 
admits, his concern with language constituted a concern with 
science.36 Unger well recognized this side of Hamann, and wrote 
that "we .... find a double language concept represented by Ha-
mann, a metaphysical and an empirical, an almost mystical and a 
rationalistic."37 Hence, one cannot be surprised to find the Magus 
characterizing genuine language philosophy as "an algebra and 
construction according to equations and abstract signs." But 
he was careful to avoid the implication that such a systematiza-
tion with its abstractions was to be taken as a "copy" of reality 
in the sense in which the abstract formulas of the current physics 
were held to be such. For he plainly specifies that such an 
"algebra" would "signify nothing per se and everything possible 
and real per analogiam." It is thus revealed in what sense Ha-
mann's "science" is to be understood. 
Early in Hamann's career we find him stressing the impor-
tance of language study and even its priority over mathematics 
and logic in connection with intellectual development. This re-
mained his position throughout life, and the only change which 
can be discerned in this connection is a deepening of the con-
viction that the symbols of natural language are to be taken quite 
seriously as clues to the nature of thought and reality. (I,159-
160). Particularly relevant for our discussion at present is the 
stress upon the analysis of natural language for an understand-
ing of "higher, more important, more difficult, indeed of spiritual 
things." (1,160) .Twenty-five years later he adopts the same posi-
tion with the exception that he is somewhat more specific as to 
the connection of natural language with reality. In writing to 
F. E. Lindner, whose son he was tutoring, he expresses the con-
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viction that Latin grammar is intellectually more useful than 
mathematics. (Vl,335). Obviously the case for traditional gram-
matical analysis is overstated. But it should be remembered that 
the Aristotelian-Alexandrian theory of grammar was unques-
tioned in his day. More significant is the parallel he draws between 
syntax and human relations. (Vl,335 ;cf.345). The implication is 
that the relations subsisting between the words of natural lan .. 
guage are to be compared with the relations between individual 
human beings. As we shall see at a later stage, Hamann's episte-
mology requires the reality of the objects of sense and of the 
relations subsisting between such objects, but not the reality of 
relations between abstract concepts. This position rules out a 
purely abstract analysis of human relations, because the alleged 
relations of abstract systems relate nothing. Only natural lan-
guage, with its signs for real objects and relations between them, 
can act as a surrogate for real individuals and their interrela-
tions. In connection with language study, Hamann decries mere 
memorizing, and emphasizes "attention" and "judgment" in its 
stead. (VI,345). 
One weakness of Hamann lay in the fact that he who was so 
quick to question the abstract systems of the philosophers did not 
so readily question the categories of the traditional grammarians. 
Had he done so, his principle of the importance of the analysis 
of natural language would have proved itself more immediately 
useful. For instance, the notion that the units of ordinary lan-
guage are constituted by the traditional parts of speech, i.e., the 
isolated words to be found in a dictionary, rather than by sense-
units, 38 phrases, or sentences, he seems never to have explicitly 
questioned. Yet here is an excellent example of his often re-
peated principle that the philosophers are perennially separating 
that which nature has joined together. A deduction from Ha-
mann's clearly stated general principles leads inescapably to the 
conclusion that not isolated words, but sense-units are the basal 
elements of language. For in his verbal.istic philosophy all mean-
ingful utterances require two distinct types of linguistic signs. 
As we shall see, these signs, subjectively conceived, represent 
the reflective and perceptive faculties of the mind, and, objec-
tively conceived, they represent relations and objects. There-
fore, it is possible in connection with Hamann's thought to define 
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the sense-unit as a combination of linguistic signs representing 
the reflective and perceptive faculties of the mind, or, again, 
as a combination of linguistic signs representing relations and 
objects. In the light of these definitions-the essential validity. 
of which for Hamann's thought will be established in a subsequent 
chapter-it may be said that the basal elements of language are 
the smallest possible sense-units, i.e., combinations of linguis-
tic signs which clearly stand for either the reflective and per-
ceptive activities of the mind or relations and objects. 
Since Hamann does not admit the reality of objects except in 
so far as they are immediately intuited as undifferentiated 
wholes of ordinary human experience, only natural language is, 
strictly speaking, the bearer of the sense-unit. Abstract language 
destroys the genuine duality of language by eliminating concrete 
words and substituting for them reflective or relational words. 
Hence, as we have defined the sense-unit, it cannot properly oc-
cur in abstract language, but must be sought in natural language. 
From this it is obvious why the structure of natural language is 
decisive for Hamann. When Hamann states that language is the 
"organon" or "criterion" of reason,39 he means that the structure 
of natural language is the norm for reason. 
Hamann held that "a mind that thinks at its own expense 
will always interfere with language." (II,131-132). That is, the 
original thinker does not merely repeat the stereotypes and 
cliches of language, but creates expressions which may serve as 
more adequate vehicles of his meaning. For Hamann, this was 
true of both the poet and the abstract thinker, but in unequal 
senses. The poet, the truly creative master of language, creates 
new sense-units; he does not simply parrot "at the expense of a 
society" (II,132) the current stereotypes of his mother-tongue 
-"the words prescribed for him." (II,132). The poet rarely 
creates new individual words; instead he creates new phrases, 
i.e., new combinations or syntheses with the words provided for 
him by the language in which he composes. The abstract thinker, 
however, often creates new individual words, i.e., new abstrac-
tions. The creativity of the poet is genuine, that of the ab-
tract thinker spurious. God himself is the "poet at the begin-
ning of days" (II,282), not the primordial philosopher. 
Actually it can be shown that Hamann's own procedure as a 
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writer was to create new sense-units which represent combina-
tions of terms referring to objects of ordinary sensory or ima-
ginative experience, and to avoid terms which are primarily re-
flective or, to use his concept, relational. The full explication of 
this idea must be delayed until the discussion of Chapter III 
concerning the duality of symbolism in all natural language. 
As important as language was for Hamann, he was never 
able to formulate anything like an adequate definition of it. The 
few de:finitions which he offered are quite inadequate. He speaks 
of language, for example, as "the true art of thinking and acting 
or of communicating oneself and understanding and interpret-
ing others." (VI,325-326). Further, language is the "means 
of communicating our thoughts and of understanding the 
thoughts of others." (Il,128). These definitions are inadequate on 
two scores. First, they make no reference at all to the peculiar 
medium of language proper. Hence, on the basis of them no 
distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic signs can be 
made. Secondly, there is no reference to meaning in the objective 
sense. In these attempts at definition, he does not, of course, do 
justice to the insights into the nature of language almost every-
where apparent in his writings. When, however, he prefaces 
one of the cited definitions with the word "mathematics," con-
trasting it with "memory work," we have no right, as Unger 
does,40 to complain of the obscurity of his meaning, for, as we 
have already seen, he simply desired to call attention effectively to 
the necessity for logical thought in the interpretation of natural 
language. On this interpretation, language study may be con-
sidered as a sort of "mathematics" or "practical logic." Since 
the structure of natural language is a better guide to the structure 
of reality than the language of pure mathematics or of formal 
logic, it may then be asserted to be the true intellectual dis-
cipline. For unlike Bergson, Hamann believed that language is 
"molded on reality." 
In spite of his recognition of the tremendous difficulties in-
volved in an understanding of language, Hamann never gave up 
the attempt. To be sure, the ultimate nature of language he held 
to be mysterious, and yet he seemed to feel that, if human rea-
son could b~ effectively applied anywhere, it could be effectively 
applied to language. Moreover, the universal importance of Ian-
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guage impressed him, and further added to the urgency of an 
understanding of its nature. In an interesting passage from the 
Miscellaneous Remarks concerning Word Order in the French 
Language,hesays: 
Money and language_ are two subjects whose investigation is 
as profound and abstract as their use is universal. Both stand 
in a closer relationship than one might presume. The theory of 
one explains the theory of the other; therefore they seem to flow 
from common sources. The wealth of all human knowledge rests 
on the exchange of words; and it was a theologian of keen wit 
who declared theology-this oldest sister of the higher sciences--
to be a grammar of the language of the Holy Scriptures. On the 
other hand, all the goods of civil or social life have reference to 
money as their universal standard • • . • ( H's italics. Il,135). 
Language and money, economics and theology-for Hamann 
these things are not separate, but must be seen and understood 
in their togetherness. If natural language is the key to revelation 
and reason, money is the key to trade. Thus the visible is the gate-
way to the invisible, and through it one must pass, if he would 
reach the invisible. This is a genuinely Hamannian principle, 
and we shall encounter it again. It is thus seen that, when Ha-
mann adduces a secular example, it is for the purpose of under-
standing the more clearly a religious principle. For it is to be 
remembered that language is the point at which the encounter 
between the divine and human takes place. It is the Logos 
(VII,151) in space and time. 
Our investigation in this chapter has led from revelation to 
grammar and its philosophy. This represents a faithful follow-
ing, at least in large outline, of Hamann's thought. Throughout 
the chapter our principal theme was the primacy of natural lan-
guage. It is true that Hamann based the authority of natural 
language on the divine revelation. Natural language in its poetic 
form is the language of the spirit, because God has so ordained it 
in his general revelation through the poets of all races and 
through his special revelation to the Jews and Gentiles in the 
Biblical word. In the final analysis, no other reason need be 
given for the primacy of natural language; God's choice of it as 
the supreme revelatory medium is decisive for Hamann. Even an 
acknowledgment of the extra-Biblical revelation is dependent 
upon an acknowledgment of the Biblical revelation. Yet human 
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reason can discern, to no small degree, the grounds for the choice 
of natural language. 
Since man is an emotional as well as an intellectual being, 
and since his spirit is reached primarily through his emotions, 
the reason for the primacy of natural language in relevation is 
patent. For poetically uttered natural language is the language 
of the emotions. Why God created man as an emotional being is a 
secret hidden in the divine wisdom.41 
But man's emotionality is not the only reason for the primacy 
of natural language. Natural language takes precedence over 
the specialized languages of reason, since it is the "womb" 
or source of them, and they are ·finally accountable to it. Natural 
language further manifests its own logic, which is the true logic, 
since it is genuinely natural, and since it constitutes the only 
link with ultimate reality. In writing to Jacobi in 1783, he 
added to certain remarks concerning the nature of pure reason 
the following words : 
I have, however, entirely given up this investigation on ac-
count of its difficulty, and now hold myself to the visible element, 
to the organon or criterion-I mean language. Without a word, 
no reason-no world. Here is the source of creation and govern-
ment. (G, V, 7). 
The strength of the Biblical revelation is its language, which 
is at once human and divine. On its human or natural side, 
it transforms even simple folk, "Galileans and fishermen," into 
wise men; but language, wrongly understand and misapplied, may 
transform the wise into fools. In a frequently cited and impor-
tant passage from Golgotha and Scheblimini (1784) Hamann 
indicts the misuse of language thus: 
The abuse of language and of its natural testimony is the 
grossest perjury, and makes the transgressor of this first law of 
reason and its legitimacy the worst misanthropist, traitor, and 
adversary of the plain sincerity and candor upon which our 
dignity and felicity rest. (H.'s italics. VII, 37). 
Therefore, language possesses a twofold nature, a good and an 
evil one. "It is the two-edged sword for all truths and lies." 
(G,V,122). In order to understand the abuse of the "natural 
testimony" of language it is necessary to see that overweening 
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reason seeks a divorce from language, but, since this is impos-
sible, it effects a compromise with language which undermines 
its validity. In the following pages we shall attempt to trace the 
outlines of Hamann's thought as he wrestled with the problem 
of the rationalistic transformation of language into a form of 
"perjury." It will be seen that, in Hamann's conception, the unity 
of language is destroyed by the excessive intervention of reason. 
If, as Urban says, "language is the last and deepest problem of 
the philosophic mind,"42 Hamann wrestled all his mature life 
with the most difficult and important of philosophic problems. 
Hamann's peculiar contribution was his emphasis upon the 
primacy of natural language both for an understanding of the 
nature of language in general and for an understanding of the 
structure of experience. 
CHAPTER II 
LANGUAGE AND EXPERIENCE 
In one sense, the theme of Hamann's philosophy may be sum-
med up in his dictum: "Experience is after all always the best 
school and evidence the best proof." (G,V,86). For with this 
statement are bound up all the various skeins of his thought. But, 
as Whitehead well says, "the word 'experience' is one of the most 
deceitful in philosophy,"1 and on its definition, we may add, hinge 
the important issues of any philosophic system. This entire study 
is, from one point of view, an extended definition of that term, 
and I may be excused, if I do not summarily define it here. Never-
theless, it may be said that a definition should have to make it 
quite clear that, for Hamann, the subjective aspects of experience 
always imply, at least on the human level, their objective cor-
relates. In this chapter, where it is my task to establish that ex-
perience is for Hamann essentially verbal or linguistic, it will be-
come plain that the parallelism of the subjective and objective 
aspects of experience is a basic Hamannian principle. 
Hamann frequently appealed to Nicholas of Cusa's principium 
coincideniliae oppositorum, though ascribing it always to Giordano 
Bruno.2 But this should not be understood to mean that he con-
ceded the capacity of human reason to arrive at a metaphysical 
principle which resolves all contradictions.3 It is my opinion that 
two things are involved in Hamann's appeal to this principle. 
First, it is a statement of the religious belief that all contradic-
tions are resolved on the divine, not on the human level. Secondly, 
it is another way of Hamann's asserting the inevitable together-
ness of distinct and yet naturally associated elements of ex-
perience, just as the human body and its limbs are distinct from 
one another and yet constitute an empirical, functional unity. 
(VI,20). In connection with language, the appeal to this prin-
ciple is merely another way of his stating its inseparability from 
thought. In other words, it is a variation of his thesis that 
thought, though distinct from language, is inseparable from 
it. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Hamann 
cites the principium coincidentiae oppositorum precisely at those 
times when the linguistic bases of his philosophy are most ap-
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parent. Again, it can be applied to the union of the opposites, re-
flection and perception in cognition, and relations and objects in 
external experience, as that union is reflected in natural language. 
This, however, is a subject which belongs to another chapter. In 
sum, it appears that Bruno's principle meant for Hamann, on 
the human level, the togetherness of any of the distinct elements 
of human experience which may be observed in a functional 
union, but its most important application is to the opposite ele-
ments of language. 
No matter how complex the ramifications may be, the theme 
of this chapter is essentially simple. It is the inseparability of 
thought and language for Hamann, language constituting the 
objective aspect of experience in contradistinction to thought as 
the subjective aspect. In asserting the omnipresence of some sort 
of linguistic symbolism in connection with thought, Hamann was 
asserting the dependence of all thought upon objective experience. 
Except from any but the strictly behaviorist point of view, lan-
guage signifies a togetherness of concept and word. But as to the 
nature of this togetherness no general agreement has prevailed 
among philosophers. Thus, in treating this theme, Hamann was 
dealing with a most difficult but important matter. The following 
generalizations may help to set his ideas in their proper frame-
work. 
Most of the great philosophers have explicitly conceded that 
the problem of the relation of the concept to the word or of 
reason to language is of fundamental importance for philosophy. 
But their solutions of the problem differ greatly. They may, how-
ever, be divided into three types or groups. To the first group 
belong those who would, in the last resort, seek an escape from 
the fetters of language; to the second group belong those who 
would not seek an escape, deeming this finally impossible, but 
who would refashion language to render it a more precise in-
strument of thought; to the third group must be assigned those 
who accept the ineluctable union of thought and language as a 
fruitful marriage of inner and outer experience. Allowing for 
quite significant differences between the thinkers within each 
group, we may still consider the following in general agreement 
with reference to their attitude toward the language of ordinary 
discourse. To the first group belong Plato,4 Plotinus, Berkeley,5 
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Bergson, and, oddly enough, certain .contemporary Soviet lin-
guists, 6 for they all hold that somehow reality or even ultimate 
reality may be intuited apart from language. The second group 
includes philosophers like Descartes,7 Leibniz, Russell,8 and 
Whitehead,9 for these thinkers maintain that reason must re-
fashion language in order to transform it, whether such a trans-
formation appear in the form of an international auxiliary lan-
guage, a logical calculus or a revised metaphysical vocabulary. 
The third and final group includes men like Hamann, Herder, 
Humboldt, and Cassirer, all of whom see in the togetherness of 
thought and language the most promising possibilities, and there-
fore neither search for an escape into a realm of a-lingual in-
tuition nor wish to remold linguistic symbolism after the image 
of reason. Philosophers like Kant10 who omit to deal consciously 
with the problem of language do not thereby escape the full force 
of the problem. Some interpreters have suggested that the Kant-
ian critique of reason is in effect a critique of language. If so, 
nothing is gained by Kant's dealing unconsciously or indirectly 
with this important topic. That he failed to come to grips with 
the problem of language makes Hamann's criticism of him 
doubly interesting, for this is exactly the point at which he 
opens up and maintains his attack on the system of his great con-
temporary. 
Before leaving this discussion, it is worthwhile to note that 
there is still another way of approaching this particular ques-
tion, a way which might be described as the reverse of the 
Berkeleyan procedure, since it involves a radical externalization 
of the linguistic process. It is the conception of behaviorism, 
whose most important proponent in this area is John B. Watson. 
Behaviorism concedes the apparent problem of the relation of 
thought to language, but allegedly solves it by denying that we 
have in point of fact to do with a duality at all. Watson writes, 
for example, that "what the psychologists have hitherto called 
thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves."11 In this 
way the duality is held to disappear and the problem to be solved, 
for language is thus completely externalized. Obviously this is 
the culmination of a trend, prominent since Darwin's advent, to-
ward assimilating man to nature scientifically conceived.12 
Experience was for Hamann quintessentially the word. It 
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has been stated that Kant in his critical philosophy was "think-
ing not of the structure of language but of the structure of ex-
perience."13 Hamann's retort to that assertion would be that 
language is experience in its most significant form. Hamann did 
not arrive at this principle by virtue of reflection on the nature 
of experience or of language in the abstract, but chiefly as the 
result of his conversion experience in London in 1758, when he 
was deeply and permanently impressed by the fact that the 
Biblical revelation was in the form of the word. "God reveals 
himself-the Creator of the world is a writer-" he wrote in the 
Biblical Meditations of a Christian. (1,56). But the remarkable 
thing was that God, the writer, had not chosen to write in the 
language of the philosophers. Rather he had condescended to 
write in the vernacular. (I,85-86). Hamann would no doubt have 
been interested in language without his religious experience. We 
have evidence of that from his attitude prior to his conversion,14 
but his conviction that ordinary language, which is also the lan-
guage of poetry, provides the clue to an understanding of reality 
indubitably stems from his religious conviction. 
In the course of years Hamann's conviction that natural 
language is the key to the understanding of reality-as far as he 
conceived understanding in this. connection to be possible at all-
deepened and broadened. He never lost the point of view which 
became his as a result of the conversion experience, namely, that 
God had chosen to ennoble human language by revealing himself 
in it, but in the course of time he did concern himself more and 
more with the purely human aspects of language. In 1768 he wrote 
to Herder: "I keep myself to the letter and the visible and ma-
terial as to the hand of a clock :-but what is behind the dial is 
the art of the master craftsman .... " (III,381-382). That is to 
say, he exalts the empirical elements of experience without con-
ceiving them to exhaust reality, but indeed to render it the more 
marvelous. Some fifteen years later he wrote to Jacobi: "I .... 
now hold myself to the visible element, to the organon or cri-
terion-I mean language. Without a word, no reason-no world." 
In this latter quotation he asserts his point of view quite deliber-
ately in face of the most recent developments on the philosophical 
scene, which principally centered around Kant's discussions in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. It is evident that Hamann was strug-
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gling to break with the purely introspective method of philosophy, 
i.e., to find a medium in which both reason and experience could 
be found in concrete form. He thought he had actually found this 
medium in language, and, therefore, he spoke of his own philo-
sophy as "verbalism," a philosophy which he conceived of as a 
mean between the extremes of idealism and realism. (G,V,493; 
cf .494-495). 
The expression, "without a word-no reason," may be under-
stood to mean that reason must objectify itself in the language 
process or remain ineffectual. Here Hamann set himself in sharp 
opposition to the ancient tradition-which was essentially the 
standpoint of the Enlightenment15-that language is a veil which 
should be lifted to the greatest possible extent in order that reason 
might see the more clearly. Elsewhere he states unequivocally: 
"Without language we would have no reason .... " (H.'s italics 
VI,25). Again he holds that reason in general is dependent upon 
its symbolism just as special applications of reason like the 
mathematical disciplines are dependent upon their symbolisms. 
(IV,15). His most explicit statement on this subject is to the 
effect that: "My reason is invisible without language. . . ." 
(G,V,508). While thought is not to be equated with language, 
there is no thought, whether highly abstract or not, apart from 
some kind of linguistic symbolism : "Togetherness ( Gesellig keit) 
is the true principle of reason and language, by means of which 
our sensations and representations ( Vorstellungen) are modified" 
(G,V,515), and "The entire ability to think rests on language . 
. . . " (VII,9). It is significant that the last quotation is from 
Hamann's critique of the Kantian philosophy, which in his 
opinion, fails to take into account the importance of language for 
cognition. With characteristic vehemence, he summed up his 
view of the importance of language for reason thus·: "All idle 
talk about reason is mere wind; language is its organon and 
criterion." (VI,365). 
The above quotations, as well as others which might be cited,16 
are sufficient to establish the fact that Hamann held reason, or 
the reflective capacity of the mind, to be necessarily objectified 
in language. As shall become evident subsequently, his conception 
of the status of abstract words is additional testimony that he 
held to this view. 
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Before there can be anything like cognition, however, the ob-
jects of sensory experience, no less than the operations of rea-
son, must be symbolized in language. Although the objects them-
selves are symbols of the divine wisdom and energy, they must 
be symbolized further in human language. Hence, Hamann could 
say: "Without a word-no world." Apart from the creative 
word of God, the world and its objects would not exist; but apart 
from the verbal representation of sense objects, there can be no 
real knowledge of the world. This is clear from a passage like 
the following, in which Hamann is concerned with answering 
Herder's thesis that human reflection, working freely, invented 
language: 
Every phenomenon of nature was a word-the sign, symbol, and 
pledge of a new, inexpressible, but all the more intimate union, 
communication, and community of divine energy and ideas. Every-
thing that man heard in the beginning, saw with his eyes, con-
templated, and his hands touched was a living word. With this 
word in his mouth and in his heart, the origin of language was as 
natural, as near, and as easy as child's play. (IV, 33-34). 
In this passage are contained all the essential ideas of Hamann's 
thought on the origin of language.17 Apropos of the present dis-
cussion is simply the notion that man apprehends the world not 
by means of ,concepts alone, but by means of the concept wedded 
to the word. 
In speaking of the verbal representation of sense objects, 
Hamann was frequently moved with deep religious emotion, and 
therefore his language is suffused with poetic imagery. In the 
Aesthetic in a Nutshell, he waxes eloquent about the creative 
energy of the word : 
"Speak that I may see thee!-This wish was fulfilled by the 
creation, which is speech to the creature through the creature; 
for day unto day utters speech, night unto night shows knowledge. 
Its line runs through every sphere to the end of the world and its 
voice is heard in every dialect." (H.'s italics. II, 261). 
Perhaps one of the plainest statements of his thought on this sub-
ject is the utterance that "speaking is translating ...• thoughts 
into words, things into names, images into signs." (H.'s italics II, 
262). The common ground for the inner and outer experience of 
man is found in language; both aspects of experience must be re-
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:fleeted in the word. The spirit which informs his declarations of 
the symbolization of the world of real objects in language is quite 
different from that which informs his utterances on the symboli-
zation of reason in language. When he asserts the former, he is 
proclaiming a fact which moves him to the very depths of his 
being. When he asserts the latter, he is prophetically and often 
bitterly reminding the rationalists of the utter dependence of 
reason on language. 
In the sequel we shall see that Hamann's verbalistic philosophy 
requires a distinction between the symbols of reason and the 
symbols of sense experience within language. For the present we 
shall not concern ourselves with the duality within language, 
but only with the duality of thought a_nd language. 
The bond of union between thought and language was for 
Hamann a mysterious bond with religious meaning. (I,440). He 
wrote that language entails ''the transfer and communicatio 
idiomatum of the mental and material, of extension and sense, 
of body and thought." (G,V,495). Against Kant he m·ged that 
language is a "sacrament" (VII,16), i.e., the mysterious union of 
opposites in concrete form. These and other lines of similar19 
import stress the union of "these things so different from one an-
other," i.e., language and thought, by means of "an incomprehen-
sible bond." 
On the basis of his religious conception of the "togetherness" 
of thought and language, it is understandable that Hamann pro-
tested so vigorously against the separation of the constitutive 
elements of the cognitive process. His conception of the union of 
thought and language accounts for the peculiar mixture of ra-
tional arguments with religious allusions in his dicta on the 
subject. In his opinion the most ambitious and important attempt 
to divorce thought from language in his own age was undertaken 
by Kant. Of this, however, we shall speak in a subsequent chapter. 
According to Hamann, it is the perennial tendency of the hu-
man mind to shrink from the word, to attempt to circumvent its 
inevitability in one of two ways. As we have noted, there is :first 
the mystical tendency, which seeks to penetrate to the inner-
most secrets of reality apart from language; secondly, there is 
the tendency to rework language or to refashion it after the image 
of reason. The latter attempt is really a compromise in that the 
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word is retained, but it is a transformed word, and hence muti-
lated. According to Hamann, since the human being bears his 
reason within himself, he thinks to have escaped effectually from 
experience, or to have rendered himself autonomous. Different as 
their methods may be, the mystic and the rationalist have this 
much in common : they both feel language as a burden, and they 
hope by one method or another to circumvent it in order to break 
through "the confines of sensory experience."19 Let us now con-
sider more closely Hamann's estimate of these two attempts at 
flight from linguistically mediated experience. 
No matter how frequently Hamann may verbally equate the 
basic elements of human experience, self, nature, and God, they 
are nevertheless always for him quite distinct entities. These 
elements are intimately associated in his thought, but never fused. 
The bond which most effectively links man with nature, name-
ly, language, is at the same time a barrier. Nor is nature ever 
identified with God in the light of such characteristic words as 
these: "Heaven be thanked that there is a Being high above the 
stars that can say of himself: I am that I am-let everything 
under the moon be mutable and capricious." (VII,419 ;cf.G,V, 
495). Finally man is never identified with divinity for there ob-
tains "an infinite misrelation to God." 20 However intimately man 
is properly related to natur~onceived as verbally mediated-
and through the revelational word to God, these entities must be 
understood as discrete and not imperceptibly blended with one 
another. "God, nature, and reason," he wrote, "have as intimafe 
a relationship to one another .... as author, book, and reader." 
(G,V,22). Only in the sense in which author, book, and reader are 
one may we speak of the oneness of God, nature, and reason (or 
man). But obviously the author is not to be equated with his book, 
nor his book with the reader, nor the reader with the author. I 
emphasize these distinctions at the risk of appearing pedantic, 
because it is a matter of fact that distinguished interpreters 
have failed to recognize that Hamann unequivocally declared his 
belief in the utter discreteness of these entities. For example, 
H. A. Korff taking his lead from Unger, says that Hamann's sym-
bolism becomes "divinity itself."21 Now it may be said with com-
plete confidence that this is simply not true. Revelation, as will 
become plain later, occurs in real time and real space, and there-
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fore shares the relative aspects of concrete reality. But more of 
this later. 
In the last analysis, it is the failure to recognize the distinctions 
mentioned above that gives rise to asseverations of Hamann's 
mysticism. When a commentator of the first rank like Josef Nad-
ler interprets the Magus as one of the important bearers of the 
"ancient mystic" tradition of German thought, which passed 
through the speculative, theosophic phase of the seventeenth cen-
tury,22 he can only do so because he fails to observe that Jakob 
Boehme arrived at his religious knowledge by means of "direct 
divine illumination,'' and that he engaged in a study of "God in 
himself," whereas for Hamann the divine revelation, historically 
actualized in the Scriptures and in the person of Christ, is con-
stantly interposed between God and man, and, further that God is 
a hidden God who has disclosed only as much of himself as neces-
sary "for our salvation and our comfort."23 Hamann may be de-
scribed as a personal mystic24 as opposed to the speculative mystic, 
but when this is asserted of him, it must be remembered that 
between man and ultimate reality there is a barrier which may 
never by lifted, even for a rare moment of insight or ecstatic 
elevation of feeling. His unflagging insistence upon the necessity 
of the objectively given revelation and his constant appeal to the 
doctrines of the English sensationalistic philosophers, especial-
ly Bacon and Hume, must be taken into account, when one speaks 
of his mysticism. If a mystic is anyone who interprets existence 
otherwise than as sheer matter of fact, i.e., literally, then Hamann 
may be said to be a mystic.25 The formulas of logic and mathema-
tics do not exhaust reality for him. If, however, we distinguish be-
tween those who seek the truth principally from within them-
selves, on the one hand, and those who seek it principally from 
outside themselves, on the other, describing the former as the 
true mystics, then mysticism cannot be predicated of him. For if 
his philosophy makes anything at all clear, it is that man cannot 
free himself from dependence upon external experience, whether 
for knowledge of self, nature, or God. 
But the mystic is not the only thinker who seeks to avoid 
the necessity of constant recourse to external experience. The 
rationalist, motivated by other interests and possessed of other 
techniques, is likewise persuaded that he may divorce himself 
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from "facts and their hated evidence." (IV,336). According to the 
postulates of the rationalists, reason bears within itself truth, 
which needs but to be unfolded to yield knowledge. Hamann 
charges that the excessive faith in reason in his own day stems 
from Descartes, Spinoza, and Wolff. But we may take Leibniz as 
the source of Wolffianism, and hear his words as the definitive 
pronouncement of the spirit of Enlightenment: 
.... It is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truth that 
distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and 
the sciences, raising us to knowledge of ourselves and God. And 
it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind.26 
A pretty general agreement is an indication and not a demon-
stration of an innate principle; but the exact and decisive proof of 
these principles consists in showing that their certainty comes 
only from what is in us ••... 27 
That Leibniz believed it was possible to demonstrate innate prin-
ciples is evidenced not alone by his arguments,28 but by his whole 
system, a system which is probably unparalleled in the history 
of philosophy for its confidence in that which "comes only from 
what is in us." 
It is highly significant that Hamann formally commenced his 
attack on the Enlightenment in the year 1759 with the Socratic 
Memoirs. For precisely by choosing Socrates, the favorite phifoso-
phic paragon of the rationalists, he declared most effectively his 
purpose "to disturb others in their faith." (I,437-438). While his 
contemporaries-at that time even Winckelmann and Lessing 
are to be included-were being swept along by the flood tide of 
confidence in human reason, pregnant with "eternal truth," Ha-
mann alone raised his voice in defiant protest. This protest took 
the form of a reinterpretation of Socrates to the eighteenth cen-
tury reader. Hamann's independently rebellious attitude deeply 
impressed Dilthey and Troeltsch, who asked in effect how this 
man felt constrained, just at the time when the Enlightenment 
was at its zenith, to offer, like a bolt from the blue, such a chal-
lenge to the prevailing faith of the age.29 
The Socrates limned by Hamann is no rationalist or apostle 
of common sense. It is the irrational or non-rational elements in 
the Socrates of tradition which are made to predominate. The 
Socratic ignorance is not a propaedeutic to a thoroughgoing ra-
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tionalism, but to an archetypal exemplification of the true be-
liever's attitude. 
The ignorance of Socrates was sensation. But between sensa-
tion and a theoretical proposition is a greater difference than 
between a living animal and an anatomical skeleton of the same. 
The old and new skeptics may wrap themselves ever so much in 
the lion-skin of Socratic ignorance, nevertheless they betray them-
selves by their voices and ears. If they know nothing, why does 
the world need a learned demonstration of it? (H.'s italics. II, 35). 
That Socrates' awareness of his own ignorance rested on "sen-
sation" means-as we know from Hamann's doctrines in general 
-that he recognized intuitively and immediately that the fullness 
and endless variety of external objects perceived by the five 
senses contrasts vividly with the original emptiness of the isolated 
self. Knowledge is derived not from "what is in us" but from 
what is without us. Here is the decisive difference between the ra-
tionalistic and the Hamannian version of Socrates. Leibniz, for 
example, appeals to a Platonic dialogue wherein "he introduces 
Socrates leading a child to abstruse truths by questions alone, 
without giving him any information."30 Thus the Socratic ignor-
ance is understood in two contradictory ways. The Hamannian 
Socrates is ignorant of the external world, and must therefore 
learn of it. The Enlightener's Socrates is ignorant of the re-
sources within himself, and only needs the maieutic assistance 
of an interlocutor to transform vague knowledge into clear. The 
fact that at this point the Enlightener's version of Socrates is pro-
bably closer to Plato's intention in the depiction of his mentor is 
irrelevant. Decisive for our purposes is only Harnann's reinter-
pretation. 
The Socratic ignorance signified for Hamann the necessity 
for faith. "Our own existence," he continues, "and the existence 
of all things outside us must be believed and cannot be determined 
in any other way." (H.'s italics. II,35). The emphasis on faith 
or belief is partly ascribable to the influence of Hume, whose 
philosophy was having its effect upon him even in the first period 
of his literary creativity. (G,V,506). But the influence of Hume 
is merely the secondary source; the primary source is to be found 
in the New Testament, for it was out of his newly won faith 
in the Biblical revelation that he drew strength for his Socratic 
indictment of the age. 
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As is to be expected, the Magus stresses the daimon or genius 
of Socrates, but the understanding of this influence is original 
with him.31 The daimon is equated both with the Holy Spirit of 
Christian faith and with the creative inspiration of genius. 
(II,38). The Socratic daimon or genius is somehow linked with 
the spiritual and emotional elements in the Christian faith, and 
therefore Socrates belongs in a sense to the prophets. "Whoever 
would not tolerate Socrates among the prophets must be asked: 
Who the Father of the prophets is, and whether our God has not 
named and shown himself to be a God of the Heathen." (H.'s 
italics. II,42). 
The conception of the Socratic daimon as the influence of 
the divine spirit and creative genius at once provides us with a 
very revealing insight into the foundatons of the Hamannian phi-
losophy. For it is the permanent annealing of religious and cul-
tural motives in that philosophy which gives it its peculiar 
strength and coloring. Hamann has always been difficult to place 
within the traditional interpretational categories. Does he be-
long to the history of literature, of philosophy, or of theology? 
Or does he belong to all three equally? In my opinion he will 
always be difficult to classify because of his rare blending of 
religious and cultural interests in a manner which does not lead 
to the absorption of one into the other.32 The relationship which 
we found to obtain in his thought between God, nature, and man, 
which involves intimate association without mutual identifica-
tion, may be said to obtain here. Those who would see him 
primarily as a philosopher or theologian are confronted with his 
astounding belletristic interests and critical capacity,33 which 
made him the "ferment"34 which revived German literature in 
the Storm and Stress Period. Those, on the other hand, who 
would interpret him primarily from his literary side, are, con-
versely, confronted with his deep Lutheran piety and his theo-
centric religious philosophy; they are ever reminded by him that, 
"A world without God is a man without head-without heart, 
without vitals, without powers of reproduction." (G,V,48). At 
no point are we able to discern more clearly the indestructible an-
nealing of religious and secular motives which is so characteristic 
of him than in his conception of the Socratic genius. 
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The Hamannian reinterpretation of Socrates does not signalize 
a retreat from the principle that knowledge is not innate in the 
human mind, but must be assimilated from without. A super-
ficial understanding of the genius-doctrine may see Hamann as 
simply shifting the source of creative power from the intellect, 
i.e., from the "rules of art" as intellection, to the realm of emo-
tion or feeling. If such were the case, the source of creative power 
would still be within the individual and Hamann's strictures 
against the solipsism of the rationalists would be unjusti'fied. 
But the poetic genius is as dependent upon objective experience 
as the scientist and philosopher. The particular form of experi-
ence upon which he is dependent, however, is the spiritual experi-
ence of mankind as crystallized in natural language. The pos-
sessor of genius, a Homer or a Shakespeare, does not have to know 
the rules of art, which are always contrived "after him," i.e., on 
the basis of his accomplished work, but freedom from rules does 
not mean that he can remain unacquainted with the spirit of his 
race as reflected in the "public treasury of a language." Apart 
from this treasury, he is, creatively speaking, poverty stricken. 
He must approach his mother tongue as a believer, as one who 
believes that "we find the history of a people in its language" 
(I,449), and that God has revealed himself in history as well as 
in the Biblical record. (I,138). Therefore, it is the task of the 
poetic genius to explore the hidden and manifold riches of his 
mother tongue, and out of these to create new linguistic forms 
which provide the vehicle of his message. (I,119). Such forms 
are not artificial. The abstract philosopher is a creator of new 
linguistic forms also, but in his case the new forms are principal-
ly new words, i.e., new abstract terms. "A mind which does its 
own thinking will always interfere with language." The religious 
and poetic genius, however, interferes with language in a legiti-
mate way. He creates new phrases, new sense units-rarely new 
individual words-out of the material furnished by experience, 
out of the public treasury of a language.35 It is the task of genius 
to create the right combinations of symbols from natural lan-
guage, not to invent new individual symbols. (Cf. II, 131,148). 
But in the final resort the secret of genius is unfathomable. 
Socrates was given to the Greeks "by the gods" (II,42), and 
the genius always falls from heaven. (II,151). But the divine 
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origin of the genius does not exempt him from dependence upon 
external experience. 
The discussion of the creativity of genius is for Hamann far 
more than merely a matter of aesthetic theory. It strikes at the 
very heart of the subject under consideration. "Poetry," he 
urged against the rationalistic critics of the Bible, "is the mother-
tongue of the human race." (H.'s italics. R,II,258). And God is 
the "poet of the beginning of days" (Il,282), and not a cosmic 
mathematician, logician or moralist. It is patent that we are 
here dealing with the central theme of the Hamannian religious 
philosophy. God's word to man in the Biblical revelation is the 
poetic word. This does not mean that revelation is reduced to 
a form of human creativity, but simply that God chose to reveal 
himself in the language of the poets and not in the language of 
the abstract philosophers. 
The evidence adduced suffices, I believe, to establish that in 
Hamann's eyes there is no genuine cognition apart from lan-
guage. Experience is more than language, but this "more" can-
not be rendered cognitively effective apart from linguistic sym-
bolization. On the whole, Hamann is faithful to the notion that 
there is no such thing as purely "private" knowledge, i.e., pri-
vate in the sense that it cannot be symbolically represented.36 
Hamann's thought concerning the symbolic nature of all 
knowledge is best summed up in his remark in The Wise Men from 
the East at Bethlehem (1760) to the effect that ''human living 
seems to consist of a series of symbolic actions by means of which 
our soul is capable of revealing its invisible nature, and produces 
and communicates beyond itself an intuitive [i.e., empirical] 
knowledge of its effective existence." (H.'s italics. II,156-157). 
This statement is explicit warranty of the fact, everywhere im-
plied in his thought, that symbolization is the essence of mind. 
He recognizes that language is not the only symbolic medium 
available to man, but it is the most effective and important. This 
is true because God is a speaking God, and man, in so far 
as he preserves the divine image,37 seeks to know mediately or 
symbolically, and not immediately or a-symbolically. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DUALITY IN UNITY OF LANGUAGE 
In the previous chapter it was found that thought and lan-
guage are inseparable for Hamann. Thus it is possible to speak of 
a duality of the concept and word or of thought and language, 
a duality which is transcended in an ultimately mysterious unity 
which Hamann terms the "sacrament of language." Hamannian 
scholarship has largely ,contented itself with the explication of 
this idea, adding the general information that Hamann held ab-
stract language to be disruptive of the natural adhesion of lan-
guage to experience. In the words of Metzke, "First abstraction, 
first the ratio artificially dissolved this original concrete unity in 
order to give out the abstract parts as the truth."1 The manner in 
which this process takes place is generally not explicated.2 A 
writer like Metzke, however, fully recognizes the importance of 
the subject.3 On the other hand, Unger, whose interpretation of 
Hamann's language philosophy is still authoritative for many, 
reduces Hamann's thought to mere attitude rather than recog-
nizing it for what it is, namely, a very trenchant, if sometimes 
hesitating critique of abstraction and the entire rational process. 
Thus Unger interprets Hamann, at least in this regard, as a pure 
romantic, and says, in effect, what Santayana has said of the 
romantic: " .... he can say nothing that is worth carrying away; 
everything in him is attitude and nothing achievement."4 That 
such an opinion of Hamann's language philosophy is erroneous 
the following pages are intended to show. It is my conviction 
that there are hitherto unutilized resources in Hamann's writings 
for the illumination of his thought concerning abstractions, a 
matter which lies at the very heart of his philosophy, and apart 
from which his idea of unity is quite incomprehensible. 
In an earlier chapter it was stated that the basal elements 
of natural language are for Hamann sense-units, which were de-
fined as combinations of linguistic signs representing the re-
flective and perceptive faculties of the mind or relations and ob-
jects. Anything less than a unit which manifests these two prop-
erties is a fictitious element of language, hence of thought. The 
proof of the validity of this conception was necessarily delayed 
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until the present discussion. We shall now proceed to examine 
the evidence that this conception is genuinely Hamannian. 
The most important clues to a deeper understanding of the 
language philosophy are to be found in Hamann' s linking of ab-
stractions with relations, in his assumption of the reality of re-
lations between real objects (but not between abstract entities) 
and in his general, qualified relativism. One shall not expect a 
systematic development of a theory of relations from a writer 
like Hamann. For, if it be true that most metaphysics since 
Spinoza has been characterized by the failure to recognize the 
importance of relations,5 it is indeed surprising that Hamann 
dealt with the subject at all. 
One thing is quite clear, and it is of fundamental importance for 
our study: Hamann frequently identified abstract substantives 
as expanded relational symbols, particularly in his latter days in 
the letters to Jacobi. For example, in the letter of April 29, 1787 
he wrote to his friend, "Being, faith, and reason [abstractly 
conceived] are mere relations which may not be handled absolute-
ly; they are no things, but purely scholastic conceptions, signs 
for understanding, not admiring (Zeichen zum Verstehen nicht 
Bewundern), aids to arouse and to hold our attention (Hilfs-
mittel unsere Aufmerksamkeit zu erwecken und zu fesseln) . 
. . . . " (G,V,513). In this characterization of abstractions we are 
confronted with the peculiarly Hamannian interpretation: ab-
stractions are considered as "mere relatiO'ns," and are not 
criticized as mere qualities with a subjective status. In asserting 
that abstractions are signs for understanding not admiring, he 
passes judgment on the incapacity of abstractions to appeal to 
the whole man, i.e., to the emotions as well as to the intellect. 
He further says: "Existence [i.e. concrete existence in a world 
of real objects] is realism and must be believed; relations are 
idealism and rest upon connective and discriminatory procedure 
(beruhn auf Verknupfungs-und Unterscheidungsart) ." (G,V, 
507). In this case, Hamann stresses the necessity for faith in the 
reception.of sensory impressions of the outside world, but at the 
same time defines reflection, which he terms "idealism," as es-
sentially connective and discriminatory procedure. The state-
ment that "relations are .idealism" does not mean that he denied 
the reality of relations proper, but that only when relations are 
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expanded into abstractions and further relations are predicated of 
them, do they constitute mere relations. Hamann recognized 
that connective and discriminatory procedure is necessary for all 
language, but deplored the predominance of its peculiar sym-
bolism in abstract language as involving a dangerous imbalance 
of language. 
Elsewhere Hamann singles out the concept "being-in-itself," 
and asserts it to be "the most abstract relation" or the "most 
general relation, whose existence and qualities must be believed." 
(G,V,509). But belief in the reality of such abstract entities is 
an illusion, for he asks, "are there for relative concepts ab-
solute things?" The answer is emphatically negative. (G,V. 
516-517). Hamann compares the veridical nature of the word 
of everyday experience, which is at once the revealed word, the 
word which Adam had "in his mouth and in his heart" with the 
abstract language of the philosophers. From his criticism of the 
Kantian system we have the following lines: 
Metaphysics misuses the word-signs and figures of speech of 
our empirical knowledge as pure hieroglyphs and types of ideal 
relations, and works over by means of this learned mischief the 
s·traightf orwardness of language into such a hot, unstable, indefi-
nite something = x, that nothing remains but the soughing of the 
wind, a magic phantasmagoria at the most, as the wise Helvetius 
says, the talisman and rosary of a transcendental, superstitious 
belief in entia rationis, its empty bags, and slogan. (H.'s italics. 
VII, 8). 
The words "pure hieroglyphs and types of ideal relations" (lauter 
Hieroglyphen und Typen idealischer Verhdltnisse) might even 
be taken as Hamann's definition of purely abstract terms. How 
fruitful this characterization of abstraction as a "working over'~ 
( verarbeiten) of the "straightforwardness of language" ( die 
Biederkeit der Sprache) may be will become evident. It is informa-
tive that Kantian transcendentalism is equated with a "super-
stitious belief in entia rationis." 
Relations seem to be real for Hamann in so far as they subsist 
between real objects.6 They become unreal, when they are pre-
dicated of ideal entities or abstractions. In his strictures against 
abstractions as mere relations, he is not objecting to the reality 
of relations, but to their elevation to the status of objects which 
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require further relations. Natural language must deal in rela-
tions as well as objects; indeed it is one of the principal uses of 
language to reveal the true nature of relations between real ob-
jects, and the master of language is he who can so use it as to dis-
close true relations. Thus, 
our concepts of things are mutable by means of a new language, 
by means of new signs which make us aware of new relations or 
rather restore the oldest, original, true ones. ( G, V, 494). 
Certain abstractions are justified, but they may not be arbitrary 
or derived from a purely mechanical conception of nature. 7 Fur-
ther, they are to be clearly understood as mere "signs for under-
standing .... aids to arouse and to hold our attention,'' and 
not as symbols of real entities. "The real remains, the ideal de-
pends more on us, and is mutable by means of nominalism." (G,V, 
494). Thus Hamann is correctly described as a nominalist,8 
though strictly speaking he should not have been, since he admits 
the reality of relations, and relations are universals.9 
Yet Hamann is not the only philosopher caught in this dilemma, 
as the long history of the debate over the reality of universals 
abundantly testifies. It is simply our concern to note that he 
links abstractions with relations, and indeed interprets them as 
standing for "mere relations." If he had criticized them as rep-
resenting mere qualities, subjectively conceived, he might have 
been led into Berkeleyan idealism. Therefore, if we are to speak of 
Hamann's nominalism, it must be remembered that he does not 
criticize abstractions on the basis of the subjectivity of qualities. 
This fact is sufficient to distinguish him from the classic nomina-
lists of the eighteenth century. Hamann would seem to say that 
there are only two genuinely empirical types of knowledge: 
knowledge of objects and knowledge of relations. The knowledge 
of qualities is less sure than knowledge of relations, for relations 
can be known apart from qualities, but qualities cannot be known 
apart from relations. When we assert anything of an object, we 
are really asserting something about its relations, but tend to 
think we are asserting something about its inner nature. This 
type of thinking is justified with reference to real objects, but 
not with reference to pure abstractions, in the case of which we 
have mere relations. The foregoing statement is somewhat con-
THE DUALITY IN UNITY OF LANGUAGE 51 
jectural, but seems to be a fairly faithful summary of Hamann's 
thought processes in this connection. 
It is not at all conjectural, however, to assert that Hamann held 
to the reality of objects and the reality of relations between 
them. His empiricism can be understood only on this basis. That 
it is radical empiricism is obvious from the fact that he re-
mains, in so far as he asserts anything on the basis of reason 
alone, close to demonstrable realities. And according to Russell, 
it is possible to demonstrate the reality of relations.10 It has 
already been noted that Hamann denied that there are such en-
tities as the universals represented by substantives. That the 
status of adjectives is also questionable is indicated by his state-
ment: 
Good and evil are really general concepts which do no more 
than indicate a relation of ourselves to other objects and the 
reciprocal r,e!ation of these to us, if I may so speak. We thus 
stand in connection with other things and on this nea;us is based 
not only our true being and real nature, but also all changes and 
nuar.ces of which it is capable. (I, 139-140). 
The terms "good" and "evil" are adjectival in form in the ori-
ginal language of this quotation (gut und bose). In the Haman-
nian thought, adjectives are thus considered as indicating rela-
tions. We may inf er from his treatment of substantives that 
they may either be veridical or not, i.e., they may indicate true 
relations or imaginary ones. That relations and objects are real, 
when empirically demonstrable, will be seen from what follows. 
If abstractions are the expanded symbolism of relations, what, 
we may ask, are the legitimate symbols of relations in natural 
language? With the exception of adjectives, which apparently 
may or may not be genuinely relational symbolism, it is not 
possible to answer this question on the basis of what he has ex-
plicity stated. The answer must be sought by deduction from his 
general principles. Before the attempt is made, however, it will 
be necessary to consider the evidence for the reality of relations 
and objects in the Hamannian epistemology. For it is only on the 
basis of the general duality of meaning in natural language that 
Hamann's notion of the union of discrete elements within natural 
' language is comprehensible. 
Evidence that Hamann considered relations to be real may 
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be had from his view of the fundamental relations of time and 
space. While his doctrines in this area are inchoate, as Metzke 
indicates,11 the major outlines are distinct, and they establish a 
fundamental difference between the Magus and Kant. 
Ida Axelrod, in stating that for Hamann there is "in reality 
.... neither past nor future, only the present"12 is in error. 
In the Metacritique of the Purism of Pure Reason Hamann re-
vealed that he considered time and space as objective in nature 
and that even the concepts of time and space are experientially 
derived. He suggests there that the sense of time arose from the 
cadence of music and the perceptible (fiihlbar) rhythm of the 
heart-beat as well as from the rhythm of breathing. (VIl,10). 
These together he considers as forming the prototype ( Urbild) of 
time-measurement (Zeitmass) and its numerical relations (Zahl-
verhiiltnisse). Space, likewise, is a concept derived from experi-
ence. This he holds to have arisen from writing in its oldest form 
-painting and drawing-which concerns itself with the "econ-
omy of space, its delineation and determinations by means of fig-
ures." (VII,10). Thus, time is mediated through the sense of 
hearing and space through the sense of sight. But these concepts, 
having once arisen from without, were rendered "as universal 
and necessary as light and air for eye, ear, and voice, so that space 
and time, if not ideae innatae, at least appear to be matrices of 
all intuitive knowledge."13 
This is a plain statement of the objectivity of time and space, 
for it reverses the Kantian process by making even the con-
ceptions of time and space initially dependent upon experience. 
Thus perceptual time is the presupposition of conceptual time. 
Time and space merely appear to be the "matrices" of intuition. 
( Cf. VIl,15-16). This position is consonant with his general 
epistemological orientation, for "sensus is the principle of all 
intellectus." (G,V,15). That Miss Axelrod ascribes to Hamann 
the doctrine of the subjectivity of time is traceable, it seems, 
to her erroneous identification of God with his creation. Creation 
is in time, but God is not. (1,122-123). There is no possibility of 
overcoming time within creaturely existence in the Hamannian 
philosophy. He adopted neither the position of the rationalists, 
which involves an escape from time by means of "eternal truth" 
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(VIl,41), nor that of the mystic which admits the penetration of 
a "Yonder,'' where there is "no change or progress."14 
It is characteristic of the Magus' approach to reality that the 
subject of time is dealt with directly or indirectly much more 
frequently than the subject of space.15 This fact naturally flows 
from his non-mathematical conception of reality. For in the 
history of philosophy the notion of space as central has always 
been linked with the mathematico-logical approach to total 
reality. Spinoza is perhaps the best example of a thinker for 
whom space is of central importance, since it is with him an 
attribute of substance, and substance is in the final resort di-
vine. Spinoza's immanentism is the antipode of Hamann's super-
naturalism, and the contradictory evaluations of the notions of 
space and substance by these two thinkers flow from their funda-
mentally divergent philosophical presuppositions. But if Hamann 
omits to deal extensively with the subject of space, he counter-
balances that omission with frequent, though not theoretically 
developed utterances, on the reality of time. 
"Everything has its time" (I,356), and "everything will come 
in its time,''16 are typical statements of the importance of the 
time-process. But not only is there a right time for everything, 
there is also a "wrong time" ( Unzeit). (I,394). Time teaches us, 
since it reveals the true nature of earthly existence. As Metzke 
says "time has everything in its power,"17 or again, in Hamann's 
own words, it "conquers, but also fulfills everything." (Ill, 125). 
Hamann invokes Socrates to exemplify the wise man's attitude 
toward the reality of the time-process. (11,22). 
To gather all the evidence for Hamann's view of the real-
ity of time would warrant an extended special study in itself. 
Metzke has collected a large number of the general statements 
apropos of the reality of time.18 But additional important evi-
dence is to be sought in Hamann's attitude toward the historical 
or time-conditioned process in connection with the development 
of the human spirit and intellect. Attention has already been 
called to the fact that language is dep_endent on the time-process 
for its growth: the genius arises from time to time to contribute 
to the salutary development of language. But not only the lan-
guage of ordinary discourse and poetry is dependent upon the 
temporal process; even the language of the philosophers and 
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the discussions bound up with it are temporal and historical for 
Hamann. "This much is certain, that without Berkeley there 
would have been no Hume, just as without the latter there would 
be no Kant." {VI, 244). Thus, the line of development is 
Berkeley-Hume-Kant; there is no line from Kant directly back to 
Berkeley, but only through the mediation of Hume. Hume's prece-
dence of Kant is not merely temporal, for he exerted a great in-
fluence on Kant. It is both temporal and causal. A philosophy dis-
posed to deal in "timeless" ideas would be forced to admit the 
crucial importance of the temporal-historical process in this type 
of development. 
Even revelation is in space and time and cannot be ab-
stracted from its historical framework. Hamann makes this 
clear in Golgotha and Scheblimini, written in answer to Mendels-
sohn's Jerusalem. Mendelssohn had sought to establish the thesis 
that Judaism, in contradistinction to Christianity, is no religion 
of dogma, but a religion of "nature and thing."19 Judaism is re-
duced to revealed law, which is reasonable in itself. In other 
words, Mendelssohn subjects Judaism to a typically deistic rein-
terpretation. In answer to the proposition that Judaism is there-
by distinguished from Christianity, Hamann wrote: 
The characteristic difference between Judaism and Christianity 
concerns therefore neither immediate nor mediate revelation in the 
sense in which this is taken by Jews and naturalists-nor eternal 
truths and dogmas-nor ceremonial and moral laws, but simply 
temporal historical truths which occurned at one time, and shall 
never return-/acts, which through a confluence of causes and 
effects, became true at one point of time and in one place, and 
therefore can be conceiwid as true only from this point of time 
and space . . . . (H.'s italics. VII, 43). 
Elsewhere in the same writing Hamann disclaims knowledge of 
"eternal truths" but admits "constantly temporal" truths. (VII, 
41). The historical truths of revelation are thus both temporal 
and eternal. (VII,57). Just as the development of language and 
literature is dependent upon the time process and the geniuses 
which it provides, so is revelation dependent upon the appearance 
of the prophet and teacher, whose advent cannot be predicted. 
This view of the necessity of dependence upon the temporal-
historical process is, of course, the classic Christian conception. 
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For those who, like Hamann, accept it as a basic principle it 
implies that there is no escape into the realm of purely timeless 
truth, and that the life of the spirit may, to that extent, be 
said to be time-conditioned. 
Though time and space are indubitably real for Hamann, they 
are not real in the sense in which objects of everyday experience 
are real. This fact renders it difficult to deal with his thought in 
terms of the subject-object dualism.20 Relations have for him an 
objective or quasi-objective status as long as they are predicated 
of objects of immediate experience. When, however, they are 
transformed into abstractions, and further relations are asserted 
of them, we have, according to the Hamannian conception, mere 
relations of relations, statements concerning which are entirely 
subjective. "This and that philosophy," he complains, "is always 
separating things which cannot be separated at all. Things with-
out relations, relations without things." (G,V,515). 
Just what Hamann had in mind in the reference to "things 
without relations," unless it was an all-pervading substance like 
that of Spinoza, which has no need of relations, since it com-
prises everything, or the monads of Leibniz, which are "window-
less," and are therefore incapable of relations, except in so far 
as they appear to have them by virtue of preestablished harmony, 
is difficult to see. However, it is patent that the description 
"relations without things" refers to abstract systems in general, 
for, as we have seen, Hamann holds abstractions to be "mere 
relations," construed as real entities, but which are actually 
"fancies." 
The subject-object dualism has, then, a limited usefulness in the 
interpretation of Hamann's epistemology. First, it is a dualism 
in terms of which he criticizes preeminently the form of philo-
sophical systems. Philosophy cast in abstract form is subjec-
tive; philosophy cast in poetic form is objective. Secondly, this 
dualism may be of assistance in criticizing Hamann's thought, 
if it is clearly understood that both mind and experience have a 
dual nature-the former being divided into reflective and percep-
tive faculties and the latter into relations and objects-but that 
they may in turn have a dyadic relation to one another. From our 
study of the previous chapter we have already the clue to the 
nature of the relation of mind to experience in the relation of 
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thought to language. There we found that Hamann has no ra-
tionalistic theory of the togetherness of these elements, but that it 
is for him simply a given fact of experience and, as such, a mat-
ter of faith. 
Actually it is best to avoid the subject-object dualism in the 
general interpretation of Hamann's thought (except in so far as 
his critiques of other systems are concerned) for his constant 
appeal to language, in which he conceived the two modes of 
reality, the relational and the objective, to be symbolically pres-
ent, leaves no room for its practical application. Only when 
reason "mutilates" language does he conceive subjectivity to be 
in evidence. It should be remembered that Hamann, unlike Kant, 
was always thinking of the structure of language, not of the 
structure of experience in divorce from language. The two aspects 
of reality become visible in linguistic symbolism. Since they can-
not be separated, "there are no absolute creatures and, just as 
little, absolute certainty." (G,V,515). In other words, the struc-
ture of natural language tells us that there are two modes of 
reality, and that they must always be considered together. Neither 
can stand alone. It will be found that Hamann's indictment that 
the philosophers are frequently guilty of dealing with "things 
without relations," on the one hand, and with "relations without 
things," on the other, is susceptible of a graphic illustration from 
the linguistic viewpoint. This, indeed, constitutes the most re-
markable aspect of the Hamannian verbalistic philosophy. But 
to this we shall return later. 
Although it is sufficient for our purpose to establish the reality 
of the fundamental relations of space and time in Hamann's 
thought, it may be pointed out briefly that further evidence for 
the reality of relations in his philosophy could be adduced in the 
form of his general relativism. It is indeed striking that as pro-
found a believer in the transcendence of ultimate reality as Ha-
mann could nevertheless adopt a philosophy of historical rela-
tivism. Blanke has commented on his acceptance of a relativistic 
and yet at the same time absolutistic view of the Bible.21 Unger, 
likewise, has recognized the peculiar .combination of absolutism 
and relativism in Hamann's philosophy of history.22 Relativism 
was an important philological and iiterary principle with Ha-
mann. The relative nature of language should, in his opinion, be 
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recognized ; it is, to a certain extent, conditioned by the circum-
stances of its development; therefore, "in the language of a people 
we find its history." (1,449). The influence of the psychological 
and environmental conditions shaping an author's work should 
be taken into consideration, for "intention, time, and place of an 
author are all determinants of his expression." (II,210; cf. 32). 
Thus, the reader should identify himself as far as possible with 
the author in order fully to appreciate his work. This idea was 
so completely accepted even by the young Hamann that he 
pleaded for its acceptance in connection with the reading of the 
Bible. (I,54). From the little that has been said in this connec-
tion, it is plain that Hamann is thoroughly modern in his espousal 
of the principle of historical relativism. His association of this 
principle with absolute transcendentism differentiates him, to be 
sure, from the typical relativist, and renders his thought logically 
contradictory. A frank recognition of the dichotomous nature of 
his thought in this connection is necessary. 
On the philosophical level, Hamann never admitted the pos-
sibility that one idea can illuminate all areas of human experi-
ence. "Our thoughts are nothing but fragments. For we know 
in part" ( I,129) , he declared early in his career, and he never 
wavered in this conviction. From this tenet stemmed his pas-
sionate antipathy for the philosophic systematizers. For him, 
metaphysical monism was, of all the errors of the intellect, the 
greatest and most disastrous. It may be said with assurance that 
Brunner, in expressing his own judgment that monism is to be 
equated with "monomania,"23 was also expressing Hamann's 
judgment in the matter. It is most interesting to notice how the 
Magus, who so frequently poured out his scorn on those who claim 
to proceed on the basis of pure logic, turns upon Spinoza's 
monism with unassailable logic: 
In the _first formula of Spinoza, causa sui, lies the whole error 
of the logomachy. A relative terminus may not, according to its 
very nature be conceived absolutely, without its correlatum. Thus 
(effectus) causa sui is at the same time (causa) etfectus sui. A 
father who is his own son, and a son who is his own father. Does 
the whole of nature yield such an example? Spinozism is there-
fore an unnatural opinion, according to which nothing more than 
a single existing thing, which is cause and effect at the same time, 
is assumed. . . . ,24 
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In this analysis of Spinoza's idea of "cause of itself" Hamann 
calls attention to the confusion of relations involved rather than 
explicitly invoking the law of contradiction. He points out that 
the term "cause" is meaningful only when its correlative term 
"effect" is understood. Unlike a proper name, for instance, whose 
meaning is dependent upon a contingently existing entity, the ab-
stract terms ".cause" and "effect" are, by definition, statements 
about relations in space and time. If the accepted meaning of the 
terms is retained, cause must precede effect. The same is true of 
the terms "father" and "son." By substituting the more familiar 
terms for the less familiar ones, he renders vivid the Spinozistic 
procedure in dealing with relational terminology at this impor-
tant point. For the absurdity of a father who is his own son 
is more immediately apparent than a cause which is its own 
effect. According to Hamann, the greater degree of abstraction 
inhering in the terms "cause" and "effect" than in the terms 
"father" and "son' does not absolve the first set of terms of the 
necessity of conforming to simple logic. This, indeed, is the old 
error of the rationalistic system-builders; it is the attempt to 
conceive a relative terminus as if it were absolute. As we have 
seen, Hamann accepted Bruno's principle of the coincidence of 
opposites, conceiving it in his own way, but he recognized that 
it transcends reason. For him the coincidence of opposites was 
a confession of faith; for Spinoza, Hamann asserts in effect, it 
became the corner-stone of an allegedly rational theology. But 
this theology demands a single, all-embracing substance or 
"thing" which dispenses with relations, since it comprises every-
thing to which it might appear to be related.25 It would be mis-
leading to suggest that Hamann's comments upon the philosophic 
systems are often as clear as the passage cited above. In fact, 
they seldom are. But it is important to recognize that he who 
is so often described as an "irrationalist" was at times capable 
of purely rational analysis. 
The reality of relations for Hamann is nowhere more strongly 
attested than in his conception of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge 
might easily be supposed to be immediate and certain apart from 
any external reference, as in the case of Descartes, who held 
the proposition "I think, hence I am" to be "so certain and of such 
evidence that no ground of doubt could be alleged by the sceptics 
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capable of shaking it."26 In direct contradiction of this doc-
trine,27 Hamann held that knowledge of self can only be deter-
mined in relation to the external realities, God and man. "God 
and my neighbor belong. . . . to my self-knowledge and. my 
self-love." (1,135). Again he describes one's neighbor as the 
mirror of self. (1,135; ct. G,V,233). In order to know the self 
it is necessary to know one's relations to others. "When I desire 
to fathom myself, it is not a question alone of knowing what man 
is, but also what his status is. Are you free or a slave? Are 
you a minor, an orphan, a widow, and how do you stand in 
respect of higher beings?" (1,134). Thus at the very point where 
the isolated individual might find his most certain knowledge, 
Hamann emphatically proclaims the necessity for relations. In-
deed his emphasis upon relations in human society is so great 
that, with a systematic thinker, it would lead to theore-
tical difficulties.28 "Thus everything in the world hangs together," 
he said to Herder, "by means of threads which cannot be sundered 
without hurting us or others." (Vl,71-72; cf. 1,131-132). In fact 
he goes so far as to say that all things are so interrelated that 
"I cannot move from the spot, but am almost petrified." He in-
vokes God as the one alone capable of altering relationships. 
(H.'s italics. G,V,484). 
Likewise on the ethical level Hamann admitted no absolute 
ideals. "Good and evil indicate a relation of ourselves to other ob-
jects and the reciprocal relation of these to ourselves .... .'' (I, 
139; cf 319). Therefore, good and evil are for Hamann not 
qualities which inhere in the nature of persons and objects, but 
our employment of such terms is simply a mode of stating rela-
tions to the human and non-human environment. Therefore, all 
moral absolutism is entangled in the same error as all other ab-
solutisms, namely, in the error of treating relative concepts as 
absolute. Influenced as he was by Pietism, Hamann refused to ac-
cept the conventional Pietistic moralism. 29 The Kantian idea of 
the good will he repudiated on the grounds that good will be-
longs alone to God, not to man. (G,V,443). "What a fine counter-
part good will is to pure reason!" he exclaimed to Jacobi. (G,V, 
364). In his interesting association with the Princess Gallitzin 
in the last year of his life, Hamann, according to her own testi-
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mony courageously pointed out to her the pride which was bound 
up with her religious perfectionism.30 
Having examined the evidence for the reality of relations in 
Hamann's philosophy, we may now turn to his idea of the real-
ity of objects. 
Hamann recognizes a world of real objects ( Gegenistiinde), 
which he accepts "with naive confidence in the reliability of sen-
sory experience."31 "The .certainty of our knowledge," he as-
serts, "is not dependent upon our powers nor upon its organiza-
tion, but for the most part on the certainly of the object itself . 
. . . . " (G,V,51). Here Hamann is seen to reject both pre-Kant-
ian and Kantian rationalism, for he does hold knowledge to be 
primarily dependent on ratiocination, as in the case of Wolff,32 
nor does he question the testimony of the senses, as in the case of 
Kant.33 Thus he exalts perception at the expense of reflection, 
and with this procedure is bound up a suppression of abstrac-
tion as involving a misuse of the symbolism of relations, since in 
his view it adds nothing to the certainty of knowledge and sub-
tracts from its effectiveness. 
In so far as it is possible to assign Hamann to a specific 
epistemological tradition, he must be seen as standing in the 
nominalistic tradition of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. Of 
these men, however, the last named was by far the most impor-
tant influence on his thinking, since he afforded Hamann phil-
osophic ground for serious reflection upon faith as a way of 
knowing and at the same time a point of departure for his attacks 
on rationalism. "I was full of Hume," he confessed in a letter to 
Jacobi, "when I wrote the Socratic Memoirs and the following 
passage of my little book has reference to that: 'Our own exis-
ten.ce and the existence of all things outside us must be believed, 
and can in no other way be determined.' "34 Hamann not only 
began his formal attack on the Enlightenment with Hume as an 
ally, but until the end he considered the English philosopher the 
most realistic of contemporary epistemologists. After the ap-
pearance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Hamann wrote im-
mediately to Herder: 
Hume is always my man, because he at least has ennobled the 
principle of faith and included it in his system. Our countryman 
[Kant] is always rehashing his blustering about causality. That 
doesn't appear honest to me. (VI, 187). 
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There are, of course, significant differences between Hume and 
Hamann, and the latter was quick to recognize and acknowledge 
these differences. As early as 1759 he had written to Kant: 
The Attic philosopher Hume finds faith necessary, if he de-
sires to eat an egg and <lrink a glass of water ..... If he finds 
faith necessary for eating and drinking, why does he deny his 
own principle, when he judges higher things than sensual eating 
and drinking! (I, 442; cf. VI, 187). 
Hamann's translation of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural 
Religion in 1780 is evidence of his high estimate of the philosophi-
cal worth of Hume, despite the differences between the English 
thinker's views and his own. It was Hamann's conviction that 
faith "belongs to the natural conditions of our cognitive powers, 
to the basic motives of our soul" (H.'s italics. VI,326), and in 
Hume he found a contemporary thinker of the ·first rank who 
in a sense supported him in this opinion. 
Hamann accepted the proposition of the sensationalists that 
all knowledge derives ultimately from sources outside the mind. 
"There is nothing in our understanding," he asserted, "without 
having previously been in our senses." (H.'s italics. VI,44). By 
"senses" he meant the five physical senses of the body, for, a,s he 
stated in this connection: "Upon what is all knowledge based? 
Upon five barley loaves,35 upon five senses which we possess in 
common with the unreasoning brutes." (I,127). His writings are 
studded with declarations of the superiority of empirical over ra-
tional knowledge. Thus he exclaims: "Should not sense knowledge 
be more apodictic than rational knowledge!" (G,V,504). Further: 
"One must begin .... the matter a posteriori, not a priori, which 
is a great mistake of the other philosophers." (G,V,232). Against 
Kant the watchword was essentially the same as against the 
orthodox rationalists of the Enlightenment: "I desire. . . . to 
oppose experience to pure reason.'' (H.'s italics, G,V,494). 
In his reckoning with rationalism, he accepted in uncritical fash-
ion the doctrines of the empiricists in so far as they served 
his purposes. Their strictures against rationalism he applauded; 
the same strictures applied to faith in Christianity he repudiated. 
Up to this point we have been engaged in showing that ab-
stract substantives as well as adjectives denote relations for 
Hamann, and that in his epistemology both relations and objects 
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are real. It is obvious that certain words of ordinary language 
act as surrogates for empirical objects, but the question remains 
as to which words of ordinary language, apart from abstract 
substantives and adjectives, whose status is controversial, un-
ambiguously refer to relations. If certain words or symbols can 
be identified as relational in reference, whereas others clearly 
refer to objects, the Hamannian principle that language is a 
functional union of two discrete elements will receive additional 
light. Moreover, light is thereby thrown on his theory of ab-
stractions. 
If it is assumed that the so-called "empty or colorless 
('pale') words or auxiliaries"36 of ordinary language unam-
biguously refer to relations,37 some of which are always present 
in linguistic expressions, either implicity or explicitly, Hamann's 
dicta on the unity of language take on new meaning. For instance, 
the idea that language involves a "transfer and communricatio 
idiomatum of the mental and material, of extension and sense, of 
body and thought" may be understood in a different sense from 
that which we have previously taken it to have. For previously this 
type of statement was adduced to give evidence of his assertion 
of the union of thought with language in general. It is my 
opinion, however, that Hamann often had a double meaning in 
mind, though unconsciously, when making assertions of this 
kind. Another statement of the same import maintains that lan-
guage is a union of "thoughts, concepts, and sensations by means 
of the audible and visible signs of language." (VI,34-35). In 
such a case the implication seems to be that there is a demon-
strable distinction between the signs of thoughts and concepts, 
on the one hand, and of sensations, on the other. Again language 
is described as the "finest parable of the hypostatic union of the 
sensory and rational natures, of the common idiom-exchange of 
their powers" (VII,12), which may likewise be taken to point 
to his double meaning. The fact that Hamann does not free him-
self in these quotations from the subject-object dualism does 
not vitiate the principle we have stated as definitive for his 
epistemology, namely, that both relations and objects are real. 
It should be remembered that he had to make a distinction some-
how, and that the terminology for any other distinctions was 
not available to him. 
THE DUALITY IN UNITY OF LANGUAGE 63 
If, as I believe, the archetype of Hamann's abstract relational 
symbolism is to be sought in the so-called empty words 
and syntactical devices of ordinary language, the application of 
this principle to his thought should confirm its general correct-
ness. This is, fortunately, not difficult to do. For example, if one 
tries to visualize a sentence made up entirely of empty words and 
syntactical devices, such a congeries of linguistic signs would ob-
viously mean nothing, since they would stand in isolation from 
the words pointing to the empirical realities of familiar experi-
ence. One would in such a case be truly confronted with "air-
castles" (G,V,16) or with "a violent divestiture of real objects 
into naked concepts .... into pure appearances and phenomena." 
(VII,107). Indeed all of the variegated Hamannian epithets 
could-certainly with greater justice !-be applied to our con-
geries of empty words. Surely it was something like this 
that Hamann had in mind, when he spoke of abstract philosophy 
as the "speciosa dehinc miracula of a deceptive fairy" (VII,108), 
and when he charged that "this and that philosophy always sep-
arates things which cannot be separated at all." For obviously we 
have here the symbolism of "relations without things." 
On the other hand, it is equally plain that a congeries of 
symbols referring exclusively to empirical realities would also 
constitute an undecipherable riddle.38 It is only through the 
proper union of these two types of symbols that meaning can 
arise. In the case of a collection of words referring to empiri-
cal objects, with all connective words and devices removed, we 
would have linguistically speaking Hamann's "things without 
relations." 
This duality of linguistic symbolism which we have been de-
scribing may be termed "semantic," if that word is understood 
apart from its connection with contemporary positivistic lan-
guage philosophies. For it is a duality which is predicated on the 
basis of meaning. It should be noticed that it is a duality with-
in language, and is to be distinguished from the duality of con-
cept and word or of thought and language. As we have seen 
both dualities are present in Hamann's thought, though con-
fused with one another at crucial points. It is because Unger 
fails to see this distinction that he is unable to throw any real 
light on Hamann's language theory, though his treatise on that 
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theory will always remain a valuable guide to certain aspects of 
Hamann's language philosophy. 
Unger charges it against Hamann that "language (in the 
human sense) is for him at one time an allegory of thoughts, at 
another, symbolization of external things, again even the reflec-
tion of the inner nature of the speaker."39 But this is precisely 
the point! If our interpretation is correct, language is for Ha-
mann these three things at once. It is an "allegory of thoughts," 
in so far as it represents the reflective capacities of the mind. 
On the other hand, it is a "symbolization of external things," in 
so far as it reflects the world of empirical objects. This capacity 
of the mind to symbolize its reflective and perceptive activities 
at the same time, i.e., of disposing itself toward objects and 
toward relations simultaneously, implies an "inner nature of the 
speaker" which transcends its own differentiations, since it is the 
ground or source of them. Such an explication of Hamann's lan-
guage philosophy is supported by a typical quotation from Ha-
mann like the following : 
If sensation and understanding, as the two stems of human 
knowledge arise from a common, but to us unknown root, so that 
objects are given by means of the former, and thought (understood 
and conceived) by the latter, for what purpose such a violent un-
warranted separation of that which nature has joined together? 
Will not both sterns wither and dry up as a result of this dichoto-
my or schism of their transcendental root? (H.'s italics. VI, 
49-50; cf. VII, 10). 
It is difficult to see just what this "common, but to us un-
known .... transcendental root" may be, if not that which Unger 
describes as "the inner nature of the speaker" and that which 
we have described as the capacity of the mind to symbolize both 
relations and objects, without thereby losing its essential na-
ture, which is the ability to transcend any particular instance of 
symbolization and to repeat the process indefinitely. 
Thus Unger accurately states the meaning of language for 
Hamann, but he sees in the juxtaposed elements-which his thor-
ough research has led him to ·find-only contradiction and mutual 
exclusion. For him, they have no meaning as parts of a larger, 
more comprehensive whole. But since he consistently interprets 
Hamann's language philosophy in terms of its alleged Platonism,40 
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it is inevitable that he miss the radical nature of the Hamannian 
ideas. Ironically enough, Hamann, the indefatigable foe of ab-
straction, produced an idea of language involving a high degree 
of abstraction, as our study demonstrates. Unger recognizes 
this, but misses the mark widely, when he characterizes it as 
"remote from reality."41 This misunderstanding arises from his 
inability to see that with Hamann it is not merely the mysterious 
and remote which must be symbolically represented, but even the 
familiar data of human experience must likewise be symbolized 
before there is anything like cognition. (See 11,156-157). Sym-
bolism is precisely as necessary for our most immediately given 
and certain knowledge as for knowledge of the transcendent 
elements of experience. 
The human mind cannot prescribe in advance the proportions 
of reflective and perceptive symbols in any given statement of 
· natural language. The human being merely speaks meaningfully, 
and finds that his speech has invariably woven together these 
two types of symbol, and reflection upon them must always be 
a. posteriori. It is undoubtedly the given nature of this symbolic 
synthesis which caused Hamann to invest it with a religious aura. 
That he had this synthesis in mind at times appears beyond doubt, 
although it must be conceded that his statements concerning the 
unity of language frequently seem to apply specifically to the 
union of thought and language and not to the union of the dis-
crete elements within language. (Cf. l,449f.) On the other hand, 
there are utterances which cannot be interpreted on the basis of 
the unity of thought and language or of concept and word. For 
example, the description of language as "the finest parable of 
the hypostatic union of our sensory and rational natures, of the 
common idiom-exchange of their powers" is meaningless if the 
thought-language unity is consistently adhered to. For, if the 
words "sensory and rational natures" are equated with "language 
and thought respectively-the only logical equivalents in this con-
nection-it would follow that all thought is conceived as "ra-
tional," a conception which is manifestly at variance with Ha-
mann's basic doctrines. Moreover, on this interpretation the 
words "sensory and rational natures" become repetitive of the 
preceding words "parable" and "hypostatic union." In other 
words, we are interpreting Hamann as saying that language is 
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"the finest parable of the hypostatic union of language and 
thought," which is a patent absurdity. In the opinion of this 
writer, the only meaningful interpretation of this passage is as 
follows: The perceptive processes of the mind ("sensory na-
ture") and the reflective processes of the mind ("rational na-
ture") function in a living union ("hypostatic union") and are 
symbolically present in language ("parable") in the form of dis-
crete symbols. In addition to the characterizations of the unity 
of language which .clearly formulate one of the two types of unity 
under discussion, there are some which may be understood from 
either standpoint. Such are the descriptions of language as a 
"shekinah" (VI,34), "tabernacle" (VI,34), "sacrament" (VII, 
16), and "koinonia without transubstantiation-neither body 
nor shadow, but spirit." (VI,170). 
It is important to notice the consistently religious terminology 
which Hamann employs to describe the unity of language. This 
implies that the idea of the unity of language, however it be con-
ceived, evoked religious feelings in Hamann. Although he does 
not say so explicitly, we may safely infer that the recognition of 
the unity of language requires faith. For, if the existence of one's 
own self and the facts of the external world require faith, even 
more should the recognition of the given opposites of experience 
reflected in language require the same. Such faith is essentially a 
religious faith, since, according to Hamann, the opposites of ex-
perience are held together in a living union, not by the power of 
the human mind, but by the power of God, whose unity "is re-
flected in the dialect of his works." (II,276). 
I do not believe that the attempt to determine as precisely 
as possible the meaning of the obviously figurative statements 
concerning the unity of language is misguided. It is conceded 
that a rigorous analysis of Hamann's statements in general-
even where it would seem to be at all possible-would not only be 
fruitless, but in direct contradiction of his spirit. But it must be 
remembered that, in spite of its profound religious meaning 
for Hamann, language constituted for him more nearly a sub-
ject of scientific discourse than anything to which he turned his 
attention, and therefore we may expect him to be logical at this 
point, if at any. 
It may be pointed out that, if the interpretation of his con-
THE DUALITY IN UNITY OF LANGUAGE 67 
cept of linguistic unity as primarily a unity within language be 
.correct, it provides an entirely new criterion by which to judge 
not only his language theory but virtually all areas of his thought. 
For, as Cassirer has said, language is the "fixed center" of his 
philosophy, and the understanding of that center is definitive. 
Our formulation of Hamann's concept of linguistic unity requires 
one important step which he did not take-the identification of 
the relational symbols of ordinary language as the archetypes 
of abstractions.42 But since this step seems to be an entirely justi-
fied deduction from his general principles, there appears to be no 
valid reason for not taking the step, especially since it clears up 
many difficulties. 
The puzzling fact is that Hamann himself did not identify 
the empty words of ordinary language as the archetypes of ab .. 
stract terms, for not only does such an identification seem im-
mediately implied, but he actually comes close to saying some-
thing of this sort on occasion. For instance, he asserts that ab-
stract thought "works over" the "straightforwardness of lan-
guage" into "pure hieroglyphs and types of ideal relations" or 
into an "indefinite something=x, that nothing remains but the 
soughing of the wind, a magic phantasmagoria .... " But he does 
not elucidate the notion of the straightforwardness of ordinary 
language, which he nevertheless says involves our "empirical 
knowledge." (VIl,8). In short, he does not take the final step of 
identifying the symbols which represent relations in contradis-
tinction to those which represent objects, and find in the former 
the source of abstractions as relations.43 
The explanation of this default is beyond question to be found 
in the fact that the problem of meaning in connection with 
language philosophy was not discussed in his day.44 It is an 
amazing fact that as great a linguist as Otto Jespersen could 
write as late as 1924 the following line in his Philosophy of 
Grammar: "I may be .... excused if I leave semantics45 out of 
consideration in this volume."46 This scholar considers it suffi-
cient to distinguish between an "inner meaning" and an "outward 
form" of linguistic phenomena, leaving aside all reference to 
objective meaning. Thus he holds merely to a word-concept or 
language-thought duality, which we have already found inade-
quate for an understanding of Hamann's thought. In the light of 
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the foregoing facts, our surprise at Hamann's failure to formu-
late a clear statement of the semantic duality in unity of language 
is somewhat mitigated, and we shall not wonder that Hamann 
wrote as late as 1784 that "we still lack a grammar of reason, as 
well as of language and its common elements, which are inter-
mingled just as the strings of the psaltery are intertwined, and 
yet sound harmoniously." (H.'s italics. G,V,22). Until very re-
cent years, the philosophers have sought to consider meaning 
apart from language, and the grammarians, conversely, have 
sought to consider language apart from meaning. Obviously this 
schism of thought and language was unnatural and finally self-
stultifying. Here indeed the Hamannian dictum that the phi-
losophers have separated that which nature has joined together 
may be fittingly invoked. That Hamann could not clarify his 
own thought on this subject more effectively was due in part to 
the general state of linguistic philosophy in his day-which was 
unable to furnish him even with a helpful terminology. 
Somewhat earlier we dealt with the concept of the sense-
unit, which was defined as the smallest meaningful combination 
of the linguistic signs of relations and objects. The necessity for 
the presence of both types of symbols in the sense-unit is now 
fully apparent. Reality is, according to Hamann's covert doctrine, 
possessed of a bipolar nature, and therefore every linguistic 
construction purporting to represent reality must reflect this 
nature. This is why, on Hamann's interpretation, the conceptual 
categories of the Aristotelian or Kantian variety are really not 
the units of thought after all. As abstractions, they represent only 
one side of reality, namely, relations, and are therefore unipolar. 
Only in conjunction with truly objective symbolism can they 
have any meaning. On this view, if the categories of thought are 
to be determined at all, they must be cast in another form. Their 
symbolism must conform to the dual or bipolar nature of reality. 
It is to be noted, however, that this duality is a functional unity. 
Therefore, one is justified in speaking of the duality in unity of 
language. Every linguistic unit which manifests this dual nature 
is likewise possessed of duality in unity. 
From the purely philological standpoint, the tacit doctrine 
of the sense-unit as the irreducible category of language suggests 
that this is the element common to all languages, however mani-
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fold the forms in which it appears. In the first letter of the Clover 
Leaf of Hellenic Letters, Hamann recognizes that all languages 
have certain "properties" in common. He appeals to what he 
calls the "migrations of the living languages," whose "mutable 
pattern" discloses their common elements with the "dead" lan-
guages, for light on the problem of the necessary constituents of 
a universal grammar.47 "There must be," he stated in the Essay 
con,cerning an Academic Question, "similarities among all human 
languages which are based on the uniformity of our nature." 
(II,121). He does not specify what these "~imilarities among 
all human languages" or the "uniformity of our nature" may be, 
but it may be deduced from his general principles that the simi-
larities among all languages are to be sought in the sense-units, 
and the uniformity of our nature in the coalescence of the percep-
tive and reflective powers of the mind as reflected in the sense-
unit. Thus indirectly Hamann provides us with his particular 
answer to the age-old question as to the common elements of all 
languages. On the basis of this conception it should be possible to 
predict of a vernacular-in advance of any specific knowledge 
of it-that it will be possessed of the sense-unit in some form, 
i.e., of the bipolar symbolism which represents the two aspects 
of cognition and the two aspects of reality. Therefore, if any 
sort of apriorism may be properly asserted of Hamann, it 
must be termed linguistic apriorism. Whether or not the doc-
trine of the sense-unit is a sound philological principle can-
not concern us here. It is interesting to note in passing, however, 
that our investigation discloses at this point a principle which 
is capable of empirical veri'fication or refutation, as the case 
may be. 
Confronted as we are with Hamann's implicit doctrine of the 
indestructible bipolarity of language, we are as near to the 
foundations of his concept of unity, and therefore of his total 
philosophy, as it is possible to approach. For here we are face 
to face with the quintessential symbol of the primordial together-
ness, the unity of the created, the mysterious coincidentia op-
positorum within experience. It is finally this togetherness whose 
disruption and dissolution Hamann is really decrying, whenever 
he complains of the scission of natural elements. Linguistic sym-
bolism, properly understood, constitutes the ultimate expression 
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of the "unity of the head as well as the division of the body 
into its limbs and their dijf erentia specifica," which is "the 
secret of the kingdom of God from its genesis to its apocalypse." 
(VI,20). Rationalistic philosophy is the persistent attempt to 
split asunder the unity of the created, to "dissect a body and an 
event into its .first elements," to have relations without things and 
things without relations. But this attempt-which we shall dis-
cuss more thoroughly in the next chapter-must, according to 
Hamann, fail, for "what God has joined together, no philosophy 
can put asunder." (G,V,496). 
Here, I believe, is the true source of Hamann's long and 
lasting influence on the poetic creativity of Goethe48 and the rea-
son for the latter's admission that Hamann was the author from 
whom he learned most.49 For Goethe, to whom the "original-
phenomenon"50 (das Urphi.inomen) was indivisible and the oc-
casion for reverential awe, was certainly influenced by no other 
writer who held to this conception as consistently and as ardently 
as Hamann. But, with Hamann, the conception is grounded in 
religious theism in the strictest sense of the word, and, as this 
study is intended to show, is based on important, if sometimes in-
articulate, philosophical insights. Thus, Hamann's conception of 
the "original-phenomenon" is to be distinguished from Goethe's 
on two scores: the religious and the philosophical presupposi-
tions. The Magus is often described as a "profound thinker." 
Nothing justifies this opinion of him more than his implied doc-
trine of the togetherness of relations and objects and their 
symbolic distinction within a functional unity. For a concern 
with terms and their relations is a concern with philosophically 
basic concepts. 
The indissoluble togetherness of the discrete elements of ex-
perience, most adequately symbolized in the sense-units of lan-
guage, is ultimately a creational51 togetherness. God has joined 
together from the beginning what reason attempts to separate. 
With this principle in mind, we cannot be surprised at Hamann's 
vigorous opposition to any theory of the human origin of lan-
guage. It was inevitable that Herder's anthropocentric theory of 
the origin of language should elicit Hamann's animadversions. 
The problem of the origin of language was much discussed 
during the period of the Enlightenment. But Hamann's views on 
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the subject were not formulated until the appearance of Herder's 
prize-wmning essay, Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772). 
Herder's principal argument is that man, in contrast to animals, 
possesses the capacity of reflection (Besonnenheit). Reflection 
enables him to single out one wave from the ocean of sensations 
which flood in upon him, and to preserve that one wave as a 
characteristic feature (M erkmal) of the experience which pro-
duced it. Thus the bleating of the lamb suggests itself as the 
characteristic feature or Merkmal of that animal. Herder held 
that animals have a language, but not in the sense of human lan-
guage. Man's inferiority to the animals in strength and instinct 
is compensated by his far greater mental faculties, which differ 
from those of the animals not merely in degree, but also in kind.52 
Herder's theory makes room for the argument that man in-
vented language ( Bacon, Locke) as well as for the opposed doc-
trine that language arose from the sounds of nature ( Condillac), 
and herein no doubt lay its great appeal to his contemporaries. 
But Herder's argument virtually eliminates the necessity for the 
creative activity of God. It is this aspect of his theory which 
evoked Hamann's censure. Hamann did not take up a position like 
that of Siissmilch, who conceived of God as intervening to solve 
an otherwise insoluble enigma. Hamann countered Herder's 
arguments by undertaking to demonstrate the latter's inconsis-
tencies and by appealing to general principles.53 
Hamann found Herder's theory of the origin of language 
unacceptable on two scores. First, it credits man rather than 
God with the creation of language. Secondly, it oversimplifies 
the facts of the linguistic process. Instead of recognizing that 
everything within experience is divine and human at the same 
time, Herder fell into the old error of the rationalists, and at-
tempted to understand man apart from God. "But everything 
divine is also human," Hamann wrote in The Last Wi1l and Testa-
ment o"f the Knight of Rosenkreuz concerning the Divine and 
Human Origin o"f Language in answer to Herder. (IV,23). "This 
communicatio of divine and human idiomatum is a fundamental 
law and the main key of all our knowledge and of the entire visible 
economy (Haushaltung) ." (IV,24). In Hamann's judgment, 
Herder sought to render human reason independent of God and 
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to absolutize its power. Hence stems his demurrer and his irony 
with regard to Herder's theory. 
Since everything is at once divine and human, it follows that 
language arose from the co-activity of God and man. (IV,24). The 
duality in unity of natural language is a symbol of the duality in 
unity of its origin, of the communicatio idiomatum of the human 
and divine. In crediting reflection (Besonnenheit) with creative 
power, Herder was, in effect, ignoring the dual nature of mind.54 
In the light of our previous interpretation, the following formu-
lation of Hamann's criticism of Herder seems to follow. 
Since all cognition is dependent upon some kind of verbalization, 
according to Herder's view, abstract language had to precede 
natural language. For reflection apart from perception can only 
produce abstract language. But it cannot be true that abstract 
language is prior in time to natural language. Hence, Herder's 
theory of the human origin of language is false. But, since it 
renders superfluous the creational togetherness of the discrete 
elements of mind and experience, it is not only false: it is irreli-
gious. It is destructive of the "sacramental" nature of language, 
a nature imparted to language by the Creator. 
By way of recapitulation of the argument of this chapter, 
we may say that language seems to be naturally the bearer of 
two distinguishable types of symbols, which are best diff eren-
tiated on the basis of relations and objects or on the basis 
of the reflective and perceptive capacities of the mind. Natural 
language is veridical in nature, because it deals in real relations 
and real objects. The purely relational symbolism of ordinary 
or natural language is susceptible, however, of expansion into ab-
stractions. How this occurs, Hamann's thought gives us no clue, 
but we do know that he considered abstract terms as indicating 
"mere relations." These terms must, in turn, be used in conjunc-
tion with the normal relational symbolism of ordinary language so 
that entire sentences in the abstract form are seen to be exclu-
sively relational in reference. The dual or bipolar nature of lan-
guage in the natural state has therefore been cancelled, and such 
transformed language is held to be merely unipolar in reference. 
In other words, the duality in unity of natural language has been 
destroyed. Objectively considered, this represents a divorce of 
language from one aspect of external experience; subjectively 
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considered, it represents a hypertrophy of the reflective capa-
cities of the mind and an atrophy of the perceptive capacities. 
It was further found that, although Hamann did not break 
with the traditional grammatical notion of parts of speech, iso-
lated words cannot, on his principles, be the units of language, 
since linguistic symbolism must always manifest a dual nature. 
That is, every genuine unit of language must be possessed of the 
distinct symbolism of relations and objects or of reflection and 
perception. The inevitable togetherness of these discrete ele-
ments is due to the creative act of God, and represents the most 
important unity within cognitive experience, since it is, in the 
words of Hugo Delff,a "visible image"55 of the interaction of the 
ideal and real. 
CHAPTER IV 
REASON AND EXPERIENCE 
If, as Hamann maintains, the final aim of the rationalist is to 
render man completely independent of objective experience, i.e., 
to break through "the confines of sensory experience"1 to an ab-
solutely autonomous position, he must entirely eliminate lan-
guage. For linguistic symbols, whether abstract or not, "belong 
with their elements to sensation and intuition." (H.'s italics. 
VII,13). Although he cannot accomplish this end, it is possible for 
the rationalist, with the aid of the "most powerful acid of rea-
son" (IV,436), to destroy the bipolar nature of language. In 
other words, since he cannot destroy the basic union of language 
and thought, he compromises by destroying the union of language 
with experience. Since language represents the final and most 
important link with experience, it is possible according to Hamann 
to understand the schismatic effect of rationalism upon the union 
of reason and experience by a consideration of the effects of ex-
cessive ratiocination upon language. 
The rationalist shares with the mystic a dissatisfaction with 
natural language, but unlike the mystic he does not seek to dis-
pense with language entirely _in order to gain an immediate in-
sight into the nature of reality. The rationalistic procedure in-
volves reducing language to "empty" or relational symbolism, 
which is adequate for the space and time categories of the mathe◄ 
matical disciplines, but which is totally inadequate for inter-
preting the meaning of life. The unquestionable successes of a 
Galileo, Kepler, and Newton as pure scientists cannot establish 
them or their methods as authoritative in the fields of philosophy 
and religion. (IV,25; cf. VI,39). The mathematical spirit in 
philosophy and religion, though its ideal aim is to eliminate that 
residuum of experience found in language, contents itself with 
its partial rejection of language. In the following paragraphs we 
shall note Hamann's estimate of the abstract method in general 
and then his reckoning with the thought of two contemporary 
thinkers of the first rank. 
In the otherwise inept characterization of the Magus' life 
and thought in the Encyclopaedia Britannica the author makes one 
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statement which comes very near to the truth about Hamann: 
"His fundamental thought is the unsatisfactoriness of abstrac-
tion."2 Now, although this statement omits all reference to Ha-
mann's constructive views, it is, with certain provisions, an ade-
quate formulation of the negative aspects of his thought. For 
this is the ever reiterated refrain of his "authorship" with regard 
to the great architectonic philosophic systems, and it is expressed 
with all the cogency, wit, satire, and even abuse that he can 
command. His valid insights into the nature of the abstracting 
process have been inadequately treated even by sympathetic 
scholars largely because of his all too often vituperative approach 
to the subject. 
The following statements and characterizations of abstrac-
tions will serve to give the reader a general idea of the Hamannian 
opinion and feeling in this connection. It should be said, how-
ever, that here, as almost everywhere else, it is exceedingly diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to give an adequate English rendering of 
his terminology. "A general term," he wrote, "is an empty bag 
(leerer S1chlauch), which changes its shape every moment, and, 
overextended, bursts." (G,V,513). Such descriptions as the fol-
lowing are applied to abstract language: "fancies" (Hirnge-
spinnste) (G,V, 516); "wax noses," i.e., deceivers (VII,420); 
"the handiwork of sophistry" (VII,420); even "thief and mur-
derer." (VII,36). The fancies of reason are used in the "arbitrary 
construction of philosophical primers and Bibles." (G,V,517). 
The arch-abstraction is, however, the term "reason" itself. 
"What," he asked rhetorically, "is most blessed reason. with 
its universality, infallibility, extravagance, certainty, and evi-
dence?" Thereupon he answered his own question: "An ens 
rationis, a dumb idol, to which a noisy superstition of unreason 
ascribes divine attributes." (H.'s italics. VI,16). Sometimes rea-
son and its products appear as passive creatures of the mind ;3 
at other times they appear as active and even vicious enemies 
of the truth.4 This imputation of a twofold nature to abstractions 
is illuminating for Hamann's critique of reason and language. 
"A small addition of new concepts has invariably changed the 
language of philosophy" (I,388), and this transmuted language 
has itself become a fruitful source of error. 
Not only are individual words of this type subjective, but, ac-
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cording to Hamann, entire systems constructed by means of them 
are mere displays of subjectivity with no genuine conformity to 
the structure of reality. As he opined of the Kantian Critique: 
"Nothing but pure words, pure concepts, for which the thing 
exists nowhere, nor can be proved." (G,V,518). In discussing the 
philosophers Spinoza and Franz Hemsterhuis (1720-1790), 
Hamann wrote that the "Euclidian shell of the one and Platonic 
shell of the other" were both "untrustworthy" as far as he was 
concerned. (G,V,603). Yet there are undoubtedly some things in 
Spinoza which Hamann, despite basic differences between the 
men, should have and iunder more favorable circumstances no 
doubt would have appreciated.5 This we may conclude from his 
attitude toward Rousseau, the content of whose religious phi-
losophy is actually alien to Hamann's historically and Biblically 
oriented views, but who never elicited the animadversions which 
Spinoza did. The uncongenial ideas of Spinoza's philosophy were 
rendered for Hamann all the more distasteful by the former'3 
method. Since the German word for spider is Spi,nne, Hamann 
exploited the similarity in form to the name Spinoza, and com-
pared the Dutch philosopher's system to Spinneweben or spider-
webs. (1,438). In this vein, he wrote: "The geometrical structure 
is natural for spiders and their admirer, Spinoza." (111,192). 
Carrying out the analogy further, he remarked, with scarcely 
pardonable irony, that Spinoza's method can catch only small in-
sects. Franz Hemsterhuis, likewise, though he manifests many af-
finities with Hamann,6 affronted the latter with the form of his 
philosophy, the "Platonic shell." Hamann conceded that the 
Platonic method may have been useful against the Sophists, but 
he saw it as finally unacceptable. Thus, his generally high esti-
mate of Plato did not extend to the latter's method, to which he 
applied the epithet "mousetrap." (G,V,636). · 
In the Platonic and Euclidian-Spinozistic methods Hamann 
saw simply the relational symbolism of language transformed 
into qualitative symbolism and finally hypostatized as real en-
tities. The analogy between such philosophizing and the activity 
of spiders and silkworms is, for his purposes, quite apt, for he 
judged that thinkers employing such methods are engaged in 
spinning systems out of their own resources very much as these 
creatures spin their respective webs and cocoons out of their own 
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bodies. (III,192). Therefore, such systems are visible displays of 
the imbalance of language, for the subjective element has com-
pletely eliminated the objective element. 
In Hamann's rejection of the scholastic method we encounter 
a genuinely Lutheran motif. For he shares with the great re-
former a distrust of discursive reasoning in theology. Luther's 
judgment that "only without Aristotle can we become theolog-
ians"7 can be adopted as descriptive of Hamann's opinion, if the 
name "Aristotle" is understood as a symbol of the scholastic 
method in general. His rejection of this method, like Luther's, 
was carried out in the interest of a Biblically oriented theology. 
"Reason and Scripture," he wrote to Jacobi, "are basically the 
same thing: the language of God." (G,V,247). 
The use of the abstract method, however, constitutes an im-
plied rejection of experience. The deep-seated aversion to ex-
perience which characterizes the rationalist is best revealed in his 
struggle to free himself from the language of God and the lan-
guage of man, thus from religious experience and all external 
experience whatsoever. Let us now consider the struggle of the 
rationalist to declare himself independent of experience in so far 
as that struggle is exemplified by two great contemporarks of 
Hamann. 
Blanke remarks in his essay "Hamann and Lessing" that 
"Johann Georg Hamann, the brilliant witness to the gospel ir 
the period of the Enlightenment, found in his age only two op-
ponents who were worthy of him: Lessing and Kant."8 Hamann's 
indictment of these two men was that they attempted to nullify 
the natural bond of man with experience. It is immaterial tl,at 
Lessing was attempting to separate man from the Biblical revela-
tion, and that Kant was attempting to separate man from 0 .. di-
nary human speech. Both were engaged in fundamentally the 
same task-to render reason autonomous. Both men criticized 
the claims made on behalf of reason by the typical Enlighteners, 
but according to Hamann they were nevertheless both infected 
with the same faith in reason. It is in his judgment of Lessing's 
view of revelation that Hamann's theological differences with the 
Enlightenment are brought into sharpest focus. 
With regard to revelation Lessing's thesis may be thus sum-
marized :9 Individual experience of Christ as a present reality 
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is necessary to establish his divinity. But it is impossible to estab-
lish that divinity on the basis of miracles, since the miracles 
recorded deal with past events. As past realities they cannot 
convince in the present. That which can convince in the present, 
however, is Christ's doctrines, for they manifest an inner logic 
which commends them to us as necessary rational truths. But 
once apprehended through the medium of the historical revela-
tion, the revelatory record may then fall away. Thus the revela-
tory form is accidental. Obviously the virtual autonomy of reason 
is guaranteed, for revelation is simply a medium through which 
reason is brought to a consciousness of its own powers.10 
Lessing's estimate of revelation differed from that of the 
orthodox Enlighteners in that, whereas they desired an immediate 
break with the necessity for revelation, and desired at once to 
supplant faith with reason and revealed religion with natural re-
ligion, Lessing considered it necessary to delay the severance from 
the Biblical record until such time when mankind shall have at-
tained the age of maturity. At some future stage in the deve-
lopment of mankind, revelation, by virtue of the augmented ra-
tionality of mankind, may be dispensed with. This naturally fol-
lows from his principles as explicated in the Education of the Hu-
man Race that humanity, conceived as a sort of corporate in-
dividual, is in process of education from a less rational to a 
more rational mode of existence. On Lessing's view, Hamann 
charged, God must be conceived as a summus paedogogus who is 
gradually guiding his pupil, the human race, to be less and less 
dependent upon revelational experience and to become more and 
more dependent upon reason. (VI,128). Or, to state it another 
way, God is engaged in guiding mankind out of the age of faith 
into the age of reason. This process constitutes, in effect, a transi-
tion from a state of heteronomy to a state of autonomy. In con-
trast with the other Enlighteners, who conceived God as a 
summus philosophus (VI,128), and who were willing to engage 
confidently even in the present age in a search for eternal truths 
to supersede the truths of revelation, Lessing was merely in-
clined to postpone the ideal of autonomous reason until a future 
stage be reached. Hamann's opinion of Lessing's theology may be 
summed up in his own words from a letter to Herder in 1780 con-
cerning the Education, of the Human Race, which had just ap-
REASON AND EXPERIENCE 79 
peared: "Nothing but the transmigration of ideas into new 
formulas and words. . . . no reformation-spirit, no conception 
which might deserve a Magnificat."11 
This reckoning of Hamann with Lessing is exceedingly im-
portant not only for an understanding of the former, but also 
for an understanding of the intellectual history of eighteenth 
century Germany, for we have here a settling of accounts be-
tween two critics of the Enlightenment who had otherwise a 
great deal in common. Both were enemies of the Wolffian ra-
tionalism in belles lettres12 and in religion.13 Both appealed to 
Luther as their mentor.14 Both were bearers of the critical spirit 
of the Enlightenment, a spirit which was willing, if necessary, to 
turn even upon itself. And yet it is patent that a great gulf sepa-
rated them, a gulf which Hamann clearly recognized. This gulf 
was constituted by Lessing's virtual rejection of experience, a re-
jection which may be made clearer by his implied endorsement 
of a type of rational proposition contingently available for reli-
gious knowledge.15 
An analysis of Lessing's idea of the gradual emancipation 
of reason from revelation by virtue of the self-authenticating na-
ture of Christ's teachings reveals that he was simply withdrawing 
temporarily from a more to a less ambitious estimate of rationa-
lism. If the essence of the Leibniz-Wolffian rationalism required 
in the last resort an appeal to the analytic judgment,16 i.e., to 
the type of proposition in which the predicate is obtained by 
analysing the subject, then Lessing may be said, in effect, to 
have rejected contingently this type of judgment in his view of 
revelation. Although in his writings on religion Lessing was 
dealing primarily with what would have later been called value-
judgments, we may simply treat them as factual judgments for 
the purpose of clarification. In admitting the necessity of the 
"historical truths" of revelation for an initial insight into their 
validity, he was at the same time conceding that the answer was 
not known beforehand, i.e., the predicate was not really con-
tained in the subject. However, after revelation has made clear 
the nature of the subject-here Christ's doctrines-reason could 
thereupon confirm their truth, and thereafter deduce all that is 
further necessary. By way of parallel, it might be suggested that 
Lessing was here adopting for his view of revelation some-
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thing very much like Kant's synthetic judgment a priori, since he 
admitted the original necessity of experience. But the parallel 
ends here, for Lessing apparently looked for the day when some-
thing like the analytic judgment would be restored, i.e., when 
reason should have become sufficiently rational to dispense even 
with the initial necessity for revelation,17 whereas Kant never 
looked for the day when the human mind should have so developed 
that experience would no longer be necessary for the synthetic 
judgment a priori. 
But even though experience in the form of Biblical revelation 
was still required by Lessing for. the first flash of insight into 
the truth of Christ's teachings, it virtually guaranteed in Ha-
mann's eyes the autonomy of reason. For here there is no neces-
sity for constant recourse to experience, in this case to revela-
tion.18 One can imagine the• effect of this proposition on the 
Magus, for whom the "repeated reading" (I,53) of the Scriptures 
was a confirmed habit, and who not only "dared to make the 
Bible the starting point of his thinking,"19 but who made it the 
constant and final norm of his entire philosophy. In the end, he 
saw no more real difference between Lessing's and Wolff's 
theology than between what he ironically termed "the powerful 
differences of analytic and synthetic judgments." (VII,4; cf. VI, 
49). Both establish the virtual a priority of religious knowledge. 
Another point to be noticed in Lessing's thought is the discon-
tinuity between reason and the temporal-historical process. He 
asserts that "accidental historical truth can never become proof 
of the necessary truths of reason."20 That is to say, there are two 
kinds of religious truth, one merely historical, the other purely 
rational. The implication is that rational truth is superior to his-
torical truth, or, to state it still another way, truth manifested in 
the temporal process is discontinuous with rational truth. This 
constitutes, according to Lessing, "the loathsome, wide ditch 
across which I cannot get, however often and earnestly I have 
attempted the leap."21 This is virtually a declaration of reason's 
independence of the time-process in so far as it is history. But 
for Hamann historical truths were both "temporal and eternal" 
at once (VII,57) ; the two cannot be separated and set over 
against one another. For reason itself is a fragment of history,22 
and the truths which it apprehends are no "eternal truths" alone, 
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but are also "constantly temporal" truths. (VII,41). Thus, for 
him there can be no double religious truth, with one aspect taking 
precedence over the other. 
Although Lessing's theory of revelation elicited from the 
Magus a criticism which is most enlightening with reference to 
the latter's thought-world, no account of the generally schismatic 
effect of reason upon the togetherness of reason and experience 
is complete apart from reference to Kant. Not only was Hamann 
the personal friend of Kant-though in a peculiar and limited 
sense-for more than a quarter of a century, but he was also al-
ways the interested spectator and remarkable critic of Kant's 
achievements. The relationship of the Magus to Kant is a long 
and interesting story,23 and it is reflected in epic proportions in 
letters like that of the twenty-fifth of July, 1759 to Kant and 
in writings like the Socratic Memoirs (1759) and the Metacriti-
que (1784). Kant's effort, at the instance of a mutual friend, J. C. 
Berens, to dissuade the young Hamann from the religious stand-
point he had adopted after his religious experience of 1758,24 his 
overture to Hamann for the purpose of securing the latter as a 
collaborator on a proposed textbook in physics for children,25 
and his assistance in Hamann's procurement of a minor position 
with the tax authorities of East Prussia in 1767 provide valuable 
material for the interpretation of each of these men individually 
and in their interrelationship. It is, however, preeminently in 
Hamann's response to the Critique of Pure Reason that one finds 
the fundamental differences between the thought of the two men 
laid bare. 
One of the most striking things about the Hamannian estimate 
of Kant is the revaluation which it has undergone in recent years. 
Time was when it was simply taken for granted in scholarly 
circles--even if with an ineffectual dissent here and there26-that 
Hamann totally failed to understand Kant, and the former's meta-
critical work was therefore dismissed as an "experience of mis-
understanding."27 But with regard to this opinion various com-
mentators have, especially in the last quarter of a century, 
vigorously demurred, adducing solid reasons for so doing. Thus, 
Blanke,28 Nadler,29 and Metzke,30 approaching Hamann from the 
theological, literary, and philosophical standpoints respectively, 
and with over a century and a half of scholarly investigation of 
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the Hamannian problem behind them, concur in the opinion that 
Hamann not only understood the Kantian philosophy, but that 
what he had to say concerning it is significant indeed. The in-
creasing dissatisfaction with the stereotyped misinterpretation 
of Hamann's philosophic efforts and the need for an objective 
revaluation moved the Konigsberger Gelehrte Gesellschaft about 
two decades ago to offer a prize for the best essay on Hamann's 
philosophy.31 If it be true that the comprehension of Hamann's 
meaning has grown with the years, events have proved Goethe 
wrong in his prediction that Hamann's writings would become 
more and more incomprehensible to future generations.32 It is 
true that Hamann's allusions are obscurer to the twentieth cen-
tury than to the eighteenth; but it is equally true that the 
twentieth century is more receptive to his basic ideas than the 
eighteenth. After all, Hamann himself looked for an increasing 
understanding of his purpose and his major ideas with the pas-
sage of time. "One easily overcomes the double affliction," he 
wrote in The Crusades of the Philologist, "of ,not being under-
stood by his contemporaries, and therefore of being mistreated, 
through the taste of the abilities of a better posterity." (H.'s 
italics. II,114). 
Those who charge Hamann with failure to understand the 
philosophical systems he attacked are right in one respect and 
quite wrong in another and more important respect. They are 
right, in so far as they mean by "understanding" a thorough ex-
ploration of the details of a system after the manner of an audi-
tor examining financial records for calculational errors. They 
are wrong, however, in so far as they mean by that term a grasp 
of the fundamental presuppositions of a philosophy, its general 
method, and its immediate and ultimate consequences. A few 
months before his death, Hamann wrote: "I still consider it fruit-
less labor to do patchwork on subordinate principles and to dis-
cover their contradiction." (G,V,637). It is an error to suppose 
that Hamann's opposition to abstract thinking arose from intel-
lectual incapacity. It may be true, as Bertrand Russell asserts, 
that "many people have a passionate hatred of abstraction .... 
because of its intellectual difficulty; but as they do not wish to give 
this reason, they invent all sorts of others that sound grand."33 
But to this class of persons Hamann does not belong. Even his 
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most merciless critics have conceded his ability, though deploring 
at the same time his antirationalistic tendencies.34 Actually Ha-
mann utilized abstraction in his campaign against abstraction. 
Therefore, Unger was led to complain of the abstractness of 
Hamann's central notion of language.35 As this study is de-
signed to show, there is inescapably implied in the Hamannian 
language philosophy a trenchant criticism of the abstracting 
process, and indeed what is explicit is a very instructive and 
valuable criticism. Hamann perceived deeply and wrestled con-
stantly with the problem summed up by Whitehead in his state-
ment that "thought is abstract; and the intolerant use of abstrac-
tions is the major vice of the intellect."36 Having cleared the 
ground for Hamann's reckoning with the critical philosophy of 
Kant, we may now proceed to examine that reckoning in its es-
sential features. 
On the basis of the Magus' presuppositions, it is not difficult to 
understand why he condemned the great speculative systems of 
philosophy. Yet, one should expect from him a feeling of sym-
pathy and appreciation for the efforts of his compatriot, Kant. 
For it was the latter's self-imposed task to define the limits of 
reason. " .... It is my task to answer the question," he wrote, 
"how far reason can go, without the material presented and the 
aid furnished by experience."37 If the Enlighteners had promised 
all things in the name of reason, Kant attempted to show what 
could be legitimately expected of it. If, from our point of histori-
cal vantage, we are able to see Kant's work clearly as one of the 
great water-sheds in the history of intellectual development, 
it was not so easy for his contemporaries to appraise his signifi-
cance for the future.38 Mendelssohn, who distinguished himself 
from most of the contemporary rationalists by his clairvoyance 
as to Kant's radical significance, if not with reference to his 
grasp of Kant's system, symbolized for all the orthodox Enlight-
eners the actual state of affairs. He accepted stoically the dash-
ing of his philosophic hopes by the "all-destroying Kant."39 
"I know," he confessed by way of capitulation, "that my philo-
sophy is no longer the philosophy of the times."40 On the other 
hand, there were those who sensed in Kant a danger from an 
other side, and, to use Hoffding's phrase, afforded "significant 
opposition."41 Chief among these was Hamann, who was joined 
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by Herder and Jacobi. It was the non-rational aspects of human 
nature and traditional values which they saw threatened by the 
Kantian critique, and which they were determined should not be 
minimized or ignored. 
As far as Hamann was concerned, Kant's modified rationalism 
was, if anything, more dangerous than the vulnerable rationalism 
of Wolff; for Hamann, it meant simply the strategic retreat of ra-
tionalism to an allegedly impregnable citadel. Though Hamann 
was one of the very nrst to publish his reactions to the Critique, 
the form his answer was to take required time for its develop-
ment. A few months after the appearance of the Critique, how-
ever, he compared Kant favorably with Hume-a compliment to 
Kant-but he qualified this by asserting that he pref erred Hume, 
since the latter recognized the role of faith in knowledge. (VI, 
187). However much Hamann should have had in common with 
Kant, in the end he repudiated and reprobated Kantianism. We 
saw that Lessing was for the Magus always at heart an En-
lightener; so likewise was Kant. As Metzke says : 
It is necessary to see this reckoning of Hamann with Kant in 
relation to Hamann's general attack on the Enlightenment. Only' 
thus-and not in isolation-will one understand it properly, and-
without apology!-do justice to it, for thus Hamann saw Kant. 
Everything that Hamann wrote to Kant or against Kant is, in 
principle, a reckoning with the Enlightenment,42 
Hamann's evaluation of the Critique is found chiefly in his 
Review of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the Metacritique, and 
in his letters. I shall draw chiefly on the Metacritique as con-
taining the essence of his criticism. The question has always been 
raised as to whether this essay really concerns itself with Kant's 
system at all. This question may be answered affirmatively or 
negatively, according to the point of view. It is plain that Ha-
mann does not criticize Kant on the latter's own terms. He could 
not agree that reason can be its own arbiter, its own "organon 
and criterion." Therefore, he could not embark upon a detailed 
criticism. Rather he preferred to "keep to the foundation-pillars, 
which are worm-eaten." (VII,315). The foundation pillars are 
constituted by logic in divorce from experience. Kant had clearly 
laid it down that it was his aim to trade the limits of reason by 
means of reason itself. "Common logic,'' he wrote, "presents me 
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with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple opera-
tions of reason." 43 But for Hamann the only arbiter of reason was 
language. As we saw in the previous chapter, reason and exper-
ience become cognitively effective in language only, where their 
characteristic symbols are distinguishable from one another. 
Therefore it is unwarranted to abstract a part and to set the 
part up as the organon of the whole.44 
If the objection be raised at this juncture that Hamann him-
self had recourse to logic in his attempt to refute Kant, and 
therefore vitiated somewhat his own argument, it must be con-
ceded that this is the case, but the important fact for our under-
standing of him is that in the process he called attention to the 
empirical fact of language as the sine qua non of rational dis-
course, a fact which in Hamann's view Kant ignored. Hamann's 
struggle here was to find a common universe of discourse with 
Kant. It is idle to consider the self-consistency of another's dis-
course, if one does not wish to discourse at all about that subject. 
If Kant's Critique may be described as an investigation of reason 
in the light of reason, the Metacritique may be described as a 
prolegomenon to an investigation of reason in the light of lan-
guage. 
The Metacritique provides us with what might be called, in 
Spenglerian terms, a morphology of the history of the rational 
method in philosophy. Hamann desired to set the Kantian effort 
to delimit the province of reason in its world-historical frame-
work. According to Hamann, it is the second great stage in the 
evolution, or better, devolution of reason. The first stage was 
attained in the Enlightenment, when reason was freed from de-
pendence upon social experience, i.e., tradition. "The first purifi-
cation of philosophy consisted in the partly misunderstand, part-
ly unsuccessful attempt to make reason independent of all cus-
tom and tradition and all faith in them." (VII,5). Here Hamann 
had reference to the attempts of the pre-Kantian rationalists to 
free reason of all heteronomous influences-the authoritative 
church, the authoritative book or creed, and the authoritative 
political system. In this stage, reason asserted an autonomous 
character, as opposed to its former heteronomous character. 
Formerly it was in the service of tradition; now it attacked and 
disposed of tradition. Lessing, though he provisionally retained 
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the Biblical revelation must, as we have seen, be included here. The 
second stage in the "purification" of reason was reached in the 
work of Kant. For it was he who attempted to divorce reason from 
the one thing the Enlighteners had left in company with it, name-
ly, individual experience. "The second purification," Hamann 
continued, "is even more transcendental and aims at freedom 
from experience and its everyday induction." (VII,5). This con-
stitutes Kant's contribution, his "purism." But even at this stage 
there still remains an empirical element-language. For the 
visible and audible signs of language belong to experience. Yet 
it is precisely from experience that Kant seeks to separate rea-
son, in order to establish its just claims. 
But Kant does not lead us into the third and :final stage of the 
process of purification. By way of irony, Hamann suggests the 
development of the last stage of reason, the stage of complete 
autonomy. "The third, highest and, as it were, empirical purism 
concerns therefore language, the first and last organon and 
criterion of reason, without any other credentials than tradition 
and usage." (VII,6). This is further, however, than Kant can 
go, for it is manifestly impossible to separate the invisible mean-
ing or conceptual correlate entirely from its empirical form in 
what Hamann termed the "sacrament of language." (VII,16). 
Kant still must depend on his rarefied abstract terminology. As 
a result the third purism must necessarily suffer shipwreck. But 
the advantage of this reductio ad absurdum is that it reveals the 
fundamental error in the whole process of purification. The error 
consists in attempting to separate that which cannot be separated. 
"Sensation and understanding" have "a common root" which 
nourishes both as long as they remain in living contact with it 
(VII,10), i.e., as long as they remain united in the manner in 
which natural language unites them. 
It may further be noted that Kant is charged with an "old 
cold prejudice in favor of mathematics."45 This is held to account 
for his apriorism, and is the logical outcome of his "gnostic hatred 
for matter" or "mystical love for form." (VII,7). Thus the pro-
gress of reason on its journey of purification is not a progress into 
life, but an egress from life, or from sense experience. 
A word should be said here about the charge that Kant was 
motivated by a "mystical love for form." For one of the most 
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fundamental characteristics of Hamann also is his devotion to 
form. Indeed, in an important sense all of his writings subsequent 
to his conversion were designed to constitute an apology for the 
form of revelation as ultimately inseparable from its content. But 
it should be noticed that he indicted Kant for his "mystical love 
for form." By this Hamann apparently meant a love for form 
conceived as interior to the mind, i.e., for the mathematically 
ideal form. Since it was Hamann's concern to call attention to 
the union of inner and outer experience in the "sacrament of lan-
guage," Kant's attempt to separate the two could only appear to 
him strange indeed. That Kant attempted to execute a thorough 
critical investigation upon the differentia of reason and experi-
ence by virtually ignoring the most important form of experi-
ence, namely, language, was incomprehensible to the man who 
described his philosophy as "verbalism." But Kant did not, for 
he could not, carry his thought to its logical conclusion. He did not 
enter upon the third stage of purification, which Hamann main-
tained to be the inevitable culmination of this tendency. Thus 
Kant does not really belong to those who openly abjure the word. 
He was too much of the reformer of language-even though un-
wittingly-for that. Therefore, in the end Hamann's ascription 
of mystical tendencies to Kant must be interpreted as an admoni-
tion to that thinker. 
If we translate Hamann's thought as outlined in the pre-
ceding paragraphs into the terms I have suggested as being 
helpful in the interpretation of his philosophy, we arrive at 
something like this: By virtue of their greater confidence in 
reason, the Enlighteners expanded the symbolism of relations-
which is found in natural language in the form of syntactical or 
"empty" words and devices-into abstractions, and thereupon 
proceeded to regard these abstractions as faithful surrogates for 
real entities, from which might be deduced a great deal of knowl-
edge of a theological, cosmological, and generally ontological 
character. 
Kant, however, dissatisfied with the extravagant claims of 
the Enlighteners, confined himself, as it were, to that which is 
verbally represented in natural language by the empty words and 
syntactical devices mentioned above, and found that they tell us 
precisely nothing except the relations of space and time, either 
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grammatically or philosophically speaking.46 But since they do 
tell us this much, he posited time and space as pure forms of 
intuition. For, in the words of the Critique of Pure Reason,, "the 
transcendental Aesthetic cannot contain any more than these 
two elements-space and time."47 Of course, Kant was unaware 
of his debt to language in this procedure, and since he failed to 
recognized that debt, it is not surprising that he arrived at the 
notion that space and time are subjective. That is, if he over-
looked his obvious debt to language, it was inevitable that he also 
overlook his less obvious debt to experience for the concepts of 
space and time. Kant was willing, within limits, to expand the 
relational symbolism of natural language into qualities, hence 
into abstractions, but was careful to avoid the error of the ear-
lier rationalists and refused to assign an ontological status to 
them. His modesty in this regard, however, does not compensate 
for his failure to recognize that there can be no "pure," i.e., 
experience-free forms of intuition. Hence, the final stage of the 
purification of reason can never be reached, and the most am-
bitious attempt of all to establish the independence of reason 
has suffered shipwreck. 
The preceding paragraphs are, of course, a hypothetical state-
ment of what seems implied in Hamann's critique of Kantianism 
in the light of our interpretation of his language theory. Not only 
does such an interpretation seem to follow from his major pre-
mises but also it does not conflict with his characteristic con-
clusions concerning the nature of language. In his own way, Ha-
mann was addressing himself to the same problem as Kant-the 
problem as to what is presupposed in the cognitive process. Here 
follows the general answer to that question: 
If it therefore still remains a principal question as to how th.e 
capacity to think is possible-the capacity to think, to the right of 
and to the left of, before and without, with and beyond experience, 
no deduction is necessary to establish the genealogical priority of 
language and its heraldry over the seven sacred fu;nctions of 
logical propositions and conclusions. Not only the entire capacity 
to think rests on language .... but language is also the center of 
the misunderstanding of reason with itself. • • • • (H.'s italics 
VII, 9). 
We have already considered the process by which language be-
comes "the center of the misunderstanding of reason with itself." 
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Kant constructed, Hamann says, "the magic castle of his critique" 
by means of language, and by means of a proper understanding 
of language "can the structure be dissolved."48 
With me the question is not so much: What is reason? bu.t 
rather: What is language? and here I presume to be the basis of 
all paralogisms and antinomies which one blames on the former; 
th~refore it happens that one takes words for concepts and con-
cepts for the things themselves. (G, V, 15). 
Thus the paralogisms and antinomies, which play such an impor-
tant part in Kant's philosophy, are held to be traceable to lan-
guage, and not to reason. 49 
Hamann concluded the M etacritique with the statement that 
he left it to each reader "to unfold the clenched fist into an open 
hand." (VII,16). Our attempt to do this has consisted in the link-
ing of abstractions, as the signs of relations, with the "empty" 
words of ordinary discourse, and, in the light of this identifica-
tion, we have undertaken a reconsideration of his verbalistic phi-
losophy. If this interpretation seems to give a somewhat positivis-
tic coloring to his theory of language, I nevertheless believe 
that it is quite in his in this area. But this tendency must be 
set over against his religious beliefs, particularly over against his 
belief in a transcendent God. In Hamann there is a singular wit-
ness to the upward sweep of revelation toward heavenly things 
and simultaneously to the downward sweep of that same revela-
tion toward earthly things. On the one hand, he could assert that 
"our philosophy must begin from heaven and not from the 
theater anatomi,cum and the dissection of a cadaver" (VII,149), 
and, on the other hand, that his philosophy "stands and walks 
with its feet on the ground." (VII,400). Blanke recognizes the 
importance of this facet of Hamann's thought, and stresses what 
he terms the principle of Geistleiblichkeit as one of Hamann's 
four basic theological principles.50 In the Metacritique Hamann 
charges that Kant violates this principle by "separating things 
which cannot be separated at all." 
Whatever may be the final judgment of scholarship upon Ha-
mann's metacritical work, there can be no doubt that we do find 
in it most valuable insights into the Hamannian thought-world 
and a valid criticism of Kant for his neglect of the relation of 
language to cognition. With reference to this latter point we find 
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Hamann anticipating modern developments in philosophy. It is 
indeed astonishing to find him emphasizing in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century the centrality of language in all thought.61 
It is true that he did not think his principles through to their 
logical conclusion, but it must be remembered that others did not 
travel as far as he did along this road. When he wrote to Jacobi 
in 1787 the line: "What in your language is 'being' I should pre-
fer to call the 'word'," he was speaking not only to Jacobi but to 
the whole company of those whose discourse was in terms of the 
traditional philosophy of Western culture. Hamann would have 
had to be born in the twentieth century for that statement to meet 
with serious consideration. Therefore, that he accomplished as 
much as he did despite his isolation in this area and despite his 
owh personal shortcomings is impressive. At the least, one must 
concur in Hegel's opinion that in the Metacritique-the con-
centrated essence of the Hamannian verbalistic philosophy-we 
have to do with a "remarkable" and "ingenious" essay.62 
Hamann felt that those who sit confidently in judgment on the 
final questions of human existence, relying principally upon rea-
son, can usually be shown to be blind or naive with reference to 
experience close at hand or, as he put it, "befuddled in their 
domestic affairs." (IV,25). His favorite and most important ex-
ample of this was, of course, the myopia of the rationalists with 
reference to language. Lessing exemplifies the violence done upon 
the divine word by autonomous reason; Kant exemplifies the 
violence done upon the human word by that same reason. Thus 
it is the perennial tendency of reason to attempt the withdrawal 
from language and therefore from experience. But since the ra-
tionalist will speak, he must have recourse to language, even 
if rationally transformed language. But his discourse is in as it 
were purely syntactical symbols. The bipolar unity of language 
has been destroyed by excessive reflection. 
The uniting bond of reason and experience, "the bond of 
nature" (G,V,517), which is rendered visible or audible by the 
duality in unity of natural language, is exterior to the mind, in-
deed it lies in the bosom of ultimate reality. Its character is secret 
and hidden,53 and is a mystery of the creation. Kant's assertion 
that the union of reason and experience is effected by the mind by 
virtue of his doctrine that the categories of understanding and 
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intuition are united by means of the productive imagination54 
Hamann could not accept. (VII,6). He could not accept it any 
more than one could accept the proposition that the mind can pre-
scribe in advance the proportions of relational and objective sym-
bolism in any given statement of ordinary language. First, the 
statement must be made, and then one is in a position to com-
pare the two types of symbols. Obviously something other than 
imagination has been the determining factor in their union, 
for in order to be accepted as true, the statement must correspond 
to reality, and reality is not interior to the mind. The Kantian 
device of the productive imagination could be for Hamann but 
another means whereby Kant desired to render the mind in-
dependent of experience, for in this case the uniting bond in a 
product of the mind, even if "concealed in the depths of the soul." 
Only on the basis of Hamann's view of the decisive impor-
tance of natural language for cognition do his ambitious claims 
for a verbalistic philosophy make sense. Consider the follow-
ing lines, written to Jacobi about a year before his death, when he 
should have been a broken and beaten man on account of his ill 
health, his poverty, and his vocational crises: 
Idealism and realism-Christianity and Lutheranism. The 
former two are in my eyes ideal-the latter two real. Between 
your two ·extremes there is lacking a mean, which I might call 
verbalism. My twins are not extremes, but allies and closely re-
lated. I desire to refute the Berlin idealization of Christianity and 
Lutheranism by means of a historical and physical realism, to 
oppose experience to pure reason. To straighten out this tangle 
is precisely the herculean task which I have in mind, because I 
do not know at which end I should properly attack the matter. 
As you yourself say, the real remains, the ideal depends more on 
us, and is mutable by means of nominalism. Our concepts of 
things are mutable by means of a new language, by means. of new 
signs, which make us aware of new relations or rather restore the 
oldest, original, true ones. 
Christianity and Lutheranism are res facti, living organs and in-
struments of the Godhead and humanity.55 
It should be remembered that Hamann makes no important 
distinction between the Berlin rationalism and Kantianism, and 
that therefore his "herculean task" includes the refutation of 
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the latter as well as of the former. The call to experience is 
the call to verbal experience, not to the verbal experience of 
man in isolation, but of man in relation to the scripturally 
mediated divine Logos. Further, "nominalism" or the capacity of 
the mind of invent names for relations is seen as the- freedom 
which language grants to man, a freedom which may be abused 
by application of the dissolving acids of reason. It is apparent 
that he looked to natural language for a demonstration of the 
structure of reality. Here we find the most likely source of his 
peculiar unconcern for system56 precisely in what he aptly termed 
the "philosophical century." (II,179). 
The struggle of the rationalist to free himself from experi-
ence-a struggle which Hamann saw epitomized in Lessing and 
Kant-consists in the effort to free himself from the conditions 
which are binding upon reason. These conditions are best demon-
strated by an appeal to natural language, for a single sentence 
of natural language57 is a demonstration of the "transfer and 
communicatio idiomatum of the mental and material, of extension 
and mind, of body and thought." Nature, "whose Lord and 
Founder is a Spirit" (G,V,495) is faithfully reflected in lan-
guage, and it is the natural conditions of knowledge, symbolically 
revealed in language, which the rationalist seeks to circumvent. 
As the result of our investigation, the relation of the "empty" 
words of natural language to the words referring to objects 
may serve as the clue to a better understanding of Hamann's 
conception of the relation of reason to experience. What need for 
an artificially constructed organon or criterion of the relation of 
reason to experience, Hamann asked in effect, when the organon 
or criterion is present before our very eyes? The subordination 
of syntactical or relational symbolism to objective symbolism in 
natural language renders manifest why reason should be "the 
servant, and not the law-giver of nature." (G,V,16). 
From the theological standpoint, the most imp9rtant im-
plication of our findings-and one which suggests a fruitful area 
of research beyond the scope of this study-is the opportunity 
it affords for a better understanding of Hamann's conception of 
the relation of faith and reason.58 For, if our interpretation be 
correct, it should be possible to point to natural language as a 
"parable" of this relation. On this interpretation, Hamann would 
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seem to say that since there can be no meaningful utterances in 
natural language without the presence of the discrete symbols we 
have been discussing, either explicitly or implicitly, likewise 
there can be no religious knowledge without both faith and reason. 
Reason held to its proper domain can no more conflict with faith 
than, for instance, a preposition or an adverb can conflict with a 
substantive in ordinary language. If a conflict takes place 
between them, it can only mean that one type of symbol is en-
croaching upon the domain of the other. This is what Hamann 
seems to imply, when he describes abstractions as relations. 
To proceed on the basis of faith alone as in the case of 
Tertullianism, 59 or virtually on the basis of reason alone, as in 
the case of Averroism,60 is comparable to speaking in unipolar 
rather than in the bipolar symbolism of natural language. Ter-
tullianism would be comparable to a discourse entirely in the 
symbolism of objects, and Averroism to a discourse entirely in 
the symbolism of relations. The manner in which such a proce-
dure can be rendered graphic we have previously discussed. 
In spite of his antirationalism, Hamann recognizes the neces-
sity for the cooperation of faith and reason in all knowledge, 
but especially in religious knowledge. Neither is, in isolation, 
an absolute good.61 
Reason is the source of all truth and of all errors. It is the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Therefore, both parties 
are right and both are wrong which deify it and blaspheme it. 
Faith likewise is the source of unfaith and of superstition. 'Out 
of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing.' (G, V, 513). 
Statements to the effect that "faith needs reason just as much 
as the latter needs the former" (G,V,504), may be predicated of 
language as well as of the specific problem of the relation of faith 
and reason, for, as we have noted, both faith and reason are es-
sential elements of cognition symbolically present in language 
before the excessive intervention of reason eliminates faith and 
its peculiar symbolism. 
Our investigation in this chapter has shown that Hamann 
held excessive ratiocination to issue in a "reworking" of natural 
language into abstract form, and that this process, inaugurated 
by the desire of the abstract thinker to attain complete autonomy, 
issues in a destruction of the functional duality in unity of 
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language. The philosophies of Lessing and Kant were seen as 
classic expressions of this tendency, even though the rationalism 
of each was ostensibly more cautious than that of their predeces-
sors in the German Enlightenment. The opportunity which nat-
ural language affords of studying in concrete form the proper 
relation of reason and experience or of reason and faith is neg-
lected by the abstract thinker. He thus has no adequate criterion 
by which to judge the proper union of these disparate elements of 
cognition. 
Russell has said of Leibniz that he "drew inferences from syn-
tax to the real world."62 Hamann, we may be sure, would agree 
but would retort that this is precisely the difficulty, for the ab-
stract thinker deals in "mere relations" or in "relations without 
things," and, from the linguistic standpoint, these are to be 
equated with the syntactical symbols of ordinary language in iso-
lation from symbols referring to objects. But this, according to 
Hamann, is understood only on the basis of an appeal to natural 
language. "He who does not enter into the womb of language," he 
wrote, "which is the Deipara of our reason, is not adept for the 
baptism of a church and state reformation." (H.'s italics. VI,39). 
For only thereby can he understand the final results of the ab-
stract transformation of language. Hamann's unwaveringly hos-
tile attitude toward the abstracting process is nowhere better ex-
pressed than in Aesthetics in a Nutshell: 
0 for a muse like the fire of a goldsmith and like the soap of 
the fullers !-She will dare to cleanse the natural use, of the senses 
from the unnatural use of abstractions, by which our concepts of 
things are just as mutilated as the name of the Creator is sup-
pressed and blasphemed. (H.'s italics. II, 283-284). 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Our investigation in this study has established that language 
and thought are inextricably intertwined for Hamann, and that 
he conceived the abstracting processes of reason to consist es-
sentially in an excessive functioning of the purely reflective 
capacities of the mind with the resultant expansion of the purely 
relational symbolism of ordinary language. According to Ha-
mann, the aim of the rationalist is to render reason autonomous or 
independent of experience. Although this goal is impossible of 
attainment, it is possible for reason to achieve a partial divorce 
from experience by transforming natural language into abstract 
language. But the consequence of the reworking of natural lan-
guage into the abstract form is twofold. Substantives and adjec-
tives no longer refer to real objects and real qualities, but to 
"fancies," and, further, language has been divested of its ability 
to appeal to the imaginative and emotional life of man. This latter 
consequence is spiritually quite deleterious, since man is conceived 
as a primarily emotional being. Thus, language which is, proper-
ly speaking, the "mother of reason and revelation," may become, 
by virtue of its ability to multiply abstractions inordinately, "the 
center of the misunderstanding of reason with itself." 
It was further found that the concept of the sense-unit as the 
indivisible category of language is everywhere implied in Ha-
mann's verbalistic philosophy, and that the sense-unit, when 
considered objectively, always involves the peculiar symbolism of 
relations and objects, and, when considered subjectively, involves 
the reflective and perceptive processes of the mind in a functional 
union, which Hamann terms "the finest parable of the hypostatic 
union of the sensory and rational natures, of the mutual idiom-
exchange of their powers." Our findings with regard to the 
reality of relations in Hamann's thought add weight to his own 
description of his philosophy as "historical and physical realism," 
if the term "physical" is understood in the Hamannian sense. 
For his assertion of the dependence of the mind upon experience 
for the initial knowledge of the fundamental relations of space 
and time suggests a thoroughgoing and radical empiricism, and 
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also suggests important differences between the Magus and Kant. 
Although the former's assumption of the reality of objects and 
the reality of relations places him in a philosophically difficult 
position, he does not feel the full force of the dilemma because 
of the unsystematic nature of his thought. Whatever the on-
tological status of relations may be, the all-important fact for 
Hamann is that language is the bearer of discrete types of symbols 
which can best be differentiated on the basis of the perceptive and 
reflective processes of the mind or on the basis of objects and 
relations. Since his thought tends to press all reality into the 
mold of immediately intuited objects and relations, the subject 
of the actual status of properties or qualities is ignored. 
From the purely metaphysical standpoint, Hamann's language 
theory cannot logically provide the basis for a monistic view of 
the universe. Indeed, it would suggest rather a pluralistic view. 
For the only rational clue to the nature of reality is furnished by 
the bipolar categories of language, and if the analogy of language 
is followed, every larger real entity would be capable of dissolu-
tion into smaller and smaller entities until indivisible ones were 
reached. This must be so, because every larger unit of language is 
susceptible of dissolution into smaller and smaller units, and this 
process may continue until the categories or elementary sense-
units of language ~1ave been reached. It is true that this unit is 
characterized by an indestructible duality in unity, and, in so far 
as this is true, Hamann's language philosophy provides some ra-
tional basis for a monistic system. But even with the assumption 
of the absolutely bipolar nature of the linguistic categories and 
their correspondents in reality, one would still have to embark 
upon something like the Hegelian dialectic to arrive at a meta-
physical monism. Again an appeal to the nature of language 
makes this plain. Unlike the Kantian categories, the number of 
the categories or sense-units of language, hence of reality, is in-
finite, and the unity of larger, metaphysical wholes cannot be pre-
dicated on the basis of their unity alone. To construct a genuinely 
monistic system on such a basis would involve a procedure quite 
alien to Hamann's basic principles. 
That the categories of language did, however, provide Hamann 
with a basis for a philosophy of unity was the result of his 
religious faith. On the basis of faith, the togetherness of the dis.:. 
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crete components of cognition and of the discrete components of 
reality, symbolized in language, became for him a "parable" of 
the ultimate unity of all reality. Therefore, the togetherness of 
these discrete elements in all meaningful statements is, from the 
metaphysical and theological standpoints, the most important 
unity in experience, and is imparted by the creative act of God, 
not by any human powers. On this subject Hamann could say, 
"To dissect a body and an event into its first elements means to 
desire to detect God's invisible being, his eternal power and God-
head." For Hamann the unity of the world is ultimately a crea-
tional unity. 
It should be recalled that even the linguistic category demands 
faith for its acceptance. For such a unit must always contain 
reference to real objects of immediate experience, and the percep-
tion of objects requires, according to Hamann, faith. Moreover, 
the functional synthesis of the discrete types of symbols in lan-
guage is a fact of experience also, and as such must likewise be 
accepted on the basis of faith. Kant could ignore faith in his 
theory of pure reason only because his transcendentalism seeks 
to transcend or to go beyond experience. But the importance of 
faith in all cognition-which Hamann might establish partly with 
the aid of Hume-still does not lead him beyond the pluralism 
which we have mentioned. For even the successful establishment 
of the categories of language as the categories of thought would 
leave him with the implication of an infinite number of inde-
structible unities and not with one all-embracing unity. Some-
thing more than the faith which supports the categories of lan-
guage is necessary for the acceptance of the unity of all real-
ity. Again it is the transcendent unity of God which provides 
the basis for the belief in the unity of all reality.1 
Further, Hamann's linguistic philosophy does not escape the 
epistemological dualism which is characteristic of much of West-
ern philosophy. Although his thought, as I have understood 
it, requires a reconceiving of both elements in the dualism of mind 
and experience so that the former is characterized by the abili-
ty to reflect and to perceive and the latter by a dichotomy into 
1·elations and objects, they are in the last analysis to be regarded 
as distinct from, and parallel to one another. This makes it dif-
ficult, but not impossible to deal with his thought in terms of the 
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subject-object dualism. The broad distinction between mind and 
experience-whose interrelations are ambiguous- reveals that, 
at least on this score, there is no fundamental difference between 
his epistemology and that of the Cartesians, despite his vigorous 
demurrer. 
Likewise, the synthesis of the discrete functions of the mind and 
the synthesis of objects and relations would appear logically to 
demand an epistemological dualism. For obviously the synthesis 
of the discrete symbols of language is accomplished by the mind, 
and Hamann recognizes this frequently enough to justify Unger's 
speaking of the "inner nature of the speaker" as descriptive of 
this power. Although some of Hamann's terms for this capacity 
such as the "transcendental root" of reflection and perception are 
non-committal, many expressions like "hypostatic union" and 
shekinah attest the religious attitude he adopted toward it and his 
unwillingness to regard it as interior to the mind. Strictly speak-
ing, however, one must consider it as the mental counterpart of 
the togetherness of relations and objects in experience. In such 
a case, it would be the equivalent of the "productive imagination" 
of the German idealists. But we may be sure that Hamann would 
not admit this possibility, for his tendency was to escape the 
dualism implied in his thought by assimilating mind to experi-
ence, a tendency in which he was strengthened by his theocentric 
religious philosophy and by the empiricism of certain British 
thinkers. However, there is reason to believe that Hamann's re-
conceiving of the nature of mind and of experience has certain 
virtues, especially from the standpoint of linguistic philosophy, 
Hence, the theoretical dualism ultimately implied in his episte-
mology does not argue that he has nothing to say in this con-
nection. · 
Hamann's extreme aversion to abstraction made him the un-
wavering leader of the anti-rationalistic foes of the German En-
lightenment in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. This 
hostility became a source of strength not only for him, but also for 
his followers. On the other hand, it caused him to be singularly 
unappreciative of the virtues of more abstract thinkers. Al-
though it is always clear that his strictures were directed 
against scientific philosophy and not against science itself, the 
actual status of science in his thought is thoroughly ambiguous. 
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With the one exception of linguistic science, it must be conceded 
that his attitude toward the scientific spirit in general is hostile. 
The ambitiom:; claims of the pre-Kantian Enlighteners, how-
ever, rt!nder his attitude somewhat more understandable, if not 
defensible. Finally, it should be recognized that he was incon-
sistent in decrying abstraction, while proceeding to construct a 
theory of language which, however it be understood, is essentially 
abstract. 
Hamann failed to take the step which we have found to be 
implied in his verbalistic philosophy, namely, the identification 
of the relational symbols of ordinary language as the archetypes 
of abstractions. But, as I believe to have demonstrated, this iden-
tification is a justifiable deduction from his general principles, 
and it illuminates his specific utterances on the nature of lan-
guage. Such an interpretation reveals in his linguistic philosophy 
a structural coherence which is otherwise hidden. Since it re-
quires an appeal to linguistic facts as normative, it does not set up 
an abstract principle as explanatory of his thought-a proce-
dure which would be in manifest opposition to his spirit. 
Hamann's recurrent feeling of optimism about the language 
theory is evidence, in my opinion, of his vague awareness of a 
possibility at this point. This optimistic feeling, however, al-
ternated with profound pessimism about the same subject. "If 
I were as eloquent as Demosthenes," he wrote to Herder in 1784. 
"I would do no more than repeat one sentence three times: Reason 
is language, Logos. On this marrow-bone I gnaw, and I shall 
gnaw myself to death on it. There still remains darkness upon the 
face of this deep for me; I still wait for an apocalyptic angel 
with a key to this abyss."2 The apocalyptic angel with a key to the 
abyss has not yet appeared, but I believe that it is possible, 
strictly on the basis of Hamann's own general principles and in 
conformity with his spirit, to attain to a better understanding of 
his thought on this important subject. 
Whether or not the outline of Hamann's verbalistic philosophy 
presented in this study may finally prove justified, one thing at 
least appears certain: No account of his philosophy which 
ignores the linking of abstractions with relations and which fails 
to investigate his covert doctrine of relations will be able to do 
full justice to his thought. If in the light of its testing in various 
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areas of Hamann's thought and in the light of a thorough ex-
amination of the published material which will become available 
in the next few years, the present interpretation of Hamann's 
concept of linguistic unity be finally called in question, attention 
has at least been called to the need for a serious consideration 
of the doctrines examined. 
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22. Even the monumental work by Unger, Hamann und die Aufkliirung, is 
based almost exclusively on material published at the time of its writ-
ing. See ibid., I, 17. 
23. Josef Nadler, Johann Georg Hamann: der Zeuge d68 Corpus Mysticum 
( Salzburg, 1949). 
24. See Hamann, I, 442; VI, 151-152. 
25. G. W. F. Hegel, Werke (Complete ed.; Berlin, 1835) XVII, 74. 
26. S!!ren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. 
Swenson (Princeton, 1944), p. 224. Cf. Hamann's remark to Jacobi, 
G, V, 495. 
27. See Gunther Ipsen, Sprachphilosophie der Gegenwart (Berlin, 1930), 
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especially pp. 21 ff. Cf. further Wilbur Marshall Urban, Language and 
Reality ( London, 1939), passim. 
28. Hamann, G, IV, 7. Cf. also Johann Georg Hamann, Schriften J. G. 
Hamanns, ed. Karl Widmaier (Leipzig, 1921), pp. 323-324; Hamann, 
V, 257. Apparently the only extensive research on Hamann now in 
progress in the United States is a study of the Magus' style. T. C. 
Tatman is preparing a dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania 
entitled, "Study of the Language of Hamann before and after 1758." 
See Publications of the Modern Language Association, LXVI, No. 3 
(April, 1951), 250. 
29. Hegel, op. cit., p. 44. 
30. The only work by Hamann available in English at the present time is 
a translation of the Beilage zu Dangeuils Anmerkungen uber die Vor-
teile und Nachteile von Frankreich und GroBJBbrittanien in Ansehung 
des Handels und der ubrigen Quellen von der Macht der Staaten (1756) 
entitled "The Merchant." See Prose Writers of Germany, ed. Frederic 
Hedge (4th ed.; New York, 1856), pp. 121-127. A series of quotations 
from Hamann pertaining to pedagogical theory appear in Karl von 
Raumer, "Johann Georg Hamann," American Journal of Education, XI 
(1859), 247-259. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
1. Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 255. Cf. Unger, "Einfiihrung," Johann Georg 
Hamann: Sibyllinische Blatter des Magus (Jena and Leipzig, 1905), 
p. xvi. 
2. Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 255. 
3. For example, Josef Nadler terms the language theory the "root" of the 
Hamann problem. Die Hamannausgabe, p. 158. 
4. Hegel, op. cit., p. 44. 
5. See Unger, Sprachtheorie, pp. 7, 8 ,9, 20, 255; Hamann und die Auf-
klii,rung, I, 205, 317, 574, 575. Friedrich Burschell flatly states that 
Hegel's principles for the interpretation of Hamann are the correct 
ones. See "Ueber Johann Georg Hamann," Logos, IV (1913), 103. 
6. Metzke, op. cit., p. 1. 
'1. See Theodor Heckel, Johann Georg Hamann: Briefe zur Einfuhrung in 
Leben und Theologie ( Gottingen, 1947), p. 1. 
8. Goethe, Samtliche W erke, XXVI, 224. 
9. Hamann would doubtless feel that there is an element of ironic justice 
in the conclusion of contemporary form-critics that "the recognition of 
the poetic structure in practically all Jesus' sayings" is imperative in 
the criticism of the Gospels. For the form-critics are the direct heirs 
of the mantle of men like Michaelis and Reimarus. See Frederick C. 
Grant, "Form Criticism," An Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. V. Ferm 
(New York, 1945), p. 285. 
10. See Blanke, "Gottessprache und Menschensprache bei Johann Georg 
Hamann," col. 202. 
11. For a study of Michaelis as a Biblical scholar, see my article, "J. D. 
Michaelis: Rational Biblicist," Journal of English and Germanic Phi-
lology, XLIX, No. 2 (April, 1950), 172-181. 
12. Ernst Cassirer, !dee und Gestalt (Berlin, 1921), p. 74. 
13. Hamann, G, V, 51; cf. 16; II, 271-272, 421,432,437,443 ff; VII, 404. 
14. I employ the term "natural language" as opposed to "abstract language" 
despite the fact that Hamann sometimes applied the term "natural 
language" to abstract language, especially when he had in mind the 
analogy between natural religion as the invention of human reason and 
purely rational language as the same. See Hamann, VI, 143. In spite 
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of the ambiguity of the term "natural," it appears to be the best 
available for our purposes, and it is always used in this study in the 
Hamannian sense of nature conceived as unspoiled by the excessive 
intervention of reason, as the "language of nature" about which he 
speaks in the Aesthetica in nuce. See II, 293. 
15. Hamann, IV, 262. For the idea of nature as a "text" or "book" the 
meaning of which is ultimately divine, see: I, 86, 88, 131, 148, 499, 508, 
509; II, 19, 236, 274, 276, 285, 293, 300; IV, 33; VI, 113. 
16. Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen. Quoted by Cassirer, ]dee und Ge-
stalt, p, 30. 
17, W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. James H. Tufts (2d. 
ed., New York, 1923), p. 510. 
18. Hermann Bauke, Die Probleme der Theologie Calvins (Leipzig, 1922), 
pp. 13 ff. 
19, H. Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World (London, 
1937), p. 117. 
20. Blanke, "Gottessprache und Menschensprache bei J. G. Hamann," col. 
202. 
21. See Agathe H. F. Thornton, "The Hebrew Conception of Speech as 
Creative Energy," Hibbert Journal," XLIV, No. 2 (January, 1946), 133. 
22. In the Beilage zu Dangeuils Anmerkungen (1756) Hamann espouses 
ideas typical of the Enlightenment. For a treatment of the place of 
this essay in intellectual history, see Philip Merlan, "Parva Hamann-
iana: Hamann as Spokesman of the Middle Class," Journal of the Hi8-
tory of Ideas, IX, No. 3 (June, 1948), 380-384. 
23. Burschell well expresses this idea, op. cit., p. 101. 
24. Although these words were directed not against the French Academy 
but against the rationalistic Biblical interpreters, they may apply here, 
for Hamann makes no distinction between the language reformers' at-
tempted control of language and the rationalistic reworking of language 
in the interest of philosophy. 
25. See Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 247. 
26. Otto Jespersen says of the dictionaries of the French and Italian Acad-
emies that they were "less descriptions of actual usage than prescrip-
tions for the best usage of words." Language: Its Nature, Develop-
ment, and Origin, p. 25. 
27. From a remark made to Hippe!. See Theodor Gottlieb Hippe!, Biog-
raphic des koniglichen preussischen Geheimenkriegsrats zu Konigsberg 
Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel, ed. Schlichtegroll (Gotha, 1801), pp. 285-
286. 
28. Hamann, VI, 34-35. Hamann was well aware of the comprehensiveness 
of his idea of language. See II, 128. 
29. The large number of works on linguistics in Hamann's private library 
yields some insight into the importance of the subject for him. See Nora 
Imendorffer, Johann Georg Hamann und seine Biicherei (Konigsberg, 
1938), pp. 132 ff. 
30. For a review of Hamann's achievements in foreign language study, see 
Josef Nadler, Die Hamannausgabe, pp. 8-11, 176-177. 
31. It is erroneous to say of Hamann, as one writer does, that "it is with 
words as words (S.'s italics) that his chief concern lies." Nor ,is this 
statement atoned for by the fact that its author recognizes elsewhere 
the profound philosophical and religious implications of Hamann's 
striving with the word. See Ronald Gregor Smith, "The Living and 
Speaking God: A Study of Hamann's Doctrine of 'the Word,'" The 
Hibbert Journal, XLII, No. 3 (April, 1944), 198. 
32. Josef Nadler, Die Hamannausgabe, p. 9. 
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33. Hamann, II, 62; III, 333; VII, 238. 
34. Hamann ascribes this principle to Luther in a letter to his brother in 
1760 in which he relies upon J. A. Bengel for its authenticity. For a 
discussion of Luther as the source of the expression, see Paul Ernst, 
Hamann und Bengel (Konigsberg, 1935), pp. 74-76. 
35. Hamann, G, V, 509; Cf. 22; II, 135; III, 15-16. 
36. Hettner, op. cit., Part III, pp. 182-183. 
37. Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 153. 
38. The term "sense-unit" is borrowed from Jespersen, though he does not 
especially recommend it. As used in this study, however, it is always 
understood as defined in the text. For a discussion of the "sense-unit" 
as a problem for the grammarian, see Otto Jespersen, The Philosophy 
of Grammar (London, 1925), pp. 92-95. 
39. See Hamann II, 135; IV, 193; VI, 25, 365; VII, 6, 9, 216; G, V, 7, 422. 
Hamann acknowledged his debt to Edward Young for these terms, II, 
135; VII, 216. See also line 469 of Young's Night Thoughts. 
40. Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 151. 
41. Walter Lowrie sees in this aspect of Hamann's thought a "Christian 
existentialism." "As an existentialist Hamann laid emphasis upon the 
bodily man, the man of flesh and blood . . . . therefore man's response 
to God must be a response of the whole man, of his passions as well as 
his intellect-faith is love and practical obedience." Lowrie, Johann 
Georg Hamann: An Existentialist, p. 9. If no more is meant by ascrib-
ing existentialism to Hamann than this, one may concur in the ascrip-
tion. But one may not therefore conclude that Hamann always made a 
cult of the paradox. Hamann believed that a clear understanding of the 
structure of language would reveal to what extent the human mind is 
capable of developing a rationale of faith. It would also reveal the 
reason why intellection and emotion may not be separated in the process 
of cognition. 
42. Urban, op. cit., p. 21. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER II 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism (New York, 1927), p. 16. 
2. See Hamann, IV, 146; VI, 183, 301; VII, 414; G, V, 49. 
3. See Metzke, op. cit., p. 53. 
4, There is a discrepancy between the positions of Plato as stated in the 
Cratylus and in the Seventh Epistle. The statement from the latter 
that "no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put in language those 
things which his reason has contemplated," is taken here as generally 
definitive of his real position. See Urban, op. cit., p. 53. 
5. See especially secs. 21, 22 of George Berkeley's A Treatise Concerning 
the Principles of Human Knowledge. 
6. See especially Joseph Stalin, "On Several Problems of Linguistics," The 
Soviet Linguistic Controversy, trans. John V. Murra et al. (New York, 
1951), pp. 86-87. 
7. Although Descartes did not. address himself extensively to this prob-
lem, his thought on the subject is clear from the letter to Mersenne of 
November 20, 1629. 
8. See especially Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook (New York, 
1931), p. 82. 
9. See especially Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New 
York, 1930), p. 16. 
10. That Kant did not deal consciously with the problem of language is 
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part in Kant's philosophy." "Kantianism," Twentieth Century Phi-
losophy (New York, 1943), p. 259. Cf. further the statement that 
Kant's Critique of Pure, Reason "in general suffers throughout from a 
lack of a critical study of language." Urban, op. cit., p. 158. 
John B. Watson, Behaviorism (New York, 1925), p. 191. 
Perhaps the source of this tendency is also to be sought in pragmatism. 
See, for example, C. S. Peirce, The Philosophy of Peirce, ed. Justus 
Buchler (New York, 1940), p. 258. 
Ewing, op. cit., p. 259. 
E.g., Hamann, II, 316. 
See Cassirer, Die Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, I, 73-89. 
E.g., Hamann, II, 262; IV, 193; VII, 6, 9, 216; G, V, 422. 
The transition from the creative divine speech to the speech 
of human beings is a crucial point in Hamann's theory of lan-
guage. Hugo Delff has suggested that the link between the divine and 
human speech is to be found in the idea of imago dei. "Johann Georg 
Hamann," Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Vol. X (1879), 463. 
E.g., Hamann, IV, 23; VI, 34, 170; VII, 12. 
Hamann, (unpublished item from Roth's Nachlass), Quoted by Metzke, 
op. cit., p. 42. 
Hamann, VII, 59. The gulf between God and man can be bridged only 
by drastic action on the part of God. See VII, 41; G, V, 51. 
H. A. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit (Leipzig, 1923), I, 108. Cf. Unger, 
Hamann und die Aufklarung I, 108. 
Josef Nadler, Hamann, Kant, Goethe (Halle/Saale, 1931), p. 6. When 
one is inclined to find mysticism, he finds it in strange places. Thus 
F. J. Schmitz finds common elements of mysticism in Lessing and 
Hamann. The mysticism which these two men have in common requires 
a definition. See F. J. Schmitz, The Problem of Individualism and the 
Crises in the Lives of Lessing and Hamann (Los Angeles, 1944), p. 144. 
Hamann, I, 99. Cf. Metzke, op. cit., pp. 133 ff. 
See John Wright Buckham, "Mysticism," An Encyclopedia of Religion, 
p. 513. Richard E. Benz's likening of Hamann's mysticism to that of 
Johann Sebastian Bach appears to me to be justified. See Sprach- und 
Volkserlebnis bei Hamann und Herder. Sonderdruck aus der wissen-
schaftlichen Festschrift zur 700 J a.hr-Feier der Kreuzschule zu Dresden, 
1926, p. 131. For a discussion of the parallel between Blake and Hamann, 
see Helene Richter, "Blake und Hamann," Archiv fur das Studium der 
neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, CLVIII (1930), 213-221, CLIX 
(1931), 36-45, 195-210. Miss Richter comes to the following suggestive 
conclusion: "Zieht man nun das Fazit aus beider Leben, so mutet Blake 
beinahe wie die Erfiillung von Hamanns Daseinstraum an." Ibid., p. 210. 
Hamann never utilized the speculative mystics as sources for his 
thought. For his opinion of Bohme see I, 539; II, 77; III, 199-200; V. 
179. Kurt Leese is dou)>tless correct when he asserts that Hamann was 
essentially independent of Bohme op. cit., p. 181. Hamann was even less 
sympathetic to Swedenborg. See VII, 179, 348. For representative dis-
cussions of Hamann's mysticism, see, in addition to work cited, Heinrich 
Weber, Hamann und Kant (Munich, 1904), pp. 169 ff.; Unger, Sprach-
theorie, pp. 76 ff., 99 ff., also Hamann und die Aufklarung, I, 160 ff.; 
Wilhelm Liitgert, Die Religion des deutschen Jdealismus und ihr Ende 
Giitersloh, 1923), II, 3-4; Dyrssen, op. cit.; Helmuth Schreiner, Die 
Menschwerdung Gottes in der Theologie Johann Georg Hamanns (Stutt-
gart, 1946), pp. 26 ff.; Josef Nadler, Johann Georg Hamann: der 
Zeuge des Corpus Mysticum, passim. 
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G. W. Leibniz, Principles of Nature and of Grace, par. 5. Quoted by 
Latta, Leibniz, The Monadology, p. 234. 
See Latta's summary of Leibniz's doctrine of innate principles, ibid., 
pp. 233-234. 
Unger, Hamann und die Aufklarung', I, 10. 
Latta, in Leibniz, The Monadology, p. 234. 
See Unger, Ham,a,nn und die Aufklitrung, I, 288 ff. Although acquainted 
with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson before writing the Sokratische Denk-
wiirdigkeiten, Hamann cannot be shown to have been influenced by 
them as by Young, who, however, is not definitive for the genius-con-
cept. It is true that Young's Conjectures on Original Composition ap-
peared in the spring of 1759 and that the Denkwiirdigkeiten was not 
begun until August of that year, but according to Unger there is no 
reason to assume that Hamann had read Young's work before writing 
the essay in question. Ibid. Kind, in spite of his demonstration of the con-
siderable parallelism between Young's thoughts on genius and orginality 
and Hamann's thoughts on the same, does not prove Hamann's depend-
ence upon Young in this matter. He furnishes no evidence that Hamann 
actually read the Conjectures before August, 1759. Therefore, his state-
ment that Hamann "in his views on originality and individualism, owes 
the greater part of his material to Young" must be questfoned. See 
John L. Kind, Edward Young in Germany (New York, 1906), pp. 33-40. 
It is this unusual synthesis of religio-cultural interests that caused 
Hamann to be "wie Shakespeares so auch Luthers erster Prophet im 
modernen Geistesleben." Horst Stephan, "Ein .A;hnherr des modernen 
Christentums," Die Christliche Welt, XVI, No. 36 (September 4, 1902), 
col. 854. 
Hamann's fame as a literary critic is securely established. For spe-
cialized studies of his critical activity, see: Edith Saemann, J. G. 
Hamann und die franziiswche Literatur (Konigsberg, 1931); Walter 
Hilpert, Johann Georg Hamann als Kritiker der deutschen Literatu·r 
(Konigsberg, 1933). American scholarship has stressed this side of 
Hamann. See Robert T. Clark, "Hamann's Opinion of Herder's Ursachen 
des gesunkenen Geschmacks," Modern Language Notes, LXI, No. 2 
(February, 1946), 94-99; Francis Andrew Brown, "Hamann's Opinion 
of Muralt," Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XLVII, No. 1 
(January, 1948), 53-58. 
Minor, op. cit., p. 3. 
Hamann's own procedure exemplifies this principle. Unger gives a list 
of some of the obsolete and obsolescent words which Hamann revived. 
Sprachtheorie, pp. 247-248. 
Occasionally Hamann lapses from this position with reference to the 
adequacy of language to express the feelings. See Hamann, V, 258. 
Delff stresses this aspect of Hamann's thought, op. cit., p. 463. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
1. Metzke, op. cit. p. 126. 
2. A recent investigator of Hamann's theology devotes only five pages 
out of 334 to the problem of reason and language. See E. Jansen Schoon-
hoven, Natur en Genade bij J. G. Hamann (Nijkerk, 1945), pp. 262-266. 
In a review of Lowrie's Johann Georg Hamann: An Existentialist, 
Montgomery Belgion censures the author for his neglect of the lan-
guage problem in the study. See Theology, LIV, No. 376 (October, 1951), 
390. The Danish writer, Tage Schack, martyred by the Germans in 
1945 during their occupation of Denmark, had, however, planned a 
chapter on reason and language in the projected second volume of his 
Hamann-work. See Schack, op. cit., p. 337. 
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3. Metzke, op. cit., pp. 38 ff., 126 ff. 
4. From Three Philosophical Poets. Quoted by J. H. Randall, Jr., in The 
Making of the Modern Mind (rev ed.; Boston, 1940), p. 401. 
5. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London, 1948), p. 94. 
6. See infra, pp. 56-60. 
7. A few abstract terms toward which Hamann adopted a positive attitude 
in connection with his own use of them are: Erfahrung, Evidenz, Ge-
schichte, Glaube, Offenbarung, Natur, Vorsehung, Wahrheit. 
8. Josef Nadler terms Hamann's philosophy nominalistic, Hamann, Kant, 
Goethe, p. 42. 
9. See Russell, op. cit., p. 95. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Metzke, op. cit., p. 54. 
12. Ida Axelrod, "Johann Georg Hamanns Weltanschauung in ihrer mys-
tischen Entwicklung," Euphorion (1904), p. 437. 
13. Hamann, VII, 10. Cf. VI, 49. 
14. W. R. Inge, "Plotinus," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. VIII (1941), 
82. 
15. Thus, whereas Metzke devotes several pages to Hamann's doctrine of 
time, he fails to do the same for space. To be sure, his whole thesis is 
designed to show that the Magus broke through the prevailing "thing-
categories" of his time to categories of personal relationships. Metzke 
does not deal directly with the subject for the simple reason that 
Hamann does not. 
16. Hamann, Neue Hamanniana, p. 116. 
17. Metzke, op. cit., p. 55. 
18. Metzke, op. cit., pp. 64-57. 
19. Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, Schriften, ed. Moritz Brasch (Leipzig, 
1880), Part II, p. 419. 
20. Erwin Metzke, who was kind enough to read the present study in 
manuscript form, has written me as follows: "lch finde 1hr Aus-
gehen von der Frage einer Ueberwindung des Subjekt-Objekt-Schemas 
sehr fruchtbar. Auch die Art wie Sie das Sprachproblem in den Mittel-
punkt riicken, scheint mir sehr geeignet zu sein, um Hamann positiv zu 
beleuchten." (Letter, August 9, 1951). 
21. Blanke, Gottessprache und Menschensprache bei J. G. Hamann, col. 205. 
22. Unger, Hamann und die Aufklarung, I, 274. 
23. Emil Brunner, God and Man (London, 1936), p. 48. 
24. Hamann, G, V, 49. The only difference Hamann saw between Spinoza 
and Kant in this regard is revealed in the declaration that "Spinoza 
redet von einem Objekt causa sui und Kant von einem Subjekt causa 
sui." G, V, 406. 
25. See Russell, op. cit., p. 95. For a discussion of the metaphysical monist's 
inability to cope with the problem of relations, see Russell, Philosopny 
(New York, 1927), pp. 250 ff. 
26. Rene Descartes, The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes, 
trans. and ed. John Veitch (New York, [n.d.] ), p. 171. 
27. Hamann, G, V, 81, 476-477. 
28. As in the case of F. H. Bradley. See Appearance and Reality (London, 
1920), passim. 
29. See Fritz Thoms, Hamanns Bekehrung (Giitersloh, 1933), pp. 103-129. 
30. Ibid., p. 129. 
31. Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 85. 
32. See Ernst Cassirer, "Rationalism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 
XVIII (1941), 992. 
33. According to Kant, the "conception of the noumenon" is "connected 
with the limitation of sensibility." Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
J. M. D. Meiklejohn (London, 1855), p. 187. Of this Kantian doctrine 
Hamann complained: "Leider gibt es keine Objekte mehr, sondern lauter 
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H.'s italics. G, V, 506; cf. 492-493. Cf. Merlan, "From Hume to Hamann." 
Cf. John, 6:9 ff. 
Jespersen, The Philosophy of Gramma1·, p. 33. Linguistic symbols of 
this type vary from language to language, but are always present in 
one form or another. For a systematic classification of them, see Her-
mann Paul, Principles of the History of Language, trans. H. A. Strong 
(new and rev. ed.; London, 1891), pp, 111-112. Relations between words 
sometimes act as symbols. The fact that word-relations may be utilized 
to represent non-verbal relations may not be construed to mean that 
such a linguistic device is any less symbolic than either a word which 
stands for a relation or for a concrete entity. It is the inevitable 
symbolic nature of all linguistic signs which Hamann's theory requires. 
For a discussion of this problem, see Bertrand Russell, Philosophy, pp. 
264 ff., and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Politicus trans. C. K. 
Ogden (London, 1922). 
For prepositions as indicating relations, see Russell, The Problems of 
Philosophy, pp. 319-141, 149. It is assumed that all other "empty words" 
or syntactical devices of natural language refer to relations of space 
or time. I have confined myself to such symbols in the interest of 
simplicity and clarity. Other classes of words such as verbs might 
be used as examples of relational symbolism. 
One writer illustrates the confusion that results, when the connective 
words characteristic of English are omitted from a given statement. 
He strikes the connective words out of the first sentence of the Declara-
tion of Independence and compares 'his version with the original. The 
difference between the two versions is illuminating, but he still retains 
the characteristic English word-order, which is in itself one of the most 
important connective devices in that language. It would be necessary 
to eliminate entirely the characteristic sequence of words in English 
to note clearly the chaos which results from abstracting all connective 
devices. James C. Fernald, Connectives of English Speech (New York, 
1904), pp. vii-viii. 
Unger, Spraclitheorie, pp. 143-144. 
Ibid., pp. 67, 71 f., 80, 143, 144. 
Ibid., p. 150. 
Sapir discusses the transformation of relational words into other parts 
of speech in Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech (New 
York, 1921), p. 125. 
There is one reference connecting the philosophic "custom of trans-
forming every idea as well as bodily object into a person" with a distinc-
tion between parts of speech, but his meaning is quite obscure. Hamann, 
G, V, 683. 
Although the approach and emphases of modern language philosophers 
vary, they all concur in their judgment as to the relevance of meaning. 
At least this much thinkers like Erdmann, Ogd::m, Richards, Carnap, 
Morris, Russell, Whitehead, Cassirer, and Urban have in common. 
By "semantics" Jespersen meant simply the problem of meaning, and 
had no reference to a positivistic school of linguistic philosophy. The 
term "semantics" denoting the science of word meaning derives from 
Michel Breal (1832-1912). See his Essai de Semantique: Science des 
Significations (3rd.; Paris, 1904), p. 8. 
Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, p. 35. 
Hamann, II, 210. The Magus' keen insight into the evolution of his-
torical vernaculars is well attested by his recognition that the Greek 
dialect of Palestine, and particularly Galilee, represented an environ-
mentally-conditioned variation of Attic Greek. In this connection, he 
compared the fate of the French language in London and Berlin to the 
fate of the Greek language in Palestine. Written at a time when the 
controversy over the relation of the Septuagint and New Testament 
Greek to the classical language was still far from settlement ( 1759), 
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this opm1on provides an interesting incunabulum in the history of 
Biblical criticism. 
48. See Joseph Nadler, Die Ham.annausgabe, pp. 91 ff. Hamann is also 
an important source of the romantic idea of the unity of the arts. Josef 
Miiller-Blattau says in this connection: "Der Kerngedanke Hamanns 
von der Urverbundenheit von Wort und Ton hatte sich im Volkslied 
musikalisch ausgewirkt, der Kerngedanke von der Zusammengehorig-
keit der Kiinste, von Sprache, Musik und Gebarde hatte zur Schaffung 
der ldee des Musikdramas als eines Gesamtkunstwerkes gefiihrt." 
Hamann und Herder in ihren Beziehungen zur Musik (Konigsberg, 
1931), pp. 26-27. The great importance of Hamann's theory of language 
for musical practice and theory in general is also stressed: "Die eigent-
liche und tiefste Einwirkung Hamanns und Herders in die Zeit hinein 
liegt in der Pragung bestimmter grosser Leitgedanken der Erneurerung 
von Musikiibung und Musikauffassung. Ihre Wurzeln sind Hamanns Ge-
danken uber Sprache und Wort." (my italics) Ibid., p. 19. See also 
Alfred R. Neumann, "The Evolution of the Concept Gesamtkunstwerk 
in German Romanticism." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Depart-
ment of German, University of Michigan, 1951), p. 97. 
49. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Goethes Gespriiche, ed. F. W. von Bieder-
mann (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1909), I, 43. 
50. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Goethes Gespriiche mit Eckermann, 
ed. F. Deibel (Leipzig, 1908), II, 94. 
51. The importance of Hamann's doctrine of creation is stressed by Fritz 
Blanke in his J. G. Hamann als Theologe (Tiibingen, 1928), pp. 8 ff. 
52. For interesting discussions of Herder's theory, see Steinthal, op. cit., 
pp. 27-41; Jespersen, Language, pp. 26-29. 
53. For Hamann's theory, see Steinthal, op. cit., yp. 42-59; Unger, Sprach-
theorie pp. 155-187; Blanke, Gottessprache und Menschensprache bei 
J. G. Hamann, cols. 206-207; Josef Nadler, Johann Georg Hamann: 
der Zeuge des Corpus Mysticum, pp. 199 ff. 
54. According to Jespersen, Language, p. 28, Herder conceived of mind 
as an "unanalysable" entity. 
55. Delfi', op. cit., p. 463. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
1. (Unpublished item from Roth's N achlass). Quoted by Metzke, op. cit., 
p. 42. 
2. "Johann Georg Hamann," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XI (1941), 
p. 115. Hamann is not the only philosopher opposed to abstract termi-
nology. Students of American philosophy will be interested in Emerson's 
parallel opinion of the Hegelian nomenclature. See Henry A. Poch~ 
mann, New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism 
(Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 55 ff. 
3. See Hamann, III, 253; IV, 301; VI, 35. 
4. See Hamann, VII, 35, 125; G, V, 513. 
5. Hamann was undoubtedly influenced by the general hostility to Spinoza 
prevalent in the eighteenth century. For a description of the prevailing 
attitude, see Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New 
York, 1945), p. 569. Oddly enough, however, one writer has charged 
Hamann with Spinozism, Steinthal, op. cit., p. 59. 
6. Windelband, op. cit., p. 510. 
7. Martin Luther, Werke (complete ed.; Weimar, Bohlau, 1883), I, 226. 
8. "Hamann und Lessing," Zeitschrift fiir systematische Theologie, p. 
188. Josef Nadler calls Hamann in one of his most recent works "einer 
der gerechtesten Beurteiler Lessings." Geschichte der deutschen Litera-
tur (Vienna, 1951), p. 217. 
9. See Blanke, "Hamann und Lessing," pp. 190 ff. 
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10. See G. E. Lessing, Samtliche Schriften, eds. Karl Lachmann and Franz 
Muncker (Leipzig, 1897), XIII, 416. 
11. Hamann, VI, 128. But Hamann was not without appreciation for 
Lessing's pioneering spirit. See VII, 239. 
12. Consider the attitude of the two men toward Gottsched as expressed in 
Lessing's seventeenth Literaturbrief and in H .. mann's Versuch uber eine 
akademische Frage, II, 124. 
13. Hamann's most important encounter with W olffiannism was the variety 
represented by J. D. Michaelis and Moses Mendelssohn. The latter's 
inclination to equate the special revelation of the Old Testament with 
natural religion was anathema to Hamann. See VII, 17-70. 
14. For Hamann's relation to Luther, see Fritz Blanke, "Hamann und 
Luther," Luther-J ahrbuch, X ( 1923), 28-55. 
15. According to Matthijs Jolles, the basic idea of Lessing's fragmentary 
youthful poem, "Die Religion," is that religion in itself is neither good 
nor evil; the use to which it is put is decisive. Like fire it may be 
destructive or constructive. Presumably reason or "clear thinking" is 
the criterion by which religion is judged and guided. Here, as in the 
Education of the Hw1rwn Race, reason is the last court of appeal. 
"Das religiose Jugendbekenntnis Lessings," Deutsche Beitrage (Chica-
go, 1947), p. 117. 
16. Thus Leibniz: "Always in every true affirmative proposition, whether 
necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of the pre-
dicate is in some way comprehended in that of the subject, praedictum 
inest subjecto; otherwise, I know not what truth is." Lettre au Prince 
Ernst (1686). For the connection of this principle with "sufficient 
reason," see Leibniz, op. cit., pp. 60 ff. For Hamann's attitude toward 
the latter, see III, 85, 86; VI, 284; G, V, 49. 
17. See Lessing, op. cit., p. 433. 
18. Cf. the statement of Matthijs Jolles on the same subject. "Lessing's 
Conception of History," Modern Philology, XLIII, No. 3 (February, 
1946), 188. 
19. Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon (New York), p. 101. 
20. Lessing, op. cit., p. 5. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Blanke, "Hamann und Lessing," Zeitschrift fur s11stematische Tkeologie, 
p. 191. 
23. Heinrich Weber has devoted a long treatise to the relationship oi 
these two men. Though excellent for the details of their personal rela-
tionship, it fails to deal adequately with their theoretical differences. 
See Heinrich Weber, op. cit. See also the review of this work, 
Wilhelm Liitgert, "Hamann und Kant," Kantstudien, XI (1906), 118-
125. Other excellent studies of the relationship of Hamann and Kant 
are to be found in Metzke, op. cit., pp. 43-47, 142-144, and in Nadler, 
Johann Georg Hamann: der Zeuge des Corpus Mysticum, pp. 95-100, 
224-225, 315-318, 348-354. 
24. Heinrich Weber, Hamann und Kant, pp. 23 ff. This venture certainly 
constitutes a curious episode in the life of Kant. See also Hamann, 
I, 408,409. 
25. See Heinrich Weber, op. cit., pp. 35 ff.; Hamann, II, 443 ff. 
26. See Karl Rosenkranz, Geschichte der Kantschen Philosophie (Leipzig, 
1840), pp. 109-110. 
27. Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 230. Cf. Heinrich Weber, op. cit., p. 226. 
Only on the basis of this low estimate of Hamann's critique of Kant 
could it be possible for an eminent scholar to write over one thousand 
pages on Kant's philosophy without once mentioning Hamann! See 
Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. (Glasgow, 
1909), 2 Vols. 
28. See Blanke, J. G. Hamann als Theologe, pp. 13-14. 
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29. See Josef Nadler, Hamann, Kant, Goethe, pp. 42-43. 
30. Metzke characterizes the Metakritik as "the most concentrated attack 
against Kant which has ever been written." Metzke, op. cit., p. 44. 
31. Metzke's work, already cited, received this award. 
32. Goethe, The Autobiography of Goethe, I, 447. 
33. Russell, The Scientific Outlook, op. cit., p. 82. 
34. See Gervinus, op. cit., p. 488 
35. Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 150. 
36. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York, 
1931), p. 26. 
37. Kant, op. cit., p. xx. 
38. For a discussion of the generally slow reaction to Kant's Critique, see 
M. Kronenberg, Kant: sein Leben und seine Lehre (6th ed.; Munich, 
1922), pp. 55 ff. 
39. Mendelssohn, op. cit., Part I, p. 299. 
40. Ibid., p. 300. 
41. Harald Hoffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, trans. B. E. Meyer 
(London, 1935), II, 11. 
42. Metzke, op. cit., p. 43. 
43. Kant, op. cit., p. xx 
44. See Heinrich Weber, op. cit., p. 201. See also Hamann, VII, 6. 
45. Hamann, VII, 8. Blanke concurs in Hamann's opinion of Kant regarding 
this point. See J. G. Hamann als Theologe, pp. 13-14. Likewise Cassirer, 
"Goethe and the Kantian Philosophy,'' Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, trans. 
James Gutmann et al. (Princeton, 1947), p. 62. 
46. Consider the statement of Cassirer in his comparison of Goethe and 
Kant: "Goethe does not think like Kant in terms of mere relations; 
he can only think in intuitive forms." "Goethe and Kantian Philosophy," 
Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, p. 92. 
47. Kant, op. cit., p. 35. 
48. Hamann, G, V, 513. Cf. 109; VII, 216. 
49. See Hamann, VI, 49-50; VII, 7-10; G, V, 16, 21-22, 505, 513, 515, 686, 
et passim. 
50. Blanke, Hamann als Theologe, p. 6. 
51. See Unger, Sprachtheorie, p. 214. 
52. Hegel, op. cit., p. 83. 
53. For a treatment of what Metzke calls "das Geheimnisvolle der Wirklich-
keit" in Hamann's thought, see Metzke, op. cit., pp. 47 ff. 
54. See Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason (London, 1918), p. 77. 
55. Hamann, G, V, 494. Cf. 195, 199. 
56. Cf. the opinion of Fritz Mauthner, op. cit., p. xv. 
57. It is illuminating to compare Hamann's appeal to ordinary language 
for a demonstration of the irreducibles of cognition to a similar effort 
by the contemporary language philosopher, Richard Albert Wilson, 
op. cit., pp. 220 ff. Like Hamann, this thinker considers the problem 
of language meaningless apart from theological presuppositions. To be 
sure, his emergent evolutionism is quite distinct from Hamann's super-
naturalism, but both are essentially theological principles. 
58. Karl Barth speaks of the fertilizing effect of the "irregu,1are Dog-
matiker" like Hamann upon Christian theology. Kirchliche Dogmatik 
(Munich, 1932), I, Part I, 294. 
59. See Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Age8' (New 
York, 1938), pp. 8 ff. Tertullian's attitude toward the classical culture 
of Greece and Rome is not shared by Hamann. For in Hamann's view 
Athens has indeed a great deal to do with Jerusalem, and the Academy 
with the church. See Hamann, II, 42. Although it is possible to cite pas-
sages by Hamann decrying the excessive worship of classical antiquity, 
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on the whole he adopted a positive attitude toward it. See Josef Nadler, 
Johann Georg Hamann: der Zeuge des Corpus Mysticum, p. 21. 
60. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 38 ff. 
61. Hamann was no Barthian. For him there is no discontinuity between 
nature and grace. See especially, Hamann, I, 54-55. 
62. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 595, 
NOTES TO CHAPTER V 
1. As a believing Lutheran, Hamann was a trinitarian. His writings are 
replete with evidence that God was real for him as Father, Son, and Holy 
spirit. This poses, to be sure, the classic Christian problem of accepting 
at once the unity of the Godhead and its diversity as a Triune Person. 
Hamann tended to find the uniting element of the Godhead in the divine 
humility (Demut) especially in the Kleeblatt hellenistischer Briefe, but 
did not dwell upon this. See Hamann, II, 207. Nadler in Iiis excellent, 
though perhaps too mystical, interpretation of Hamann emphasizes 
the latter's trinitarianism and the influence of Philo and the church 
fathers on his philosophy of religion. See Johann Georg Hamann: dJer 
Zeuge des Corpus Mysticum, 21 ff. et passim. 
2. Hamann, VII, 151-152. Cf. VI, 365, 370 ff.; G, V, 406. 
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